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The Republic of Korea has been experiencing rapid, and more importantly, sus-
tained economic growth since the 1960s. This has resulted in its real GDP per
capita increasing rapidly enabling the once low-income country to join the ranks
of high-income industrialized nations within a short time span of four and a half
decades. Moreover, the majority of this growth can be attributed to knowledge
accumulation, rather than to the accumulation of traditional factors of produc-
tion of capital and labor. Korea had achieved this knowledge-based growth by
investing heavily in education and training, boosting innovation through inten-
sive research and development, and developing a modern and accessible infor-
mation infrastructure, all coupled with a stable economic and conducive
institutional regime that enabled the knowledge-related investments to flourish.
Due to this, Korea has ably made its transition to a knowledge economy, that is,
an economy that uses knowledge as the key engine of growth. Its successful
knowledge-based development experience offers many valuable lessons for
developing economies.
Korea as a Knowledge Economy: Evolutionary Process and Lesson Learned has
been jointly produced by the Korea Development Institute and the Knowledge
for Development (K4D) Program of the World Bank Institute. It is a follow-up to
the joint World Bank Institute-OECD report on Korea and the Knowledge-Based
Economy: Making the Transition (2000) that was produced at the request of the
Government of Korea. This first report, which targeted Korean policy makers in
the main, looked at the Korean economy just after the 1997 financial crisis. It
focused on providing knowledge-economy related policy recommendations to
overcome the crisis and to prevent the reoccurrence of a similar economic
downturn. 
In contrast, this new report on Korea is geared towards policy makers from
developing countries that are in the midst of, or are intending to, embark on the
transition towards the knowledge economy. It provides pragmatic policy les-
sons drawn from Korea’s forty-five years of knowledge-based growth. This
report not only looks at the current policies and challenges of today’s high-
income Korea, but also reviews its historical economic development since the
1960s when Korea was still a low income country. It follows Korea through the
v
decades as it undertook an array of knowledge strategies that propelled it
through the various income levels. The report therefore provides compelling
policy lessons that are relevant for developing countries at different stages of
economic development.
Jung Taik Hyun Frannie Léautier
President Vice President and Head
Korea Development Institute World Bank Institute
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Derek H. C. Chen and Joonghae Suh
The Knowledge Economy Framework
The Knowledge Revolution and Global Competition 
Over the past quarter-century, the global rate of knowledge creation and dissemi-
nation has increased significantly. One reason is that the rapid advances in infor-
mation and communications technologies (ICTs) have considerably decreased the
costs of computing power and electronic networking. With the increased afford-
ability, the use of computing power and electronic networking has surged, along
with the efficient dissemination of existing knowledge. Modern ICTs also enable
researchers in different locations to work together, which consequently enhances
researchers’ productivity, resulting in rapid advances in research and development
and the generation of new knowledge and technologies. One indicator of the cre-
ation of new knowledge and technologies is the number of patents granted by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) each year. Figure 1.1 shows
that the total number of patents granted by the USPTO increased from 71,114 in
1981 to 157,747 in 2005. The share of patents granted to inventors outside the United
States also grew, from 39 percent in 1981 to 48 percent in 2005. The increased rate of
creation of new knowledge and technologies thus reflects a recent global trend.
The increased speed in the creation and dissemination of knowledge has led to
the rapid spread of modern and efficient production techniques, plus the increased
probability of leapfrogging, which has consequently resulted in the world economy
becoming much more competitive. The share of world trade (exports and imports)
in world gross domestic product (GDP), which is an indicator of globalization and
competition in the global economy, increased from 24 percent in 1960 to 47 percent
in 2003 (figure 1.2). International trade increases the number of consumers and pro-
ducers participating in the market and hence increases the level of competition.
Thus, the knowledge revolution, together with increased globalization, presents
significant opportunities for promoting economic and social development. How-
1
ever, countries also face the very real risk of falling behind if they are not able to
keep up with the rapid pace of change.
In addition to the increased level of competition, the nature of competition also
has been changing. Competition was once based on just cost; now it has evolved
so that speed and innovation are also essential. Commodity production is usually
allocated to the lowest-cost producers, but intense competition resulting from
globalization tends to drive profits on commodity production to nearly zero. As
such, it has become crucial to derive additional value added by using various
means to differentiate products, including innovative design, effective marketing,
efficient distribution, and reputable brand names. Thus, for industry to prosper, it
must be able to contribute productively to global value chains and generate new
value chains, of which the key part is not necessarily production but innovation
and high-value services.
In light of this, sustained economic growth in the era of this new world economy
depends on developing successful strategies that involve the sustained use and cre-
ation of knowledge at the core of the development process. At lower levels of devel-
opment, which typically imply lower levels of science and technological capability,
knowledge strategies typically involve tapping existing global knowledge and
2 Korea as a Knowledge Economy
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The knowledge revolution, together with increased globalization, presents significant
opportunities for promoting economic and social development as well as increased risk
of falling behind if countries are not able to keep up with the pace of rapid change.
adapting foreign technologies to local conditions to enhance domestic productivity.
At higher levels of development, which typically imply higher levels of science and
technological capability, knowledge strategies also hinge on domestic innovation
and underlie the move to produce products and services that are higher value
added to be consistent with the high wages that are characteristic of these
economies.
The Knowledge Economy
A knowledge economy is one that uses knowledge as the key engine of economic
growth. It is an economy in which knowledge is acquired, created, disseminated,
and used effectively to enhance economic development. Contrary to some beliefs,
the concept of the knowledge economy does not necessarily revolve around high
technology or information technology (IT). For example, the application of new
techniques to subsistence farming can increase yields significantly, or the use of
modern logistical services can enable traditional craft sectors to serve broader mar-
kets than before. The successful transition to a knowledge economy typically
Introduction      3
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Sustained economic growth in the new world economy depends on developing suc-
cessful strategies that involve the sustained use and creation of knowledge at the core of
the development process.
involves elements such as making long-term investments in education, developing
innovation capability, modernizing the information infrastructure, and having an
economic environment conducive to market transactions. The World Bank has
termed these elements the pillars of the knowledge economy (KE), and together
they constitute the knowledge economy framework.
Specifically, the four pillars of the KE framework are
• an economic incentive and institutional regime that provides good economic
policies and institutions, which promote efficient allocation of resources and
stimulate creativity and incentives for the efficient creation, dissemination,
and use of existing knowledge;
• an educated and skilled labor force that continuously upgrades and adapts
skills to efficiently create and use knowledge;
• an effective innovation system of firms, research centers, universities, con-
sultants, and other organizations that keeps up with the knowledge revolu-
tion, taps into the growing stock of global knowledge, and assimilates and
adapts new knowledge to local needs; and
• a modern and adequate information infrastructure that facilitates the effec-
tive communication, dissemination, and processing of information and
knowledge.
The KE framework thus asserts that investments and interactions among these
four pillars are necessary for the sustained creation, adoption, adaptation, and use
of knowledge in domestic economic production. The result will be goods and serv-
ices with higher value added, which increases the probability of economic success
in the current highly competitive and globalized world economy.1
The Korean Context
Rapid Economic Growth and Structural Transformation
Korea has experienced rapid and sustained economic growth over the past four
decades. In the aftermath of World War II, Korea’s GDP per capita was comparable
to levels in the poorer countries in Africa (figure 1.3). Then the Korean War, from
1950 to 1953, made conditions even worse; the Republic of Korea was considered by
many to be a hopeless case after four years of mass destruction. However, 45 years
after the full-scale, government-led industrialization drive that started in the early
1960s, Korea’s GDP per capita has increased more than 12-fold, to more than
US$13,000, which is on par with the medium economies of the European Union
(figure 1.4).
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1. Chen and Dahlman (2004) provide a brief literature review on the contribution of each
of the four KE pillars to economic growth. In addition, using various indicators as proxies for
the four pillars, they also found econometric evidence showing that the four pillars exert sig-
nificant positive effects on long-term economic growth.
Figure 1.5 presents the decomposition of the Republic of Korea’s economic
growth over the past four decades and clearly highlights the contribution of knowl-
edge, represented here by total factor productivity (TFP), to Korea’s economic mir-
acle. It shows that about 75 percent of the increase in real GDP per capita from 1960
to 2005 is attributed to TFP growth. By comparison, Mexico’s GDP per capita in
1960 was about 2.5 times larger than that of Korea; however, by 2005, Korea’s GDP
per capita was more than twice Mexico’s. Without the contribution of knowledge,
Korea’s real GDP per capita in 2005 would still be below that of Mexico. It is this
rapid and sustained knowledge-based economic growth that makes the Korean
case particularly interesting to analyze. In addition, its journey toward the knowl-
edge economy offers valuable policy lessons for other developing economies that
are seeking to make that transition.
Introduction      5
Despite dire initial conditions, South Korea has experienced rapid and sustained eco-
nomic growth since the 1960s, resulting in GDP per capita increasing more than 12-fold.
This is almost a unique occurrence on the world stage in the 20th century.
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Source: Authors’ construction based on data from the World Bank SIMA database 2007.
The accumulation of knowledge was the main contributor to Korea’s long-term eco-
nomic growth.
6 Korea as a Knowledge Economy
Figure 1.4 The Growth Path of the Korean Economy
7 Five-Year Economic
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The Korean Development Strategy
The Catch-Up Period: 1950–97
The Republic of Korea’s rapid and sustained economic growth from the time when
it was starting out as a low-income country was an outcome of the knowledge econ-
omy approach, even though an explicit knowledge economy development strategy
was not laid out. During this time, from 1950 to 1997, Korea’s economic develop-
ment hinged on the critical interactions among the four pillars of the knowledge
economy, which have evolved with the various stages of economic development. In
particular, the pragmatic development strategies focused on achieving sustained
productivity growth by consistently increasing the value added of output. These
strategies involved intensive learning processes consisting of active technological
capability building and complementary human resources development. At the
same time, the Korean government assumed the very necessary proactive leader-
ship role of supporting the market and providing an environment that would fos-
ter and sustain the transformation.
In the 1960s, Korea embarked on the promotion of both export- and import-sub-
stitution industries, starting with subsistence agriculture (rice) and labor-intensive
light manufacturing sectors (textiles and bicycles). Considerable capital accumula-
tion and investment in primary education during this period allowed a gradual
shift up the value added chain toward more sophisticated commodities. Key to this
shift was also the use of technologies obtained through foreign licensing and
adapted for domestic production.
In the mid-1970s, the government’s use of a well-targeted industrial policy
resulted in a major shift to the development of heavy industries (for example, chem-
icals, shipbuilding). Along with industrial targeting, policies were enacted to fur-
ther improve technological capabilities, together with improving access to and
quality of technical and vocational training. 
In the 1980s, Korea undertook efforts to ensure a market-conducive environment
by deregulating various sectors and liberalizing trade. Concurrently, it expanded
higher education while investing in indigenous research and development through
the establishment of the National Research and Development Program.
Korea continued to pursue high-value-added manufacturing in the 1990s by
promoting indigenous high-technology innovation. Domestic wage hikes and the
appreciation of the Korean won had resulted in chronic current account deficits,
which sparked a series of reforms, including the reform of the financial market.
Together with the setting up of a modern and accessible information infrastructure,
there was continued expansion of research and development capabilities in Korean
industries, which drew on the skilled labor force that had resulted from the gov-
ernment’s aggressive expansion of the higher education system.
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The economic development of Korea hinged on critical interactions among the four pil-
lars of the knowledge economy.
The 1997 Economic Crisis and Economy-Wide Reforms
The Korean model of development had been very successful in propelling eco-
nomic growth for nearly four decades, but it did have some limitations. The mech-
anism of resource allocation by which the government wielded discretionary power
over the market had been effective when the economy was burgeoning. However,
it approached its limits as the economy developed and became larger and more
complex. The financial crisis of 1997 manifested the limitations of discretionary
resource allocation and underscored the urgent need for widespread economic
reform. The old policy framework and institutions that had led Korea in the early
high-growth era turned out to be bottlenecks for sustained economic growth in the
new economic environment (see figure 1.6). 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, policy efforts were made to transform the
Korean economy into a knowledge-based one in which innovation can thrive,
enhancing overall productivity and thereby sustaining economic growth. The
implementation of Korea’s new growth strategy, transforming it into an advanced
knowledge economy, was based on the KE four pillars: a conducive macroeconomic
framework, a modern information infrastructure, human resource development,
and an effective innovation system. Korea’s efforts to make the transition to an
advanced knowledge economy have been assessed to be very successful. 
8 Korea as a Knowledge Economy
The central theme of this report depicts the evolution of Korea’s economic history
through crucial interactions among the knowledge pillars, demonstrating the relevance
of the knowledge economy approach to developed as well as developing and low-
income countries.
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Many factors have enabled Korea’s rapid change. The development strategy for
the knowledge economy that the government initiated during the reform period of
the economic crisis received proactive responses from both the people and private
enterprise. The nationwide concerted effort achieved successful results. Structural
restructuring caused the unemployment rate to increase sharply for the short
period, but afterward the economy returned to its normal growth path and employ-
ment became stabilized when the reform efforts had brought substantive results.
Despite the boom and bust of the venture business, the venture industry policy, one
of the strategic policy areas in Korea’s KE strategy, has contributed to the growth of
technology-based firms and boosted the crisis-ridden economy. Today’s Korea is
facing challenges, many of which are different from those in crisis years: for exam-
ple, a rapidly aging society raises different socioeconomic problems and people are
more concerned about welfare than growth. But the fundamental principles and
strategies have not changed, and the KE framework offers very valuable guidance.
In this respect, Korea’s KE strategy is not complete, but still moves forward. There
is much room for further improvement if Korea aims to be a highly advanced
knowledge economy.
Korea as a Knowledge Economy
Figure 1.7 illustrates Korea’s performance in terms of the knowledge economy
according to the basic scorecard of the Knowledge Assessment Methodology
(KAM). The KAM2 is a tool developed by the World Bank that assists comparisons
across countries in terms of their advancement toward the knowledge economy.
Comparisons within the KAM are performed on the basis of the 81 variables for the
132 countries included in the database. The basic scorecard of the KAM includes 2
performance indicators (GDP growth and the Human Development Index) and 12
preselected, widely used knowledge indicators, with 3 indicators representing each
pillar of the knowledge economy. Because the indicators take on different ranges of
possible values, all variables within the KAM are normalized onto an ordinal scale
of 0 to 10, with 0 being the weakest and 10 being the strongest. 
It can be seen in figure 1.7 that Korea’s performance in terms of the basic score-
card knowledge indicators is strong and relatively well rounded, with all but one of
the indicators ranking above the 50th percentile and a number of them in the 80th
percentile or higher. This was true in 1995 as well as the most recent year, typically
2005. A well-rounded basic scorecard is important because it denotes balanced
development across the four KE pillars, which in turn tends to indicate that the pil-
lars are in a position to complement and reinforce one another to spur technologi-
cal progress and economic growth. Although Korea has improved on most of the
variables since 1995, it has lost ground in terms of the economic and institutional
regime variables, namely, tariff and nontariff barriers and the rule of law, and the
education variable, secondary enrollment ratio. 
Figure 1.8 compares Korea with the average of the G-7 countries and the aver-
age of countries in the high-income category in terms of the KAM basic scorecard.
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2. Further details of the KAM are presented in appendix 1.1.
Korea is at par or almost at par with the terms of the innovation and information
infrastructure pillars. However, Korea is relatively weaker in terms of the economic
and institutional regime and the education pillars, indicating that Korea still has
room for improvement in these areas. However, it is noteworthy that in terms of
gross tertiary enrollment, Korea outperforms the average G-7 and high-income
country. Later in the report, it will be elaborated on that having highly skilled
human resources is particularly important for facilitating domestic innovation or
research and development.
Figure 1.9 shows Korea’s performance in the KAM Knowledge Economy Index
(KEI) relative to other countries. The KEI is an aggregate index that represents the
overall level of development of a country or region in the knowledge economy. It
10 Korea as a Knowledge Economy
Figure 1.7 The KAM Basic Scorecard, Rep. of Korea, 1995 and Most Recent Yeara
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Korea, Rep. of Korea, Rep. of
(most recent) (1995)
Variable Actual Normalized Actual Normalized
Annual GDP growth (%) 4.5 5.9 7.1 8.9
Human development index 0.9 8.0 0.9 7.6
Tariff and nontariff barriers 3.5 2.6 3.5 5.0
Regulatory quality 0.8 7.1 0.6 6.9
Rule of law 0.7 7.5 0.8 7.7
Researchers in R&D/million people 3,187.0 8.1 2,189.9 7.1
Scientific and technical journal articles/
million people 287.6 7.9 84.4 7.2
Patents granted by USPTO/million people 88.4 8.9 29.2 8.5
Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above) 97.9 6.6 97.0 6.5
Gross secondary enrollment 90.9 6.2 100.9 8.5
Gross tertiary enrollment 88.5 9.8 52.0 9.4
Total telephones per 1,000 people 1,302.8 8.1 448.9 8.0
Computers per 1,000 people 544.9 8.7 107.7 8.1
Internet users per 1,000 people 656.8 9.6 8.1 7.9
Source: KAM, December 2006 (www.worldbank.org/wbi/kam).
a. The most recent year ranges from 2004 to 2006.
summarizes performance over the four KE pillars and is constructed as the simple
average of the normalized values of 12 key knowledge indicators in the basic score-
card. The horizontal axis in figure 1.8 plots countries’ and regions’ performance in
the KEI in 1995; the vertical axis plots countries’ and regions’ performance in the
KEI for the most recent year, currently 2004–05. The diagonal line represents the
locus of points where the KEI values in 1995 and in the most recent year are equal.
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Figure 1.8 The KAM Basic Scorecard, Rep. of Korea, G-7, High-Income Countries, Most
Recent Yeara
Annual GDP growth (%)
Internet users per 1,000 people Human Development Index
Patents granted by the USPTO per 1 million people
Computers per 1,000 people Tariff and nontariff barriers
Total telephones
per 1,000 people Regulatory quality
Gross tertiary enrollment Rule of law
Gross secondary enrollment
Researchers in R&D
per 1 million people
Adult literacy rate
(% age 15 and above)
Scientific and technical journal
articles per 1 million people
10
0
Korea, Rep. of G-7 (average) High-income (average)
5















































7 8 9 10
(Figure continues on the following page.)
a. The most recent year ranges from 2004 to 2006.
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Country Most recent 1995 Change
Finland 9.12 9.21 –0.09
Iceland 8.83 8.54 0.29
United States 8.74 9.13 –0.39
G-7 (average) 8.50 8.81 –0.31
Germany 8.48 8.63 –0.15
Japan 8.42 8.63 –0.21
Ireland 8.27 8.23 0.04
High-income countries (average) 8.06 8.24 –0.18
Korea, Rep. of 7.60 7.56 0.04
Poland 7.04 6.48 0.56
Chile 6.86 6.27 0.59
East Asia (average) 6.03 6.18 –0.15
Russian Federation 5.98 5.85 0.13
Argentina 5.41 6.07 –0.66
Turkey 5.22 5.20 0.02
South Africa 5.19 5.38 –0.19
Jordan 5.12 4.64 0.48
Brazil 5.10 4.73 0.37
Mexico 5.04 5.22 –0.18
China 4.26 2.83 1.43
Tunisia 4.20 4.06 0.14
Indonesia 2.96 3.25 –0.29
India 2.71 2.80 –0.09
Kenya 2.62 2.39 0.23
Ghana 1.97 2.05 –0.08
Nigeria 1.57 2.07 –0.50
Pakistan 1.51 1.76 –0.25
Source: KAM, December 2006 (www.worldbank.org/wbi/kam).
a. The most recent year ranges from 2004 to 2005.
Figure 1.9 (continued)
Countries and regions that appear above the diagonal line have made an improve-
ment in the KEI since 1995, and countries that appear below the diagonal line have
experienced deterioration in the KEI.
Korea’s KEI for the most recent year is 7.6, implying that it ranks in the 76th per-
centile of the 132 countries included in the KAM database. Although the KEIs for
the average G-7 (8.5) and high-income country (8.06) are higher than that of Korea,
they have fallen since 1995, and that of Korea has improved since 1995 (7.56). This
shows that Korea is on its way to catching up with the G-7 and high-income coun-
tries. Also, note that Korea is a relatively strong performer in the East Asia region,
with the KEI for the average country in the region being 6.03.
Overview of the Study
This report characterizes the Korean model and Korea’s march toward a knowl-
edge economy from a poverty-ridden economy before the launch of full-scale
industrialization in the early 1960s. The time span of the study covers those four
decades, but the report focuses considerably on the recent years. It contrasts the
catch-up model that Korea implemented during the high-growth era before the
financial crisis of 1997 and the renewed KE model that Korea has incessantly pur-
sued to overcome the crisis and sustain economic growth afterward. The report
emphasizes Korea’s achievements, as well as the remaining tasks within the four
KE pillars, with a common theme throughout—how Korea has narrowed the gaps
in its knowledge and institutions in global competition with world leaders.3
Designing a New Macroeconomic Framework
Economies need a stable and favorable macroeconomic environment to develop
into knowledge-based economies. For Korea, in particular, the economic crisis in
1997 that has beset the economy since 1997 demonstrated the need to reexamine the
macroeconomic environment and institutional regime. Chapter 4 reviews both
what has been accomplished since 1997 and what has yet to be achieved with the
economy to provide better conditions for economic players. Government-led inter-
ventionists faced a dramatic challenge in the radical changes that accompanied the
1997 crisis, and efforts were made to modernize the economic structure and envi-
ronment and the institutional regime. All of the government’s efforts since the cri-
sis—redefining the role of government, creating and leveling the playing field for
economic actors, improving the soundness and efficiency of the financial system,
and increasing the flexibility of the labor market—are crucial for the economy to
build a strong institutional infrastructure and fortify the rule of law. In this regard,
the progress is inevitably related to the Korea’s success in making the transition to
a knowledge-based economy. 
Building an Information Infrastructure
Korea’s successful movement toward an information society is the result of con-
certed efforts by the government and industry. This report investigates this process
of change from two perspectives—the government’s role and leadership in build-
ing an information society and industry’s response and efforts to make best use of
information infrastructure and technologies. The government has tried to lay down
the information infrastructure, whereas industry, benefiting from the government’s
initiative, has consistently tried to capitalize on the information infrastructure and
existing technologies. Since the mid-1990s, Korea has pushed for a strong national
and social information infrastructure. As a result, it now has one of the world’s top
broadband Internet infrastructures. At the end of 2000, 144 major cities and regions
were connected by high-speed broadband networks through fiber-optic cables. As
of June 2004, 66 percent of the population had access to the Internet. 
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3. As mentioned in the Foreword, the first World Bank knowledge economy report on
Korea, Korea and the Knowledge-Based Economy: Making the Transition (World Bank and OECD
2000), which focuses on the new development strategies Korea needed to overcome the finan-
cial crisis and sustain economic growth in the longer term. That report is a companion vol-
ume to this report.
However, despite the widespread use of IT, Korea has yet to translate the rapid
spread of its information infrastructure into qualitative results, such as increased
industrial competitiveness and entrepreneurial innovation. Korea now needs to
improve transparency and efficiency in all sectors of society, including politics and the
economy, where the information infrastructure will play an important role. All of these
efforts will be made with the ultimate goal of stimulating economic growth through
the development and best use of ICTs. Chapter 5 reviews this process, with particular
focus on the government’s role in Korea’s march toward an information society, and it
also assesses the strength and weakness of Korea’s ICT-related industries.
Meeting Skill and Human Resource Requirements
Korea’s education system has achieved very rapid growth over the past four
decades. One factor specific to Korea, “education fever,” has acted as a key driver
for the rapid expansion of the country’s education system, but it has also created a
chronic problem, the lack of quality in education. The problem now is being exac-
erbated by Korea’s move toward an advanced knowledge economy. Transforma-
tion to a advanced knowledge economy can only be achieved with an adequate
supply of capable human resources. In fact, the potential of Korea’s human
resources is among the highest in the world; however, up to now, that potential has
not been adequately realized because of the rigid and closed education and training
system.
The minimal effectiveness of public education creates problems in human
resource supply and leads to social tension. Along with universities’ efforts to
develop high-caliber scientists and engineers, industries’ absorptive capacity for
those graduates needs to be elevated. Catching up with fast-moving technologies
and thereby meeting the skill requirements for incumbent labor will require estab-
lishing a new system of job training in industry. For example, the links between ter-
tiary institutions, and other forms of education and training, such as adult
education, job training, and employer-based training, will be more important. The
Korean government has been concerned about the adequacy of current and future
supplies of skilled labor for the projected growth in demand from existing indus-
tries and expanding industries. The transition to an advanced knowledge economy
will require a new policy framework, with education reform being a major compo-
nent. These necessary changes and other pertinent aspects of the Korean education
system are taken up in chapter 6.
Harnessing the Potential of Science and Technology
Although Korea, as a late-industrializing country, has depended heavily on foreign
technologies, it has also made an effort to accumulate technological capabilities. At
the initial launch of its economy-wide development plan, Korea was poorly
endowed with factors necessary for industrialization, except for a plentiful labor
force. Furthermore, the technological competence of Korean firms was far below
world standards. Consequently, it was inevitable or natural that it would look
toward foreign sources for technologies. After the industrialization process was
launched in 1962, there was remarkable growth in imports of foreign technologies.
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The process of technological capability building in Korea is characterized as a
dynamic process involving the interplay between imported technologies and
indigenous R&D efforts. The configuration of Korea’s innovation system has
largely been shaped by overall economic development strategies. This catch-up
model has brought both limitations and advantages to the Korean innovation sys-
tem. Chapter 7 briefly reviews the process of building technological capability
within the broader framework of economic development. The development strate-
gies that have influenced the shape of the Korean innovation system can be sum-
marized as (a) government-led mobilization of strategic resources for achieving
development goals; (b) export promotion along with rapid market expansion; (c)
selective industrial promotion, notably in the heavy and chemical industries; (d)
governmental support for the growth of big business; (e) use of foreign technolo-
gies; and (f) construction of science and technology infrastructure, institutions, and
R&D programs for industrial demands.
New Challenges and Tasks Ahead
Today’s Korea faces new challenges. The slowdown in growth momentum raises
concerns about “jobless growth.” The rapid rise of low-wage economies forces
Korea to move quickly up the quality assurance ladder. However, despite the rapid
changes, Korea still suffers from the knowledge and institutional gap in compari-
son with other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
member countries. In short, Korea’s 20th century transition to the knowledge econ-
omy is not complete. For the Korean economy to sustain economic growth, it is
essential to refurbish the economic system in which creativity and entrepreneur-
ship thrive. Korea’s economic development experiences, success stories, and mis-
takes over the past four and a half decades offer valuable lessons for other
developing economies. 
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Appendix 1.1
The Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM)
The transition to a knowledge economy requires long-term strategies that focus on
developing the four KE pillars. Initially, this means that countries need to under-
stand their strengths and weaknesses, then act upon them to develop appropriate
policies and investments to give direction to their ambitions and mechanisms to
enable the policy makers and leaders to monitor progress against the set of goals.
To facilitate this transition process, the World Bank Institute’s Knowledge for
Development (K4D) Program has developed the KAM (www.worldbank
.org/wbi/kam), which is an Internet-based tool that provides a basic assessment of
countries’ and regions’ readiness for the knowledge economy. The KAM is a user-
friendly, interactive diagnostic and benchmarking tool that is designed to help
client countries understand their strengths and weaknesses by comparing them-
selves with neighbors, competitors, or other countries that they may wish to emu-
late based on the four KE pillars. The KAM is therefore useful for identifying
problems and opportunities that a country may face, and where it may need to
focus policy attention or future investments, with respect to making the transition
to the knowledge economy. The unique strength of the KAM lies in its cross-sec-
toral approach that allows a holistic view of the wide spectrum of factors relevant
to the knowledge economy.
Comparisons in the KAM are made on the basis of 81 structural and qualitative
variables that serve as proxies for the four KE pillars. Currently, 132 countries and
9 regional groupings are available in the KAM. The comparisons are presented in a
variety of charts and figures that visibly highlight similarities and differences across
countries. The data on which the KAM is based are all published by reputable insti-
tutions, and the data sources are clearly cited. The data are continuously updated,
and the country coverage is expanded whenever possible.
Because the 81 variables contained in the KAM span different ranges of values,
all variables are normalized from 0 (weakest) to 10 (strongest), and the 132 coun-
tries and 9 regions are ranked on an ordinal scale. Details of the KAM normaliza-
tion procedure can be found on the KAM Web site. 
Given its ease of use, transparency, and accessibility over the Internet, the KAM
has been widely used by government officials, policy makers, researchers, repre-
sentatives of civil society, and the private sector. The KAM has also been used by
multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, research institutions, consultants, and others
to undertake preliminary single or multicountry KE assessments.
Because countries are ranked on an ordinal scale, the KAM illustrates the rela-
tive performance of a country compared to other countries in the KAM database.
As such, when a country’s performance in a specific variable is indicated to have
declined, it could have occurred for two reasons. The country’s performance in that
variable declined, resulting in lower values in absolute terms. Alternatively, the
country’s performance could have improved and resulted in large absolute values,
but other countries experienced even larger improvements, leading to the country’s
ordinal ranking falling and resulting in a lower value in relative terms.
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2
Overview of Korea’s Development Process until
1997
Joonghae Suh
Industrialization in general is the process of changing a country’s industrial struc-
ture such that productive resources are reallocated to sectors with more value
added. For latecomers to industrialization, the process also involves learning to cre-
ate a competitive advantage against world leaders. The Republic of Korea’s mod-
ern economic history clearly shows these two aspects of industrialization. More
specifically, Korea’s industrial transformation to the knowledge economy has been
achieved through intensive learning processes in which building technological
capability and developing human resources have played decisive roles. Therefore,
the rapid and sustained economic growth that Korea experienced from the time
when it was starting out as a low-income country was an outcome of the KE
approach, even though an explicit KE development strategy was not laid out. Dur-
ing this time, Korea’s economic development hinged on the critical interactions
among the four pillars of the knowledge economy, which have evolved together
through the decades in sync with the various stages of economic development.
Another distinctive aspect of Korea’s industrialization process is the active lead-
ership role that the government assumed to support the market and provide an
environment that fostered and sustained the transformation. In retrospect, there
seem to be different paths that the government could have pursued at the start of
the big march to modernize the traditional economy, and experts debate the devel-
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Korea’s rapid and sustained economic growth since the 1960s was an outcome of the KE
approach, even though an explicit KE development strategy was not laid out.
Korea’s transformation to the knowledge economy have been achieved through inten-
sive learning processes in which building technological capability and developing
human resources were critical.
opment strategies that Korea adopted. For example, government intervention in
the market to mobilize resources to promote heavy and chemical industries (HCI)
in the 1970s seemed to many to distort the market mechanism and result in static
inefficiency in resource allocation. But these industries have since become the
growth engines of the Korean economy, which makes a case for government inter-
vention to create dynamic comparative advantages.
The Korean path to the knowledge economy also represents the numerous suc-
cesses and failures of risk-taking entrepreneurs, painstaking learning efforts of the
workforce, and the government’s trial and error experience in creating the right
business environment. This chapter reviews Korea’s development process over
three-and-a-half decades, from 1962 to 1997, from two angles: the development
strategies and policies that try to make the best use of existing resources and the
industrial structures that reflect the stages of industrialization. Using these two
viewpoints as a basis, this chapter discusses the successful elements of Korea’s eco-
nomic development and the problems that caused the financial crisis in 1997. 
Development Strategies and Policies—Chronological Review
A noticeable feature of Korea’s development process is the strategic policy plan-
ning in which the government set up development goals and deployed various pol-
icy tools to attain them. The blueprints for industrialization took shape through the
series of economic development plans. The chronological review in this section is
based primarily on official government publications about seven five-year eco-
nomic development plans. 
Before Industrialization 
Poorly endowed with natural resources and devastated by the Korean War
(1950–53), Korea had remained an agrarian society until the end of the 1950s. Indus-
trial activities were mostly confined to light industries such as simple assembly and
processing of raw materials. Economic conditions before the full-scale industrial-
ization were dismal. The efforts to establish the national identity during the years
after the liberation in 1945 had been mostly unsuccessful and filled with social
unrest and turmoil. However, during this period, the Korean government imple-
mented two important policies: compulsory education and land reform. The con-
stitution of 1949 declared it the duty of the government to educate and the right of
the people to be educated, and the government introduced compulsory education
in primary schools. The introduction of compulsory education helped create an
abundant pool of knowledgeable people that would be instrumental in industrial-
ization in later years. The land reforms of 1947 and 1949 laid another foundation for
later industrialization as more equal distribution of wealth equalized opportunities
for the people. But in 1950, the efforts to build institutional bases for the newly born
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A characteristic feature of Korea’s development process is the strategic policy planning
in which the government set up development goals and deployed various policy tools
to attain them.
country were stopped abruptly by the three-year war, which almost devastated the
emerging industrial bases.
After the war, efforts to rebuild the country’s roads, railroads, buildings, and
plants showed only minor achievements because of the limitations of the govern-
ment’s budget and the shortages of necessary resources. The government budget
depended heavily on U.S. aid, which contributed more than 40 percent of total gov-
ernment expenditures. Industrial and trade policies during the postwar 1950s were
based on import substitution that aimed to restrict imports and try to produce daily
necessities. High tariffs were levied, and the quantities of imports were tightly con-
trolled to protect domestic industries. The restoration of a domestic consumer
goods industry was aided by overvalued foreign exchange rates, but this had detri-
mental effects on exports, so the yearly volume of exports decreased until 1960.
Although the Korean government had primarily emphasized political stability
rather than systematic economic development during the 1950s, after the military
coup in 1961, the new political leadership decided that modernization of the Korean
economy and rapid economic growth should be the highest priorities.
Launch of Industrialization: 1960s 
At the beginning of the 1960s, Korea was an essentially agrarian society with a very
limited endowment of natural resources. The majority of the workforce was
employed in the agriculture, forestry, and fishery sectors, mostly producing food-
stuffs for domestic use. But the very limited area of available arable land (only one-
fourth of the total surface area of the country) did not allow much scope for the
expansion of output or the production of substantial quantities of exportable agri-
cultural products. The mining sector had no natural endowment of resources to
develop, except for limited quantities of tungsten and some other exportable min-
erals. In the manufacturing sector, 80 percent of the products were consumer goods,
particularly food and textiles. The postwar average annual population increases of
2.8 percent aggravated the problem of unemployment and underemployment in
the agricultural and services sectors. Services such as transportation and electricity
were in extremely short supply. 
The development strategies of the 1960s were aimed at terminating the vicious
circle of low savings, low investment, and low growth through policies designed to
promote an increase in government savings and a rise in foreign capital inflow,
with priority attention given to export-led industrialization (Tae 1973). The govern-
ment set up some principles for industrialization: 
• Fiscal and monetary policies, which had been used as instruments for main-
taining stable prices, are a necessary condition for the inducement of domes-
tic savings. 
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The introduction of compulsory education in the 1950s created an abundant pool of
knowledgeable people that would be instrumental in industrialization in later years.
• Investment resources should be allocated by the price system; at the same
time, price variables such as foreign exchange rates, interest rate, and wages
should reflect the opportunity cost of the resources, thus alleviating direct
controls over production, prices, wages, imports, and exports. 
• Because investment allocation by the price mechanism cannot prepare for
the dynamic development of the economy over the long run, the govern-
ment can use its own investment resources for the construction of key indus-
tries and for the formulation of social overhead capital.
Specific policies were developed from these principles: 
• Before the 1960s, the industrialization process depended mostly on import-
substitution industries under extensive protection in domestic markets, and
export promotion was very much neglected. Consequently, the increase in
reinvestment through capital accumulation was negligible, and there was no
incentive to cultivate new technology and management skills. For further
development, industrialization based on the growth of export industries was
essential.
• For increased exports, industrialization needed to start in areas of light con-
sumer products for which capital requirements could be minimized.
• Exports of labor-intensive commodities face keen competition, so the low
export margin could be compensated for by government policies on export
subsidies, such as raw material tariff exemption, preferential loans, tax
exemption, and subsidized public utilities. 
• For both export diversification and import substitution, the important deci-
sions were based on the profit motivation of private enterprises, and relaxed
import restrictions encouraged greater attention to exports and at the same
time produced competitive pressure to improve management. 
• Education should be designed for productive activities, with new emphasis
on vocational training. 
In summary, the development strategy of the 1960s was based on the promotion
of both the export- and import-substitution industries, beginning with the labor-
intensive light manufacturing sectors. In a country such as Korea, with limited raw
materials, a nonintegrated industrial structure, and a skilled labor force that received
low real wages, it was inevitable that at that stage, exports should consist mainly of
labor-intensive processing of imported raw materials and intermediate goods. The
capital accumulation that was attained through this process was then used for both
the development of the agricultural sector and for the promotion of the HCI to accel-
erate the industrialization process. In addition, although the government assumed
leadership in development efforts, voluntary activities such as private creativity and
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The development strategies of the 1960s were aimed to increase government savings
and a rise in foreign capital inflow to terminate the vicious circle of low savings, low
investment, and low growth. There was also the active promotion of both import-sub-
stitution and export-led industrialization, beginning with the labor-intensive light man-
ufacturing sectors.
initiative were encouraged. The principle of the market mechanism was accepted as
the basic premise of the economic order in the 1960s. Measures such as normaliza-
tion of interest rates, adoption of flexible exchange rates, and liberalization of trade
were used to improve the operation of the price mechanism.
Upgrading of the Industrial Structure: 1970s
In the mid-1970s, the Korean government adopted a new set of development strate-
gies, shifting from the promotion of labor-intensive export industries in the 1960s to
the development of HCI. The government acknowledged that the industrial policy
of the 1960s overemphasized the quantitative growth of industry, which took place
under heavy government protection and support. This led to imbalances in growth
and weaknesses in international competitiveness. For the future, therefore, govern-
ment support aimed to be intensive but more selective. Furthermore, the economy
could no longer rely on foreign funds for its increasing investment needs or on
imports for its increasing demands for equipment and materials. The development
of HCI was seen as a means for the economy to adapt itself to changes in its inter-
national and domestic environments and as a move toward a more resilient econ-
omy, capable of further growth and maturity. The targeted industries, including
machinery, metallurgical, chemical, and shipbuilding, were leading industries that
provided a strong driving force for the development of other industries.
Alongside the industrial targeting, the HCI plan explicitly stated the importance
of technological and human resources development along with strategies to
upgrade the technology and technical workforce. A decisive factor was the techni-
cal workforce. In particular, the education system for training technicians had to be
remodeled to increase quality and produce a greater diversity of skills (see chapter
6). This policy shift significantly deepened the industrial structure but also acceler-
ated inflation and increased economic inefficiencies. The adverse effects mainly
resulted from the overly ambitious investments, which outgrew the technological
and financial capacities of the economy. Large enterprises were crucial in the
process of heavy and chemical industrialization because of the economies of scale,
but the importance of large enterprises led to the concentration of economic power
in the hands of a few big Korean businesses (chaebols). Moreover, the development
of assembly industries without the concomitant development of component parts
and materials industries deepened the economy’s dependence on foreign imports.
Rationalization of the Industrial Structure: 1980s
The 1980s were a transition period for Korea, from an authoritarian government to
a more democratic society. During the 1980s, the Korean economy had continued its
high-growth trend with an improved balance of payments. However, the economy
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In the mid-1970s, the Korean government adopted a new set of development strategies
and shifted to the development of HCI. The strategies also included the simultaneous
development of technological and human resources to meet and complement the forth-
coming industrial needs and structure.
paid a high price, such as increased labor disputes in the process of democratiza-
tion. Continued wage hikes led to mounting inflationary pressures. To cope with
the new challenges, during the 1980s, the government promoted economic auton-
omy as one of its key policy goals. The government simplified various procedures
for approval and authorization that had hindered private initiatives and creativity. 
In the early 1980s, the major focus of the government’s development policies
was solving the economic problems that stemmed from the development of HCI in
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Box 2.1 Debate on the Effectiveness of Korea’s HCI Policy
Korea’s industrial policy to promote HCI in the 1970s has been a much-debated issue in
industrial policy. According to Lee (1991, p. 461), there are two contrasting views regard-
ing the HCI plan for Korea’s economic development. The viewpoint that is critical of the
plan consists of the following points: First, contrary to the logic underlying the HCI
plan, the plan’s execution led to misallocation of resources, thereby weakening the
Korean economy’s growth potential. Second, the process of implementing the HCI plan
distorted various market prices. Third, implementation of the overly ambitious plan
was responsible for the rapid inflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Fourth, the plan
led to excessive concentration of economic power and an uneven distribution of wealth
and income. Fifth, some of the HCI plan’s for projects have put great strains on Korea’s
resources while producing poor results. Sixth, the success of various HCI sectors in the
later years stems from the revival of private initiative and market function that resulted
from the painful structural adjustment efforts of the 1980s. 
The contrasting positive viewpoints are based on the following arguments: First,
considering its changing pattern of comparative advantage, Korea had no alternative
but to build up HCI sectors; therefore, the policy goals set by the HCI plan could not be
challenged. Second, the huge cost involved in implementing the HCI plan has been
more than paid off by the successes of the HCI projects in later years and by external
economies generated by the plan. Third, given the nature of HCI sectors and the diffi-
culties involved in building them, a nation can hardly expect to build a sophisticated
industrial structure by simply responding to price signals. Price signals usually do not
carry information about the future, especially in developing economies. Fourth, some of
the criticisms directed at the HCI plan have been misleading or misdirected. For exam-
ple, the high capital-output ratio suggested as a cost of the HCI plan would be lower if
the ratio were calculated after HCI projects are fully operational. 
Contending that the critics have overemphasized the costs of the HCI plan while
ignoring its dynamic benefits to Korea’s economic development, Lee (1991) concludes
that the construction of HCI contributed to the success of Korea’s economic develop-
ment. There are several elements of success. First, Korea launched its HCI plan to par-
ticipate in the international division of labor. Second, Korea had a solid light industrial
base, which contributed to earning valuable foreign exchange and providing employ-
ment opportunities. Third, while the HCI plan was being vigorously executed, Korea
had a well-educated and motivated industrial labor force. Also, the abundance of engi-
neers and skilled workers that resulted from the HCI plan’s workforce training meas-
ures greatly helped to resurrect the Korean economy in the 1980s. Fourth, Korea’s
entrepreneurs were vigorous and experienced in competing in the world market. Thus,
when they were freed of regulations and forced to survive on their own, they took inno-
vative, bold measures to vitalize the HCI projects. Fifth, the Korean government was
pragmatic and bold enough to reform the entire incentive and economic management
regime when circumstances dictated it. Sixth, the Korean economy benefited tremen-
dously from a favorable world economic environment characterized by low interest
rates, low oil prices, and above all, a realignment of exchange rates in Korea’s favor. 
the 1970s. Strong economic stabilization measures were implemented to curb the
inflationary trends. Economic deregulation, which reduced government interven-
tion and allowed more individual freedom, was actively pursued. Steps were also
taken to internationalize and liberalize the economy. Anticipating the Seoul
Olympic Games in 1988, the government began to pursue more active internation-
alization policies. The accelerated import liberalization policies during the five
years of the sixth economic development plan resulted in an almost complete liber-
alization of manufactured imports. Tariff rates were also substantially lowered.
These initiatives were also intended to promote the international competitiveness
of domestic industries through greater exposure to foreign competition. Fair trade
and competition policies were strengthened to reduce the inefficiencies of domestic
industrial structures and to curtail abusive practices of monopoly enterprises. By
twice revising the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, in 1986 and 1990, the
government strengthened the institutional basis to regulate unfair and anticompet-
itive trade practices. 
These stabilization, deregulation, and liberalization policies helped check the
inflationary pressures and substantially improved the international competitive-
ness of the export industries. Still, problems caused by the big gap between the
large and small business firms, imbalances between the urban and rural sectors,
and unequal income distribution remained. In the 1980s, the government there-
fore exerted major efforts to improve income distribution and enhance social
equity. The democratization movement in the 1980s has had an immense impact
on labor relations, among other things. The Declaration of Democratic Reform of
June 27, 1987, marked an important turning point in labor-management relations
in Korea. Labor-related laws, including the three basic labor laws, were exten-
sively revised to promote workers’ rights and guarantee the freedom of labor
union activities. Social equity and welfare were also significantly improved dur-
ing the late 1980s. The government enacted the minimum wage law in 1988 and
introduced the national pension system in 1988 and a nationwide medical insur-
ance system in 1989. 
Liberalization of the Economy: 1990s
Policy measures introduced during the 1980s seemed to be successful. For instance,
the Korean economy regained its high-growth path, and 1986 marked the first cur-
rent account surplus since the launch of the export-led industrialization. But the
trade deficits returned in 1989, and new problems emerged. Manufacturing wages
rose rapidly, surpassing productivity growth. Combined with the appreciation of
the Korean currency, the competitiveness of the Korean economy deteriorated, with
chronic current account deficits. Excessive expansion of domestic demand and
rapid wage hikes during the period of trade surplus led to the balance-of-payments
deficits. 
Confronted with the new challenges, in February 1993 the new government ini-
tiated a series of economic reforms known as the Five-Year New Economy Plan.
The plan was based on the premise that the various institutions built during the
earlier years would no longer work in the new economic environment. Under the
authoritarian regimes of the preceding 30 years of economic development, the
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absence of explicit socioeconomic systems and rules did not seem to hinder eco-
nomic and social development. However, the new democratic order, which gives
more individual freedom, and the movement toward internationalization call for
clearly defined economic rules and systems that are more consistent with the inter-
national norm. 
Financial reform was at the top of the policy priorities. Interest rates had been
rationalized since the late 1980s, and the financial reform measures culminated in
1993, when the new government adopted its real-name financial transaction sys-
tem, which requires all financial transactions to be made on a real-name basis.
The reform measures were pursued at the outset with an imperative urgency;
however, those measures were not implemented consistently throughout the new
government’s ruling period. In particular, the appreciation of Japanese currency
during the 1990s allowed a boom in Korean exports, which slackened reform
efforts.
Table 2.1 tabulates the various KE policies implemented since the 1960s along
with the associated stages of economic development, since the 1960s.
Elements of Success for Korea’s Economic Growth
The Korean economy has continued to have high economic growth since it began
its march toward industrialization, albeit with cyclical fluctuations, as shown in fig-
ure 2.1. The average GDP growth rate of the 1960s was 8.5 percent, twice that in the
1950s. The average GDP growth rate of the 1970s was 7.7 percent, but excluding
1980, when the oil shock hit the country with negative economic growth, the 1970s
had economic growth rates of 8.8 percent, higher than the previous decade. That
high-growth trend continued in the 1980s, with average GDP growth rates of 9.1
percent, but as the economy entered a mature stage of economic development in
the 1990s, the economic growth rate declined to 7.2 percent. In 1998, the economy
showed negative growth because of the financial crisis at the end of 1997. The
growth trend recovered, but on average was far lower than in previous decades.
The growth trend after the financial crisis manifests that Korea is now entering into
a lowered growth path. 
In addition to the rapid increases in per capita income, the economic develop-
mental process has proceeded with “the transformation of techniques, organiza-
tion, and composition of production in the direction of higher productivity,
ordinarily with concomitant growth” (Landes 1998). Table 2.2 summarizes some of
the key features of these transformations. While the population grew from 27 mil-
lion in 1962 to 48 million in 2005, the share of the economically active population
also grew, from 56 percent to 62 percent for the same period, while the unemploy-
ment rate decreased from 8.2 percent to 3.7 percent. At the beginning of industrial-
ization, 48 percent of the population suffered from absolute poverty, but, as of 2000,
that number had declined substantially, to 6.4 percent. The concomitant improve-
ment in people’s welfare is revealed in the steady increases in per capita gross
national product (GNP) for the years of industrialization: from US$87 in 1962 to
US$16,413 in 2005. Hence, the goals of economic development, “to establish a self-
reliant economy and to make the people’s life worth living” (Government of the
Republic of Korea, 1962, p. 4), are effectively achieved.
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Table 2.1 KE Policies and Development Stages of the Korean Economy
Major policy Macroeconomic Human resource 
Development goals directions policy framework development Science and technology
1960s • Build production base • Expanding export-oriented • Preparation of legal • Decreasing illiteracy • Building scientific 
for export-oriented light industries and institutional • Establishing national institutions: legal and 
industrialization • Mobilizing domestic and bases to support infrastructure administrative framework
foreign capital industrialization
1970s • Build self-reliant • Promoting HCI and • Maximization of • Increasing vocational • Setting up scientific infra-
growth base upgrading industrial growth: expand training structure: specialized 
structure policy loans • Improving teaching science and technology 
• Building social overhead • Government inter- quality institutions, Daeduck 
capital vention in the markets • Increasing college Science Town
graduates in 
engineering
1980s • Expand technology- • Increasing industrial • Stabilization • Expanding higher • R&D and private research 
intensive industries rationalization • Enhancement of pri- education system center promotion
• Decreasing export subsidy vate autonomy and • Developing semi- • Launching national R&D 
and expanding import competition skilled human programs (NRDPs)
liberalization resources
1990s • Promote high- • Supporting technology • Liberalization • Building high-skilled • Taking a leading role in  
technology development • Reform and human resources in strategic areas with the 
innovation • Building information restructuring strategic fields: IT, goal of technological 
infrastructure biotechnology, and catch-up
so on
• Developing a lifelong 
learning system
2000s • Make transition to • Using government as a • Globalization • Increasing research • Building national and 
knowledge-based market supporter • Balanced national productivity regional innovation sys-
economy • Promoting venture development • Improving quality of tems
businesses and small university education
and medium enterprises • Focusing on regional 
development
Source: Author’s compilation.
Managing the Economy for Industrialization
Accomplishing the vision of industrialization requires great effort from both the
government and industry. The government implemented interventionist policies to
achieve its development goals, and industry responded by venturing into the new
businesses. Creating institutional frameworks to mobilize resources toward tar-
geted areas was one of the government’s primary tasks, whereas the assimilation of
technologies is among industry’s main tasks. Industrialization is the result of both
accumulation and assimilation, which was made possible by the concerted efforts
of both the government and industry. 
The government’s active role has several dimensions, of which the economic devel-
opment plan is the clear manifestation. The government body responsible for design-
ing and implementing the development plans, the Economic Planning Board (EPB),
was created in 1961. The EPB, as a central agency for economic planning and coordina-
tion, had a great deal of control over other economic ministries until it was transformed
into the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) in 1994. The Korean government
had formulated a series of five-year plans beginning in 1962, and for 35 years, each five-
year plan set the development goals for the Korean economy (see box 2.2).
The five-year plans sought national agreement on the direction of medium- and
long-term policies by harmonizing various opinions from different social strata.
Usually, individual government ministries and agencies designed their own goals
and strategies within the realm of their own missions, and the EPB took the role of
social planner by coordinating those plans and thereby designing a final compre-
hensive plan that was coherent at the national level (see box 2.2). In the earlier
stages of economic development, the government took the leading role in formu-
lating the plans. The major issues of the plans were sectoral investments and mobi-
lization of domestic and foreign capital to finance such investments.
As the economy grew and the economic structures became more complex, the
government-led economic development strategy became less effective. Therefore,
since the 1980s, the five-year plan has evolved into an indicative plan that respects
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Source: Bank of Korea, National Accounts, various issues.
Overview of Korea’s Development Process until 1997      27
Table 2.2 Economic Structure of Korea, 1962–2005
1962 1972 1982 1992 2005
Population (millions) 26.5 33.5 39.3 43.7 48.1
Economically active population (%) 56.4 57.7 58.6 60.9 62.0
Unemployment rate (%) 8.2 4.5 4.4 2.5 3.7
Absolute poverty (%) 48.3a 23.4b 9.8c 7.6d 6.4e
Macroeconomic indicators
GNP (US$ billions) 2.3 10.7 74.4 329.3 790.1
GNP growth rate (%) 2.2 4.6 7.5 5.9 4.2
GNP per capita (US$) 87 320 1,893 7,527 16,413
Gross investment (% of GNDI) 11.0 21.4 28.9 37.2 30.2
Gross savings (% of GNDI) 9.9 17.0 25.7 36.8 32.9
Industrial structure (% of value added)
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining 37.0 28.7 15.9 7.7 3.4
Manufacturing 16.4 20.8 27.0 27.2 28.7
Services 46.7 50.5 57.1 65.1 67.8
Employment structure (%of all industries)
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining 63.4 50.5 32.1 14.0 7.9
Manufacturing 7.5 14.1 21.9 26.5 18.6
Services 29.1 35.4 46.1 59.5 73.5
Trade structure
Export (US$ millions) 55 1,624 21,853 76,632 284,429
Share of capital goods exports (%) 4.9 9.8 25.2 37.5 43.9
Import (US$ millions) 422 2,522 24,251 81,775 261,238
Share of capital goods imports (%) 16.5 29.9 25.7 37.7 34.7
Human resources
Illiteracy rate (%) 29.4a 12.4b 7.2c 4.1d 2.2e
University enrolment ratio of high 
school graduates (%) 29.2 29.0 37.7 34.3 82.1
Number of university graduates 20,452 29,544 62,688 178,631 268,833
Share of science and engineering 
graduates (%) 34.6 45.7 46.4 40.9 39.4
Technology indicators
GERD as share of GDP (%) 0.25h 0.29 0.96 2.03 2.99
Private enterprises’ share of GERD (%) 22.2i 31.9 50.4 82.4 75.0
Number of researchers 1,750j 5,599 28,448 88,764 234,702
Patents (per million population) 10.0f 6.5 66.3 240.1 1,527.0
Source: Author’s compilation from government statistical resources.
Note: All currency is in 2005 U.S. dollars. GERD = gross expenditure on R&D; GNDI = gross national
disposable income.
a = 1961 data; b = 1970 data; c = 1980 data; d = 1990 data; e = 2000 data; f = 1968 data; g = 1960 data;
h = 1963 data; i = 1967 data; j = 1963 data.
The five-year plans sought national agreement on the direction of medium- and long-
term policies by harmonizing the goals and strategies of the various government min-
istries into one coordinated strategy coherent at the national level.
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Box 2.2 Development Strategies and Government Plans
Korea’s development processes since the early 1960s can be divided into several phases.
Government’s development plans have clear, distinctive characteristics from early
phases to later years. Broadly speaking, Korea’s four and half decades of rapid economic
development experience can be distinguished into three regimes: government-led
industrialization years from the early 1960s to 1992; transitional period of two govern-
ments of President Kim Young-Sam (1993–1997) and President Kim Dae-Joong (1998-
2002); and balanced growth regime of the incumbent government. The three regimes are
different in many respects: for an instance, in terms of the nature of the governments,
authoritarian ones in industrialization periods versus democratic ones in later years; or,
the degree of autonomy in the private enterprises, where as the economy grows steadily,
the private sector becomes more important in later years. The Three regimes were also
distinctive in the fundamental nature of the government’s plans. 
The interventionist approaches during the industrialization phase are clearly
exposited in five-year economic development plans. At the start of the industrialization
drive, the first to fourth development plans were blueprints of the national economy,
containing very specific goals and targets for each five-year period. In particular, since
the economy was in dire shortage of almost all the resources for substantial economic
growth, the utmost goal of the economic plans was the maximum mobilization of
national resources and efficient allocation thereof via government plans. In contrast, the
fifth and sixth plans were more of the nature of indicative plans, where government set
the development goals but the allocation of resources tended to rely more on the market
mechanism. There were, among others, two factors that led to the move from national
blueprints to indicative plans. First, the aftereffect of government intervention, for
example HCI drive in 1970s, that caused inefficiency of resource allocation, forced gov-
ernment to reconsider the ways and approach of the development plans. Second, hav-
ing benefited from the successful economic growth of the 1960s and 1970s, markets and
private enterprises had grown enough to be an autonomous force of economic growth. 
The 1990s was a transition period in many ways. In tandem with the nationwide
democratization process, the seventh economic development plan was devised under a
partnership between the government and the private sector, and the plan specifically
contained the social dimensions of economic development. The seventh plan was the last
in the series of government’s five-year plans, as the outbreak of the financial crisis of 1997
forced the government to tackle the urgent task of crisis management. After the immedi-
ate crisis years, government unfolded the Knowledge-based Economy (KBE) Develop-
ment Plans. The KBE plan was by nature no longer the kind of previous government
plans. It contained policy goals and targets for Korea as a KBE, but the role of the gov-
ernment was to create the environment for new-technology based firms.
Currently, the Korean government no longer regulates directly the economy as in the
past years, since the basic role of the government is supposed to complement the mar-
ket mechanism. However, long-term planning from a nationwide perspective and
thereby preparing socioeconomic issues far in advance becomes ever more important. A
five-year, but yearly rolling, fiscal plan, the National Fiscal Management Plan (NFMP) is
instrumental in this regard. NFMP is the most comprehensive review of government’s
spending programs in Korea. It contains evaluation of program outcomes and sets up
goals or targets to be achieved for the five-year time period. The reviewing process is
open to the public, which is important in building consensus on priorities over national
agenda and deciding expenditure limits in various government spending programs. In
this regard, NFMP plays the role of past development plans in a different manner. 
The table contrasts government plans in three broadly delineated development
regimes, with highlights on key features of plans, focuses of government policies, and
examples of fiscal policy targets. As shown in the figure, a clear trend of the priorities of
government expenditures appears. Throughout the industrialization period, government
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Development Regimes and Government Plans
Government-led Transforming to market-led Balanced 
Development        industrialization economic growth growth 
regimes 1962– 1982– 1993– 1997– 2003–
Major Five-year Five-year New economy KBE Develop- National 
plans ED Plans ED Plans ED plan ment Plan Fiscal 
(1st to 4th) (5th and 6th) (7th) Manage-
ment Plan
Key Mobilization Rationaliza- Private sector’s Crisis Long-term 
features of and allocation tion and participation in management fiscal 
plans of national restructuring government’s and institu- planning 
resources planning tional reform
Focuses of Export Strengthening International Four-sector Maintaining 
government promotion,  industrial ization and reform and social equity 
policies HCI drive competitive- economic moving and sector/ 
ness liberalization towards a KBE regional 
balances
Key targets Supporting Restoring Strengthening Assisting Harmoniz-
of fiscal industrializa- fiscal industrial reforms, ing growth
policies tion, Strength- prudence, competitiveness, Expanding and welfare
ening defense Priorities on Priorities on welfare 
capabilities education and economic spending
social welfare sectors
Source: Author’s compilation based on government documents.
Note: ED = economic development, KBE = knowledge-based economy, HCI = heavy-chemical
industries.
put highest priorities on programs of economic development. The high share of defense
spending is the result of the Korea’s confrontation with North Korea, but the defense
spending share has continuously decreased over the years. The sharp increases in eco-
nomic development spending are noticeable in two periods: the late 1970s, when HCI
drive was the main cause; and the late 1990s during which public funds had been fun-
neled to cope with the financial crisis. The share of education expenditures has been
around 15 percent. As is explained in chapter 6, relatively smaller increases in government
spending in education have been compensated by private expenditures. Welfare spending
has steadily increased, taking the largest share in 2005. 
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Source: Ministry of Planning and Budget.
the initiative and the creativity of the private sector. The plans formulated in the
earlier years focused on expanding the productive capacity and mobilizing the
required resources, whereas in later years, industrial rationalization and macroeco-
nomic stabilization aimed to make the economy more efficient and productive.
Despite the active role of the government in designing and implementing the eco-
nomic plans, the plans had consistently emphasized the importance of the market
as the main mechanism by which the plans were to be implemented.1
In tandem with organizational arrangements, the government had made far-
reaching interventions in the financial market. Earlier, in 1961, the military govern-
ment had expropriated the majority of bank shares that were owned by big
businesses and limited the voting powers of private owners, which enabled the
government to directly control the banking system. The following year, the law of
the Bank of Korea was revised in a way that gave the EPB more discretionary power
over financial and banking policy. Furthermore, the private banks were required to
deposit some of the savings in the government-owned Korea Development Bank so
that the deposits could be funneled to the industrial development projects. Policy
loans had reached more than one-third of total bank loans at the height of industri-
alization (see table 2.3). In addition to the policy loans earmarked for spending on
targeted areas, the government had maintained two different interest rates. To
attract domestic savings, interest rates for one-year savings deposits were doubled,
from 15 to 30 percent in 1965, whereas those for export loans remained at 6.5 per-
cent per year, thereby offering a direct incentive for exports (Park 2004). Through-
out these actions, Korea’s banking system was transformed to support the
industrial development goals of the government.
Despite these measures, however, Korea suffered chronic shortages of domestic
savings, which made it necessary to rely heavily on foreign capital to finance the
rapid industrialization. To facilitate the inflow of foreign capital, in 1962, the gov-
ernment had enacted a law on foreign capital. One of the key mandates of the law
was the payback assurance of imported foreign capital by the Bank of Korea, backed
in turn by the government. Medium- and long-term loans and FDI amounted to a
mere US$308 million in the first plan period but increased substantially in the
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1. This is the fundamental difference between Korea’s economic planning and plans
adopted by former socialist economies. 
Despite the active role of the government in designing and implementing the economic
plans, the plans had consistently emphasized the importance of the market as the main
mechanism by which the plans were to be implemented.
Requiring private banks to leave a portion of their deposits with the government-owned
Korea Development Bank meant that private savings could be tapped for industrial
development projects.
subsequent two plan periods, to US$2.3 billion and US$6.0 billion, respectively (see
table 2.4). For the four years during the fourth plan period, the amount of foreign
capital reached US$10.7 billion. Foreign capital played a very important role in
implementing the development strategies.2
The rapid increase in foreign capital inflow has not only contributed to eco-
nomic growth by financing the expansion of production capacity, it also has
resulted in the concomitant transfer of advanced technologies that has been the
source of the productivity increase. As shown in figure 2.2, there appears to be a
close correlation between capital goods imports and royalty payments for licensed
foreign technologies, which implies that along with the capital goods imports that
were financed partly through the foreign capital, the industry has made great effort
to learn to industrialize.
Distinctive Features of Korea’s Economic Development
The features of Korea’s successful economic development process are varied (see
box 2.3). First, in the macroeconomic dimension, the high rates of investment and
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Table 2.3 Size and Share of Policy Loans by Deposit Banks
(billion won, %)
Policy loans
Year Total General loans Nonexport loans Export loans
1970 722.4 510.5 (70.7) 211.9 (29.3) 55.9 (7.7)
1975 2,905.5 2,117.9 (72.9) 787.6 (27.1) 339.2 (11.7)
1980 12,204.4 7,904.8 (64.8) 4,299.6 (35.2) 1,720.8 (14.1)
1985 33,810.7 23,382.6 (69.2) 10,428.1 (30.8) 3,129.9 (9.3)
Source: Bank of Korea.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentage share of total loans.
2. Because 30 percent of gross national investments were financed through foreign cap-
ital during the 20-year period between 1962 and 1982, Cho and Kim (1997) estimated that,
without foreign capital, annual economic growth would be lowered by 3.3 percentage points
from the actual rate of 8.2 percent.
Table 2.4 Inflows of Foreign Capital
(2005 US$ million) 
First plan Second plan Third plan Fourth plan
(1962–66) (1967–71) (1972–76) (1977–80)
Loans 291 2,166 5,432 10,256
Public 116 811 2,389 4,084
Commercial 175 1,355 3,043 6,172
FDI 17 96 557 425
Total 308 2,262 5,989 10,681
Source: Government of the Republic of Korea 1982, p. 5.
Note: Short-term capital and bank loans are excluded.
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Source: Calculated using data from the National Statistical Office.
Box 2.3 Success Factors of Korea’s Economic Growth
Among the factors that account for the success of Korea’s economic development, only
three issues—the government’s role in managing the economy, and technology and
human resource development—are discussed in this chapter. Former Prime Minister
Nam Duck-Woo was one of the key policy makers during the high-growth era in Korea.
He accounts for the factors in successful economic development as follows: Economic
factors include (a) an outward-looking strategy, (b) good use of foreign resources, (c) a
favorable international environment, (d) education, (e) faith in the free enterprise sys-
tem, and (f) the activist role of government. Noneconomic factors include (a) ethnic and
cultural homogeneity and a strong Confucian tradition that places a high value on edu-
cation, achievement, and loyalty to the nation; (b) security threats; and (c) political lead-
ership (Nam 1997).
savings imply that Korea’s economic transformation has been achieved by massive
capital investment. Korea’s capital accumulation has been made possible through
increases in domestic savings; the gap between investment target and domestic
savings in the earlier years had been filled using borrowed foreign capital. Second,
industrial and labor composition has been changed in the direction of higher pro-
ductivity as the share of manufacturing has steadily increased. Trade structures
have also fundamentally changed, from export of primary goods to export of man-
ufactured products, including capital goods, which were more than 40 percent of
total exports in 2002. Third, the changes in the structures of industry, employment,
and trade have proceeded with great improvements in human resources and tech-
nological capabilities, two of the most important factors for sustaining the eco-
nomic growth that increases efficiency. Despite the debates on the nature of East
Asian growth performance, it is apparent that Korea has poured tremendous effort
into upgrading knowledge and human resource bases. Korea’s industrialization
process was not only a process of capital accumulation; but also involved the learn-
ing process, a key concept of the knowledge-based economy.
Saving and Investment Rates
A very noticeable macroeconomic feature is the continued rise in savings and
investment rates (see figure 2.3). Savings and investment rates, measured as a per-
centage of GDP, had remained low during the 1950s, at about 11 percent. The two
rates started to increase as the full-scale industrialization unfolded in the 1960s,
growing rapidly afterward until they reached a peak in the 1990s, with 35 percent
and 37 percent savings and investment rates, respectively. Except in the 1980s, the
investment rates surpassed the savings rates, and the deficiency in savings was
made up with foreign investment. 
The long-run trend of gross investment rates from 1960 to 2006 is shown in fig-
ure 2.4, with a trend line that implies a long-run equilibrium path. The figure
shows the steep increases in investment rates during the 1960s and 1970s, with
rates reaching their peak around the end of the 1980s. The rapid increases in the
1970s were the result of the HCI policies, but those steep increases were slowed in
the 1980s by the stabilization and rationalization policies, and the long-run trend
began to decline.
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A major contributing factor in Korea’s economic transformation is the large amount of
capital accumulation, which was possible because of high Korean savings rates.
Elements of a KE development strategy, such as aggressively improving human
resources and domestic technological capability, also played key roles in Korea’s eco-
nomic development in the past four decades.
























gross saving gross investment
Source: Bank of Korea, National Accounts, various issues.
The investment trend described above illustrates how Korea’s economic devel-
opment process can be divided into three distinct phases. Rapid and steady
increases in investment rates in the 1960s and 1970s emphatically show that eco-
nomic development in that period was investment driven. The role of investment
in economic development remained high during the 1980s, although with dimin-
ishing rates of increase, and reached the peak at the end of the decade. There
appears to be a clear turn in the trend after the peak, and since the 1990s, the Korean
economy has been less and less dependent on physical investment. After the end of
the 1980s, Korea entered into a mature phase of economic development that was
different from the past. 
It is worth noting that long-term disequilibrium of investment has occurred
twice: one time in the 1980s and again in the early 1990s . As mentioned above,
the disequilibrium of investment in the 1980s was the result of the industrial pol-
icy to rationalize the overinvestment of the 1970s. The rationalization policy was
successful, and the Korean economy regained its growth path during the 1980s.
However, the overinvestment during the early 1990s, until the financial crisis of
1997, is an opposite case. Entering into the 1990s, the Korean government felt the
need to reshuffle its economic structure and tried to implement several reform
measures, as discussed before. However, the reform was not consistently imple-
mented; rather, government and industry opted for expanding production
capacities.3
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Note: Gross investment rate is the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP in national accounts.
The dotted line is the time trend of investment growth rates regressed with a quadratic equation.
3. Overinvestment in the early 1990s is criticized as being a remote but fundamental
cause of the financial crisis. For example, see Chung (2004).
Industrial and Trade Structures
The process of industrialization has been accompanied by radical changes in indus-
trial structure (see table 2.5). The primary sectors, including agriculture, forestry,
and mining, took the majority share of 48 percent in 1953; however, as industrial-
ization proceeded after the 1960s, the share of primary sectors significantly
decreased to 3.8 percent in 2005. Instead, the shares of manufacturing and services
steadily increased, reaching 28 percent and 68 percent, respectively, in 2005. The
sectoral composition of manufacturing has also dramatically changed over the
years. Until the early 1970s, manufacturing was mainly composed of light indus-
tries such as textiles and apparel and food and beverages. Entering the 1980s, the
share of HCI exceeded half of manufacturing and continued to increase afterward;
as of 2005, about 85 percent of manufacturing was composed of HCI. In addition to
the external transformation of the manufacturing sectors’ composition, intrinsic
contents of production activities in the manufacturing sectors have also changed
greatly. For instance, the main production structure of the chemical industry in the
1970s remained mostly the mass production of petrochemicals, but it expanded to
specialty chemicals and fine chemicals in later years.
Along with the changes in industrial structure, the leading industries in manu-
facturing are changing for the different stages of economic development. Table 2.6
shows the changes in manufacturing decomposed into the top 10 leading indus-
tries. Each period is marked with leading industries, which changed from labor-
intensive light industries including food and beverage and textiles to
capital-intensive HCI and to high-technology industries such as the electronics sec-
tor. Until the early 1980s, the food and beverage and textile and apparel sectors led
in manufacturing share, with about half of manufacturing, but the share of these
two sectors shrank over the years. Electrical and electronic products have had the
leading role since the 1990s; second were the automobile and the chemical indus-
tries in 1990, and in 2000 and 2005, respectively.  
The changing composition of manufacturing is the result of changes in factor
conditions of the economy, which are also manifested in trade structure. As is
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fishery, and Manu- industries industries
mining facturing (% of mfg) (% of mfg) Services 
1953 48.4 9.0 78.9 21.1 42.6
1960 38.9 13.8 76.6 23.4 47.3
1970 28.7 21.3 60.8 39.2 50.0
1980 16.7 28.6 45.6 54.4 54.7
1990 9.3 28.9 32.6 67.4 61.8
2000 5.3 29.4 20.7 79.3 65.3
2005 3.8 28.4 15.3 84.7 67.8
Source: Bank of Korea, National Accounts, reported years.
Table 2.6 Top 10 Leading Industries in Korea’s Manufacturing Sectors
(% of total manufacturing value added)
1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
Rank Industries Share Industries Share Industries Share Industries Share Industries Share
1 Food and beverage 28.6 Textile and apparel 19.2 Electrical and Electrical and Electrical and 
electronic products 14.6 electronic products 25.2 electronic products 24.7 
2 Textile and apparel 20.4 Food and beverage 19.0 Automobile 13.2 Chemicals 13.9 Chemicals 15.2 
3 Chemicals 11.5 Chemicals 13.1 Food and beverage 12.9 Automobile 11.3 Automobile 12.2 
4 Automobile 9.1 Electrical and Chemicals 12.9 Basic metal 8.0 Basic metal 11.3 
electronic products 10.4
5 Paper and printing 5.5 Basic metal 6.7 Textile and apparel 11.5 Food and beverage 6.9 Machinery 7.0 
6 Nonmetallic mineral 
products 5.3 Automobile 6.1 Basic metal 9.0 Machinery 6.9 Food and beverage 6.1 
7 Coal and petroleum Coal and petroleum Nonmetallic Coal and petroleum 
refinery 4.2 refinery 5.5 mineral products 5.6 Textile and apparel 6.9 refinery 5.4 
8 Electrical and Nonmetallic Fabricated Fabricated 
electronic products 3.7 mineral products 5.3 Machinery 5.5 metal products 4.8 metal products 4.5 
9 Machinery 2.3 Paper and printing 3.9 Paper and printing 4.6 Paper and printing 4.3 Textile and apparel 3.6 
10 Basic metal 1.5 Machinery 3.7 Fabricated Coal and 
metal products 3.8 petroleum refinery 4.2 Paper and printing 3.5 
All manufacturing All manufacturing All manufacturing All manufacturing All manufacturing 
(% of GDP) 21.2 (% of GDP) 28.2 (% of GDP) 28.8 (% of GDP) 29.4 (% of GDP) 28.4
Source: Bank of Korea, National Accounts and Statistical Yearbook, reported years.
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shown in figure 2.5, during the earlier years of economic development, the textile
and apparel industry was the only sector that showed comparative advantages.
Electrical and electronic products began to contribute positively to the trade bal-
ance after the early 1970s, followed by transportation equipment, including auto-
mobiles and ships. Chemicals as a whole became trade surplus only after the
mid-1990s, but the composition of the chemical sectors changed greatly. At earlier
stages of development, Korea’s chemical industry showed strong competitiveness
in industrial chemicals, including petrochemicals, plastic, and rubber, but
depended heavily on imported materials and fine chemicals. Only recently has
Korea expanded its domestic production of materials and fine chemicals to lower
the dependence on imports. Machinery is the least developed sector in terms of
international competitiveness, but it is showing gradual improvement. 
Building Technological Capabilities
Korea has gone to great lengths to build indigenous technological capabilities. Sci-
ence and technology have become priority policy areas; for example, when the EPB
was designing the first five-year economic development plan, it also produced the
first technology promotion five-year plan, which explicitly stated the importance of
indigenous technology development efforts for successful industrialization. 
In line with the five-year plan, Korea has invested substantially in R&D, and its
GERD has grown tremendously in both size and intensity. As shown in figure 2.6,
the percentage share of GERD increased from 0.25 percent in 1963 to 2.99 percent in
2005. The number of researchers has increased 120-fold in the four and a half
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Source: Author’s compilation from UN trade data.
Note: The trade specialization index is calculated as (exports – imports)/(exports + imports) for each
industry.
decades, from 1,900 to 198,500. See figure 2.7, which plots researchers in R&D per
million for selected OECD countries. The rapid increases in R&D have been possi-
ble through the active expansion of the private sector’s investment. During the ear-
lier years of industrialization, private sector R&D spending was negligible, but as
the rapid economic growth has called for commensurate investment in technology
development, private enterprises have continuously increased R&D. Consequently,
the funding sources have also greatly changed: the government’s share of GERD
has been continuously declining, and in recent years, only one-fourth of GERD has
come from the government (figure 2.6).
The process of technological capability building in Korea can be characterized
as the interplay between imported technologies and indigenous R&D efforts. Fig-
ure 2.8 plots the trends in the ratio of royalty payments to business expenditures on
R&D (BERD) and the ratio of BERD to sales (or R&D intensity) from 1976 to 2005.
The ratio of royalty payments to BERD substantially decreased until the early 1980s,
which implies that the growth of BERD exceeded that of royalty payments. The
R&D intensity, however, had remained at 0.5 percent. After the early 1980s, there
was a clear change in the trends; although the ratio of royalty payment to BERD
remained at 30 percent, R&D intensity started to increase. 
Underlying these changing relationships are the concerted efforts by both the
private sector and the government to develop technological capabilities. First, busi-
ness strategy has undergone a fundamental shift. In earlier years, international com-
petitiveness relied mostly on cost factors such as low wages and scale economies
based on mass production. And because imported technologies were of a kind that
required simple assimilation and adaptation, there was no need to organize R&D
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Source: Constructed using data from Ministry of Science and Technology.
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Source: Constructed using data from World Bank SIMA 2007 database.
activities. In later years, in contrast, as the cost advantage of cheap skilled labor was
exhausted and the economic structure was transformed into more technology-inten-
sive sectors, the need for institutionalized R&D activities became more pressing. The
private sector met this need by establishing in-house R&D laboratories (box 2.4).
In accordance with the stages of economic development, the Korean government
has successively changed the orientation of science and technology (S&T) policy. In
the earlier years, more emphasis was put on building the infrastructure for techno-
logical development, whereas in later years the emphasis shifted toward targeted
technological development. In the early years of launching full-scale economic devel-
opment plans, the Korean government recognized very clearly that S&T would play
important roles in the coming years. In the 1960s, two noteworthy policy measures
were initiated in this regard: the establishment of two institutions, the Korea Institute
of Science and Technology (KIST) in 1966 and the Ministry of Science and Technology
(MOST) in 1967). These two institutions, with the Korea Advanced Institute of Sci-
ence (KAIS), which was established in 1971, have exerted powerful influences over
the S&T community in Korea. MOST has been the main designer of Korea’s overall
S&T policy; KIST has played the role of technological functionary in responding to
industrial demands for rapid economic growth; and KAIS (later KAIST—the Korea
Advanced Institute of Science and Technology) first implemented the concept of the
research-oriented university in Korea’s higher education system.
Despite government efforts to build S&T institutions in the 1960s and to set up
S&T infrastructures such as specialized government research institutes, in addition
to KIST, in the 1970s, S&T policy played a limited role in those years. The techno-
logical capability for labor-intensive export industries in the 1960s and for HCI in
the 1970s could be easily acquired from foreign sources (OECD 1996, p. 27). Signif-
icant changes occurred during the 1980s as many Korean export industries shifted
from producing for original equipment manufacturers and began to market inter-
nationally under their own brand names. Changes in firms’ competitive strategies
created new challenges for government policy. In the past, S&T policy had been
supply oriented, to provide foundations for adopting foreign technologies. During
the 1980s, the direction of S&T policy turned toward encouraging domestic R&D
activities. After MOST launched a national R&D program in 1982, other ministries
started mission-oriented R&D programs. 
Investing in Human Resource Development 
Similarly to the innovation pillar of the knowledge economy, Korea’s education or
human resource development pillar has evolved from one that struggled to provide
universal primary education to one that produces highly skilled graduate and post-
graduate technical specialists. Government policy for human resource develop-
ment and the education system as a whole has proceeded with the development
stages of the economy. In the earlier years, education policy focused on the expan-
sion of primary and secondary education, which was critical to supply industry
with an educated workforce. The most conspicuous feature of educational devel-
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The orientation of S&T policy has evolved with the stages of economic development,
with more emphasis on building the infrastructure for technological development in the
earlier years and targeted technological development more recently.
opment in the 1960s was its expansion of students’ enrollment and the number of
schools (figure 2.9). The completion of the six-year compulsory education plan
enabled all children of the relevant age group to enroll in schools, and the number
of secondary school students tripled compared with the previous decades. Voca-
tional high schools were established in the 1960s to provide training in craft skills
for the growing labor-intensive light industries.
Strengthening vocational education was one of the priority areas of economic
development plans during the 1970s.Vocational junior colleges were set up in the
1970s to supply technicians for the HCI. The framework of vocational training was
institutionalized by the 1976 enactment of the Basic Vocational Training Act, which
was wholly amended in 1981. In addition to the public vocational training institu-
tions, partial government funding was introduced to support out-of-school train-
ing by enterprises. Since 1976, large enterprises have been required to either train
their employees or pay a levy to the government for the cost of vocational training
in public training institutions. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the rapid expansion of higher education had pro-
ceeded by increasing student enrollment and diversifying higher education institu-
tions. As junior colleges took a larger share of tertiary education, their programs
were diversified to meet the industrial needs. On July 30, 1980, the government
announced an education reform that included such measures as abolishing univer-
sity entrance examinations, renovating school facilities, and introducing incentives
for teachers. To finance the education reform measures, the government introduced
the education tax (box 2.5). 
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Box 2.4 What Happened in 1982?
As figure 2.8 indicates, around 1982, the trend in the interaction between imported tech-
nologies and indigenous R&D effort changed from a substituting relationship to a com-
plementary one. This turning was not accidental; 1982 marked the launch of the first
NRDP, and during that year private enterprises began to establish in-house R&D labo-
ratories. That year is also memorable in that the share of the private sector’s R&D spend-
ing reached 50 percent of the national total and continued to increase rapidly. 
Some of the government’s initiatives were instrumental in the change. MOST’s
newly introduced special R&D program, Korea’s first NRDP, aimed to implement a
nationwide, full-scale technology development strategy. A year before, the Technology
Development Promotion Act was revised to be the legal basis of the special R&D pro-
gram. The revised act came into effect in 1982, with a new clause stating government’s
direct financial support for corporate R&D centers. The Military Service Law was also
revised in that year to include a special army service exemption for qualified engineers
and researchers who opted to work in public and private R&D centers. The government
initiatives that supplied financial and human resources, coupled with technology devel-
opment programs, triggered a burgeoning of R&D activities by private enterprises.
Korea’s education system was developed in tandem with the various stages of eco-
nomic development, complementing the other KE pillars.
The availability of labor became increasingly strained in the 1980s. The portion
of the population that was economically active dropped sharply in the 1980s com-
pared with the previous decade, and labor demand continued to increase as the
economy grew at a high annual average rate of 10 percent in the second half of the
1980s. The changes in labor demand for a better skilled and higher-caliber work-
force in 1980s—the result of rapid economic growth—called for strengthening sci-
ence and engineering education in universities. Reforming the education and
training system to meet the needs of an industrializing society was one of 10 major
policy objectives and programs in the Seventh Five-Year Economic and Social
Development Plan in 1992. 
The Korean education system has undergone a series of reforms like that of July
30, 1980. The focus of the reforms has changed according to the stage of social and
economic development, yet the underlying principle of the reforms has been con-
sistent, viewing “education as the prime mover of national development” (Presi-
dential Commission on Education Reform 1997, p. 17). However, the education
reforms were not always successful. Quantitative expansion was rather easy to
implement; for example, the new industrial needs in the 1970s were met by increas-
ing the university enrollment capacity. But the quality improvement necessitates,
among other things, capital investment. The government’s investment in education
has steadily increased, but not enough to finance the amount of quality enhance-
ment needed. The Presidential Commission on Education Reform’s report
described the financing problem, stating that although economic growth and social
transformation had proceeded “at a breathtaking pace,” investment in education
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had not kept up (1997, p. 18). Since 1995, Korea’s gross educational expenditures as
a percentage of GDP have been above the average of OECD countries; however, the
public investment is far below that of average OECD countries (see table 2.7). The
investment gap is mostly supplemented by the private sector (see table 2.8). 
In addition to increasing education investment, Korea’s education system needs
to cultivate creativity. The education reform plan announced in 1997 succinctly
stated the challenges faced by Korea: “Korean education, having registered a
marked growth in quantitative terms in the era of industrialization, will no longer
be appropriate in the era of information technology and globalization. It will not be
able to produce persons who possess high levels of creativity and moral sensitivity,
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Box 2.5 Education Tax
The government’s education budget had always run short of the required investment
for upgrading the educational system. In particular, the July 30, 1980, education reform
necessitated a substantial increase in the government’s investment in education, and
government introduced an education tax in 1981. An education tax had been in place
since 1958, but it was abrogated in 1961 just after the military coup. The new law in 1981
was intended to be effective for only five years; it was revised once in 1986 to extend the
tax for another five years and then was changed to a permanent tax in 1991. 
When the education tax was enacted in 1981, it was also levied on capital gains
income (5 percent), liquor sales (10 percent), tobacco sales (10 percent), and banking
and insurance companies’ earnings (0.5 percent). The composition of the education tax
has since expanded, including, for example, property tax (20 percent) and automobile
tax (30 percent). When the government initiated the changes in the education gover-
nance system to make it more decentralized in 2000, the education tax played an instru-
mental role in empowering the provincial authorities. Education taxes that were
collected with the local taxes were directly transferred to provincial governments. This
approach is expected to give more autonomy in regional education policy to the local
government bodies. The education tax has contributed significantly to meeting the
increasing needs of the country’s educational investment. The education budget has
steadily increased over the years, reaching 4.13 percent of GDP in 2004. As shown in
the table below, , more than 20 percent of the education budget was appropriated
through the education tax until 2000; afterward, the share of the education tax
decreased to approximately 10 percent.
Trend of Education Budget and Education Tax, 1996–06
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Total education budget, 
in trillion won 17.9 19.4 22.9 28.1 33.3 35.0
As share of GDP (%) 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.1
Education tax, 
in trillion won 3.8 4.5 5.8 3.5 3.5 3.4
Share of education 
budget paid by 
revenue from 
education tax (%) 21.2 23.2 25.3 12.5 10.5 9.7
Source: Ministry of Planning and Budget.
which are required to sharpen the nation’s competitive edge in the coming era”
(Presidential Commission on Education Reform 1997, p. 17). 
The rapid economic growth has had a great impact on human resource devel-
opment in two ways. On the industrial side, rapid industrialization affected skill
formation in workplaces; in particular, for a short time industrial deepening
required substantial effort to upgrade workforce skills and knowledge. On the sup-
ply side, the education and training system had to change to meet the new require-
ments of the industry. Hence, Korea’s education and training system responded to
the growth of the Korean economy by rapidly expanding student enrollment capac-
ity, but this caused an imbalance between the quantitative expansion and qualita-
tive improvement of education and resulted in the skill mismatch between public
training and industrial needs. On-the-job training in Korea has always been empha-
sized by both the government and businesses, but public vocational training has
also been criticized for lagging behind the industries’ needs. According to some
critics, public training was in the form of basic training, whereas industry needed
specialized training that would produce workers able to cope with rapid technical
and structural change (Koh 1998, p. 64). Korea’s education system and human
resource development policy has sometimes been successful and sometimes been
deficient, exemplifying the incessant process of transformation toward a vision in
which education is a prime mover in national development.
Summary
The transformation of the Korean economy over about four decades shows a grad-
ual transition to more sophisticated and advanced industrial structures. The suc-
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Table 2.7 Education Expenditures in OECD Countries, 1995
(% of GDP)
United OECD 
Korea Japan States Canada France Germany average
Public education 3.6 3.6 5.0 6.3 5.8 4.5 4.8
Private education 2.6 1.1 1.7 0.7 0.5 1.3 1.2
Gross 6.2 4.7 6.7 7.0 6.3 5.8 6.0
Source: OECD 1998b.
Table 2.8 Educational Expenditures in Korea
(% of GDP)
Expenditure 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Korea Public 3.8 3.6 4.4 4.1 4.8 4.6
Private 1.9 2.6 2.9 2.7 3.4 3.1
Total 5.7 6.2 7.4 6.8 8.2 7.7
OECD total Public 5.0 4.8 4.9 4.6 4.8 5.5
Private 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.4 0.8
Total 6.1 5.9 6.1 5.8 6.2 6.3
Source: OECD 1998b, 2003a, 2005b.
cessful transformation has been made possible by the government’s use of the
appropriate policy framework and industries’ active engagement. The government
set development goals that clearly indicate where the country should move for-
ward. Those goals and major policy directions have changed according to the stage
of development and in response to changes in domestic and international economic
conditions.
The government’s approaches have been practical throughout the years, and its
intervention has been pervasive, as manifested in economic planning. Also, there
have been several instances of trial and error, among them, the HCI plan, which
caused serious distortions in resource allocation and overinvestment. The Korean
government responded to the mistake through rationalization policies that aimed
to restore the market mechanism. In this regard, the role of the Korean government
is not a substitute for the market; rather, it has been successful because it has com-
plemented the functioning of the market, particularly in the earlier years when the
markets and institutions were still at an inceptive stage (Aoki, Kim, and Okuno-
Fujiwara 1997).
The government’s intervention into the market has not been uniform over the
years, as shown by the changes in the macroeconomic policy framework, which has
moved from direct intervention in the early years to liberalization and autonomy
more recently. Managing the economy to support industrialization has brought
tremendous benefits but also costs. Without the government’s intervention to mobi-
lize the limited resources toward a few targeted industries—under which a small
number of large firms enjoyed favorable conditions that fostered rapid growth—
Korea might not have built such modernized industries as steel, automobiles, and
shipbuilding. However, the cost of these industrial policies was not negligible. 
Among other effects, the underdevelopment of the financial sector, which had
been subjected to the industrialization goals, not only caused losses in the financial
sector itself, it also had economy-wide impacts. The direct cost of the financial
repression in the early 1970s turned out to have negatively affected output growth
during the period, and its overall effects on the economy were significantly nega-
tive (Park, Song, and Wang 2004). In addition, the mismatch between the financial
system and the economic system as a whole has made the Korean economy vul-
nerable to outside financial shocks. Therefore, the Korean government’s efforts to
refurbish the economic system, including the financial sector in the early 1990s, did
not produce satisfactory outcomes as expected. 
The government’s intervention in general brought about positive effects in two
areas: human resource development and S&T. Investment in public goods such as
education and innovation has always been advocated as one of the priority areas of
the Korean government, and the Korean case shows that practical and stepwise
approaches can be performed effectively in line with the overall stages of economic
development. A stepwise approach was used in both S&T and human resource
development in Korea. The primary policy goal in the earlier years was expanding
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The role of the government in the Korean economy is not to substitute for, but to com-
plement, the functioning of the market.
infrastructure, whereas enhancing the quality of education and innovation was the
main focus in later years. 
Investment in strengthening Korea’s education and innovation systems is not
only important for the sectors’ own sake; it is also important for enhancing the pro-
ductivity of workers, firms, and industry as a whole. In addition, as ICTs became
critical in propelling national economic growth, Korea significantly expanded
investment in these areas, where the government played a leading role.4 Korea’s
goal of building an information society was a rather late movement, arriving after
the financial crisis in 1997. However, as chapter 5 shows, information infrastructure
was one of the key areas in which government recognized the importance of prior-
itizing investment for, on one hand, its own development and, on the other hand,
its impacts on the rest of the economy.
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Investment in public goods such as education and innovation has always been advo-
cated as one of the priority areas of the Korean government, and the Korean case shows
that practical and stepwise approaches can be performed effectively in line with the
overall development stages.
4. As chapter 5 shows, it is more accurate to say that the production and export of elec-
tronics hardware propelled Korea’s economic growth, not the use of advanced ICTs and the
Internet. This issue is recapitulated in chapter 8.
3
The Challenges for Korea’s Development 
Strategies 
Cheonsik Woo and Joonghae Suh
Problems that Caused the Financial Crisis of 1997
The financial crisis in 1997 was the critical junction for Korea to rethink and
redesign the ways of managing the national economy. During the high-growth
years, the Korean government had actively intervened in the market in the form of
selective industrial policies, yet there are debates on the effectiveness of these poli-
cies (see box 2.1). As explained in chapter 2, in the 1990s, the Korean economy faced
the urgent need to reform its economic system, make the financial system more
autonomous, and restructure redundancies in the industrial sectors. 
Despite the efforts of the new government, however, reform and restructuring
were unsuccessful until the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1997. One of the fac-
tors in the aborted reform was the short-lived economic recovery that had resulted
from the appreciation of the yen in the early 1990s, which fostered complacency
and maintained the status quo. However, according to Fukagawa (1997), the fun-
damental reason for retarded industrial restructuring lies in the “iron triangle of
bank-chaebol-government” that hinders the free flow of financial resources that are
needed to restructure the overinvested industries. Chang (2003) sees the situation
differently, arguing that the cronyism story seems implausible. According to Chang,
Korea’s selective industrial policies before the 1990s were successful because of the
government’s ability to discipline the recipients of the state-created rents. The crisis
was the result of hasty financial liberalization and the weakening of such discipli-
nary power (Chang 2003).
However, the self-diagnosis of the Korean government clearly points out the
adverse effects of the iron triangle and condemns it as a prime cause of the financial
crisis. “The government failed to set either the foundations for a market economy
or an environment in which businesses and banks would assume responsibility for
their mistakes in free market competition. In various sections of society, moral haz-
ard prevailed where market principles failed to work. Chaebols and financial insti-
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tutions expected that the government would take fiscal measures to bail them out
when the economy declined”(Government of the Republic of Korea 1999, p. 12) 
Causes of the Financial Crisis
The causes of the financial crisis might be considered from three aspects—Korea’s
financial system, international competitiveness, and the failure of the government
to build a new economic system. First, from the aspect of the financial system, inter-
national capital movements in a global marketplace weaken the autonomy of indi-
vidual countries to manage their domestic financial markets. The problem gets
worse when the financial institutions have weak risk management. Korea’s finan-
cial sectors had been regulated by the government so that financial market liberal-
ization pursued throughout the mid-1990s exposed the Korean banking system to
outside shocks without due preparation, as discussed in DJnomics:
In 1997, many banks and financial institutions became insolvent as they were
saddled with the huge unpaid debts of bankrupt chaebols. Nonetheless, such
rampant insolvency was not the sole cause for the flight of foreign capital. The
Korean foreign exchange crisis was the product of two events. First, the share
of short-term debt increased quickly, exceeding that of long-term debt by 1994
[see table 3.1]. Had it not been for this exorbitant accumulation of short-term
debt the massive outflow of foreign capital—which in turn triggered the for-
eign exchange crisis—would not have happened. Second, foreign analysts
downgraded the prospects for the Korean economy, further exacerbating the
capital flight. The causes for this rapid increase in short-term debt and foreign
creditors’ negative view of the Korean financial market are varied. The deluge
of short-term debt was rooted in the negligence of financial supervision dur-
ing the process of rapid capital liberalization, combined with instability in the
international money market and the government’s unsophisticated policy
responses to the situation (Government of the Republic of Korea 1999, p. 6) 
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The key suspected causes of the 1997 financial crisis in Korea are the breakdown in
financial system, the erosion of economy’s international competitiveness, and weak
macroeconomic and institutional environments, which were badly in need of reforms.
Table 3.1 Trends in Short- and Long-Term Foreign Debt, 1992–97
(percent)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Long-term debt share 56.8 56.3 46.6 42.2 41.7 42.4
Growth rate 11.0 1.6 7.3 24.9 32.0 17.2
Short-term debt share 43.2 43.7 53.4 57.8 58.3 57.6
Growth rate 7.6 3.8 58.3 49.0 34.7 14.1
Source: Government of the Republic of Korea 1999.
Second, the continued erosion of the Korean economy in terms of international
competitiveness is more fundamental than the financial aspect. The underlying
causes of financial insolvency and the bankruptcies of the large firms lie in the dete-
riorating profitability of businesses in conjunction with rising wages and lowered
productivity since the late 1980s. Accustomed to the growth first strategies of the
past and under the patronage of the government, those firms had neglected to
change their strategies and upgrade nonprice factors of competitiveness. Instead,
large enterprises were still preoccupied with expanding their business scale, which
was made possible through increased lending by the banks. 
The third aspect, which seems to be remote, is the failure of government to build
a new economic system. During the 30 years of economic development before the
crisis, under the authoritarian regimes, the government had intervened severely in
the market. Despite the government’s effort to enhance market functions, the per-
vasive cronyism between political and business circles had a detrimental effect on
the economy as a whole. Increased demand for individual freedom after the democ-
ratization in the late 1980s called for clearly defined economic rules and systems
that are more consistent with the international norm. The government had felt the
necessity of reform, and in 1993, the new government tried to introduce several
reform measures. But the reform efforts in the 1990s, until the outbreak of the finan-
cial crisis in 1997, were aborted because of the short-lived economic recovery that
had resulted from the appreciation of the yen, among other things.
New Strategies for Korea’s Economic Development
The overarching challenge for Korea after the financial crisis was to secure new,
sustainable sources of growth. Korea’s potential growth rate during the 1990s had
already declined to 6.7 percent from the 8 percent of the preceding decade, mainly
because of a sharp fall in labor growth (from 2.6 percent to 1.5 percent). That long-
term trend will continue in the future (see table 3.2). 
The problem of securing new, sustainable sources of growth for Korea’s future
thus translates into the problem of enhancing the knowledge base and innovation
capabilities of Korean people and firms, because a critical factor here is the produc-
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Table 3.2 Potential Growth Rates and Sources of Growth in Korea 
(percent)
1980– 1990– 2000–10 2010–20
90 2000 High Low High Low
Actual growth rate 9.1 5.7
Irregular factors 1.1 1.0
Potential growth rate 8.0 6.7 5.1 4.5 4.1 3.2
Growth in factor inputs 4.5 3.4 2.5 2.4 1.9 1.7
Labor 2.6 1.5 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.2
Capital 2.0 1.9 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.5
Productivity growth 3.5 3.4 2.7 2.1 2.2 1.5
Technological advances 1.1 1.2 1.2 0.9 1.1 0.7
Source: Korea Development Institute (KDI) 2002.
tivity growth resulting from technological progress or advances. Actually, along
with economic restructuring, these needs constituted another major thrust of
Korea’s policy initiatives after the financial crisis, and notable progress has been
made in this regard. Indeed, the latest financial crisis can be assessed as an epochal
event that precipitated Korea’s crossover from the old development paradigm of
input-based growth to a new development paradigm of innovation-driven, knowl-
edge-based growth. Korea’s strategy to seek and anchor such a new development
paradigm is well represented by the knowledge-based economy (KBE) master plan
of 1999 and the ensuing three-year KBE action plan (see Woo [2004] for a detailed
explanation).
Korea’s Master Plan for a KBE in 1999
In general, the transition to a KBE means making the entire society more suitable
for the creation, dissemination, and exploitation of knowledge. However, practical
and policy implications of the transition to a KBE vary across countries, depending
on the stage of economic development, industrial characteristics, and institutional
or cultural environments. The gist of the challenge for Korea is to make the most of
the existing pool of technologies, intellectual assets, industrial base, and other pro-
ductive assets, whether they exist within Korea or outside. 
In the 1999 design of the KBE strategy, Korea’s assets and disadvantages for the
transition to a KBE were summarized as follows: 
• Strengths include (a) the high motivation and high absorptive capability of
the people, who are equipped with good educational background, and (b)
the world-class, modern production facilities, balanced industrial base, and
reliable supply chain supported by Korea’s indigenous firms, which will
guarantee Korea some minimal level of industrial performance for a while. 
• Weaknesses are the resources gap and the institutional gap. The resources
gap is Korea’s disadvantage in core factors of production such as knowledge,
technology, and capital compared with the leading industrialized countries.
The institutional gap is Korea’s lack of a range of system assets, such as a
market economy and organizational assets, that are needed to use existing
resources efficiently. 
• Opportunities are seen in the following. (a) Multinational enterprises are
strengthening their northeast Asian strategy, looking for a regional platform
for a range of mid- to high-level knowledge-intensive activities. (b) The lat-
est crisis brought about a fortuitous chance for Korea to undertake drastic
restructuring and reform measures to make itself more market- and knowl-
edge-friendly. 
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The transition to a KBE means making the entire society more suitable for the creation,
dissemination, and exploitation of knowledge. The practical and policy implications of
the transition vary across countries, depending on the level of economic development,
industrial characteristics, and institutional and cultural environments.
• Threats include (a) the competitive pressure from low-wage economies,
which is escalating, and (b) waning momentum of reform in Korea because
of the unexpectedly fast recovery from the financial crisis. 
The strategic thrust of Korea’s KBE plan includes (a) harnessing the market fun-
damentals through successful completion of the major structural reforms that are
under way; (b) transforming Korea into a fully open, globally connected society by
further liberalization measures and proactive policies that promote FDI; and (c)
enhancing the indigenous innovation capacity by establishing an advanced system
to further national innovation.
Three-Year Action Plan
Korea’s knowledge strategy as envisaged in the KBE master plan was implemented
under the auspices of the three-year KBE action plan (see table 3.3). The action plan
deliberately focused on the microeconomic side issues of the KBE, such as ICTs,
innovation and S&T, education and human resource management, and the digital
divide. The plan did not address the macroeconomic side issues of harnessing mar-
ket fundamentals and fully opening up, because their core policy agendas such as
financial, corporate, labor, and public sector reforms were already being fully
implemented in the context of Korea’s all-out crisis management or system-rebuild-
ing efforts. 
Put into effect in April 2000, the action plan set forth three goals: (a) leapfrog to
the top 10 knowledge-information leaders in the globe, (b) upgrade educational
environments to OECD standards, and (c) spearhead S&T such as bioengineering
by upgrading to G-7 standards. Aiming to meet these goals, the plan set out 18 pol-
icy tasks and 83 actionable subtasks in the five main areas of information infra-
structure, human resource development, knowledge-based industry development,
S&T, and methods of coping with the digital divide. To implement the action plan,
the government formed five working groups that involve 19 ministries and 17
research institutes, with MOFE assigned to coordinate the overall implementation. 
Progress and Attainment 
The three-year KBE action plan was implemented in 2000 with adequate budget
support. Korea managed to substantially increase its budget spending in the
planned action areas, even though the overall budget situation was quite tight as a
result of the huge burden of financing the corporate and financial restructuring pro-
grams that were under way. In the 2000 budget, the total budget growth rate was
4.7 percent, but growth rates in the information and R&D sectors were 12.9 percent
and 13.4 percent, respectively. In 2001, the growth rates in the informatization,
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Korea’s plan for transition to the KBE included (a) harnessing market fundamentals for
the major structural reforms that were in progress; (b) increasing openness by further
liberalizing measures and policies to promote FDI; and (c) enhancing the indigenous
innovation capacity by establishing an advanced system to further national innovation.
R&D, and education sectors were 15.7 percent, 16.3 percent, and 19.1 percent,
respectively, far exceeding the overall budget growth rate of 5.7 percent. 
Greatly helped by such budget support, the action plan has stayed on track. By
June 2002, of the 83 programs, 7 had been completed (6 in the informatization sec-
tor), and 76 are under way as originally planned. The three goals have not yet been
attained, but results are more or less satisfactory. In five main policy areas, the gov-
ernment has achieved great success in the area of information infrastructure and
made good progress in the areas of knowledge-intensive industries and innovation
and S&T, but progress has been relatively limited in the area of education.1
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Table 3.3 Korea’s Three-Year Action Plan for the KBE, 2000–03
Sector Target tasks (18 total)
Informatization • Complete a basic information infrastructure, such as an optical cable 
network
• Foster an education information network
• Manage a national knowledge and information system
• Build a cyber government
• Change mindsets with respect to IT
• Build a sound and secure knowledge society
S&T and • Reinforce a strategic approach in R&D investment
innovation • Facilitate cooperation among industry, universities, and research 
centers
• Build an efficient support system for research
• Enhance an understanding of S&T and scientists
Knowledge- • Build an industrial infrastructure for a KBE
based industries • Nurture a new knowledge-intensive industry
• Upgrade traditional industries through IT
Education and • Reform the education system for creativity and competitiveness
human resource • Revamp the vocational training system
development • Develop a fair and efficient labor market
and management
Digital divide • Expand access to information and IT training
• Empower the vulnerable and enhance their life quality
Source: MOFE 2000.
1. Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 deal with the four areas of the KBE in detail. 
4
Designing a New Economic Framework 
Siwook Lee, Wonhyuk Lim, Joonghae Suh, and Moon Joong Tcha
As of 2003, Korea had risen to become the 11th largest economy in the world, in
terms of total GDP, from one of the most devastated and poorest economies when
the Korean War ended in 1953. At least part of this achievement was arguably due to
the government-led growth strategy that was based on the fast accumulation of
labor and capital, among other factors, in particular since the early 1960s. However,
this quantitative growth model has run its course as the economy has continued to
become more structurally complex. Recognizing this, the Korean government rede-
fined its role and pursued continuous reforms to convert the economic system into
a more market-oriented and autonomous one. The 1997 financial crisis is considered
to be an important turning point as the government-led interventionists faced a dra-
matic challenge because of radical changes that accompanied the crisis. The govern-
ment tried to establish market discipline in economic activities and consequently
minimize the government’s intervention in the market. Structural reforms in Korea,
starting in the wake of the crisis, have been extensive, covering most of the areas in
public and private domains. The scheme of the reforms is summarized in figure 4.1.
The economic reforms since the 1997 crisis had three main objectives:
1. to transform Korea into a market-oriented economy by deregulating across
the sectors, thereby promoting competition and entrepreneurship (at the
same time, a modern regulatory framework would be set up to support the
efficient and equitable functioning of the markets);
2. to improve the institutional regime by improving the rule of law and by hav-
ing greater transparency, disclosure of information, and accountability on
the part of the government as well as the private sector; and
3. to continue the transition to the KBE by developing a relevant and modern
legal and institutional infrastructure in such areas as intellectual property
rights, valuation of intangible assets, and laws to cover privacy and security
in digital transactions.
To encourage a market-oriented economy, the government’s objectives were to
promote competition and entrepreneurship and deregulate the market to encour-
age the creativity of the private sector. At the same time, the reform provided a
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modern regulatory framework to support the efficient and equitable functioning of
the markets.
To improve the institutional regime, the Korean government aimed to secure the
rule of law and provided greater transparency, disclosure of information, and
accountability for market players, as well as for the government.
The government initiated the transition to an advanced KBE, for which it
planned to establish modern legal and institutional infrastructures that were rele-
vant for the knowledge economy in such areas as intellectual property rights, valu-
ation of intangible assets, and laws covering privacy and security in the cyber
domain and digital transactions. The government acted as a catalyst for a high-
speed Internet backbone, promoting new technologies and facilitating networks
(among universities, researchers, and firms), while it was careful to foster market-
led mechanisms.
As well as the structural reforms, the Korean government had also focused on
developing venture business firms. The Korean government has fully recognized
the significance of venture business that commercializes the new technologies and
ideas characterized by high-risk, high-return opportunities. The Korean govern-
54 Korea as a Knowledge Economy
The three main objectives of Korea’s post-1997 economic reforms were encouraging a
market-oriented economy, improving the institutional regime, and making the transi-
tion to an advanced KBE.





















Source: Government of the Republic of Korea 1999, p. 46.
ment has felt the need to systematically support small, technologically agile firms
to advance the industry structure and create high-quality jobs. 
This chapter discusses structural reforms and other institutional efforts that
have strong implications for the Korean economy’s transformation into a KBE. All
of Korea’s efforts since the 1997 crisis are crucial if the economy is to build strong
institutional infrastructures and fortify the rule of law. In this regard, the progress
is closely related to Korea’s success in establishing a KBE. 
Financial Sector Reforms
Restoring confidence in Korea’s financial system was a top priority for the govern-
ment in the wake of the 1997 crisis. The crisis stemmed largely from the failures of
a banking system that had doled out soft loans to conglomerates, which did not
worry about profits. Financial sector reforms are the keystone of far-reaching
reforms throughout the economy. The government has embraced the following
principles in bringing the financial sector up to world standards in terms of capital
structure and prudential supervision: (a) restoration of financial intermediary func-
tions through the elimination of uncertainties that prevailed in the overall financial
system; (b) the swift exit of nonviable financial institutions from the market and
early normalization of viable institutions through settlement of nonperforming
loans and injection of public funds; and (c) prevention of moral hazard through the
strict application of loss-sharing principles to the beneficiaries of public funds.
Financial sector reforms have been undertaken in several ways. First, to rehabil-
itate the financial system, the government liquidated troubled institutions,
removed nonperforming loans, and recapitalized promising financial institutions
by injecting public funds (see figure 4.2). Following the government’s lead, finan-
cial institutions also adopted stricter standards, which have greatly contributed to
increasing the financial health and profitability of the financial industry. Various
institutional reforms also were implemented to avoid a repeat of this kind of disas-
ter. Most notably, the precrisis distortions in financial resource allocation and cor-
porate governance drew great attention.
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Cleaning Up Nonperforming Loans
In the wake of the crisis, one of the main challenges that Korea faced was “legacy
costs”—problems resulting from mistaken or unlawful decisions of the past. Fore-
most among these problems were massive nonperforming loans (NPLs) that had
resulted from unprofitable investment. The magnitude of NPLs reached a level that
it was impossible for banks to clean up themselves. Consequently, after closing the
worst of the distressed financial institutions, the government had to step in with
public funds and urge financial institutions to take proactive measures against
insolvent firms. Although the injection of public funds was likely to generate polit-
ical controversy, the government decided to withstand criticism and stabilize the
financial system. 
Once the government decided to inject public funds to rehabilitate the financial
sector, the question became what exactly constituted an NPL. Before the crisis, only
loans in arrears for six months or more had been classified as NPLs. In July 1998,
banks tightened the asset classification standards by redefining NPLs as those loans
in arrears for three months or more. Nonbank financial institutions followed suit in
March 1999. In December 1999, financial institutions adopted a forward-looking
approach in asset classification, taking into account the future performance of bor-
rowers in addition to their track record in debt service. The forward-looking crite-
ria pushed creditors to make a more realistic assessment of loan risks based on
borrowers’ managerial competence, financial conditions, and future cash flow.
Creditors classified loans as substandard when borrowers’ ability to meet debt ser-
vice obligations was deemed to be considerably weakened. NPLs were to include
substandard loans on which interest payments were not made. In March 2000, the
asset classification standards were further strengthened with the introduction of
the enhanced forward-looking criteria, which classify loans as nonperforming
when future risks are significant, even if interest payments have been made with-
out a problem up to that point. With the use of the enhanced criteria, NPLs would
have increased from 66.7 trillion won (W) to W 88.0 trillion at the end of 1999. 
To clean up NPLs and rehabilitate the financial sector, the government injected
a total of W 155.3 trillion (approximately US$129 billion), equivalent to 28 percent
of Korea’s GDP in 2001, as of end-2001. Table 4.1 shows the sources and uses of pub-
lic funds. Two-thirds of public funds were raised through bonds issued by Korea
Asset Management Corporation and Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC).
More than W 40 trillion was used to settle deposit insurance obligations and pro-
vide liquidity to distressed financial institutions. Funds used for recapitalization
and purchase of NPLs and other assets made up the rest of the government’s injec-
tion of W 155.3 trillion, which provided better prospects for recovery. 
Along with the restructuring, which was helped by the injection of large-scale
public funds, the total amount of bad loans (loans classified as substandard or
below) fell to W 31.8 trillion in 2002 from the highest W 66.7 trillion in 1999. At the
same time, the share of bad loans out of total loans sharply decreased, from 11.3 per-
cent in 1999 to 1.9 percent in 2004, at and below par relative to many OECD coun-
tries (figure 4.3). - Similarly, figure 4.4 shows that Korea’s level of nonperforming
loans is currently significantly less than before the crisis. The restructuring of the
financial sector had been implemented as planned. In that regard, the financial crisis
was a blessing in disguise in that it acted as a catalyst for change (Kang 2004).
56 Korea as a Knowledge Economy
In sum, the liquidation of troubled institutions, removal of NPLs, and recapital-
ization of promising institutions through injection of public funds have contributed
to increasing the financial health and profitability of the financial industry. The
Bank for International Settlement ratio of equity, a measure of the financial health
of banks, increased from 7.0 percent in 1997 to 10.5 percent in 2002. Banks have
increased in size through active mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry.
According to the criterion of total assets, only one of Korea’s domestic banks was
among the world’s 200 largest banks in 1997. In 2002, six domestic banks were
listed.
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Table 4.1 Sources and Uses of Public Funds, 1997–2004
(trillion won)
Settlement 
Purchase of insured Recapi- Purchase 
of NPLs deposits Contribution talization of assets Total
Bond issues 20.5 20.0 15.2 42.2 4.2 102.1
Fiscal funds n.a. n.a. n.a. 14.0 6.3 20.3
Recycled funds 17.4 7.4 2.2 6.0 5.1 38.1
Other funds 1.1 2.9 0.2 0.0 0.1 4.3
Total 39.0 30.3 17.6 62.2 15.7 164.8
Source: Public Fund Oversight Committee 2004.
n.a. not available.
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Enhancing the Financial Sector Infrastructure
The government understood the seriousness of the underdeveloped financial sec-
tor, which was one of the major causes of the financial crisis, and knew it would
retard the growth process if not improved. The government continued to reform
the financial industry by improving the financial market infrastructure and
strengthening the stability of the financial system. The major areas in the efforts to
enhance the infrastructure of the financial sector included development of capital
markets, separation of banking and nonbanking commerce, consolidation of finan-
cial regulations, and market-oriented financial supervision. Reform efforts to
restructure financially distressed firms have continued. In particular, to complete
the restructuring of the financial sector, the restructuring of the nonbank sector was
accelerated, and the government-owned financial institutions were privatized.
Moreover, to improve the market infrastructure in the financial sector, the govern-
ment has pursued measures such as the advancing the capital market, overcoming
the ill effects resulting from integration of financial regulations, and using market-
friendly financial supervision.
However, despite these positive results, the restructuring process in the non-
banking areas, including convertible securities, is not complete. In particular,
because of diminishing corporate demand for funding after the financial crisis,
once-prevalent corporate loans are now being replaced by household and personal
debt, which has emerged as a new restructuring task. The domestic financial
industry has not adequately gained the confidence of domestic and overseas
investors, in spite of the restructuring that has taken place during the years since
the 1997 crisis. As revealed in the accounting scandals in major conglomerates, the
problem of transparency in the financial markets continues, and protection of
investors against unfair trade practices in the securities market needs to be
addressed further.
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Corporate Sector Reforms
The financial crisis was triggered when it became publicly known that many large
firms, notably chaebols, had large amounts of debts that they could not repay. Pre-
viously, the chaebols had rushed into the same new industries to maintain their sta-
tus, which was the standard expansion strategy regardless of profitability and
competence. The expansion strategy of large firms turned out to be no longer sus-
tainable as the bankruptcy of large firms exacerbated the financial market credit
system. The relationship between large firms’ bankruptcy and the financial market
crunch was a kind of vicious circle, as depicted in figure 4.5. Therefore, the first
objective of the corporate reform was to eliminate overcapacity. The second broad
objective was to encourage firms to reinvent themselves on the strength of their
core competencies, by becoming more competitive in the global market. 
Enhancing the Corporate Governance System
The Korean government recognized that one of the most important reasons for the
economic crisis was the structural weakness of firms. The underdeveloped corpo-
rate governance system eroded sound management and made firms vulnerable to
shocks. Starting in 1998, the Korean government introduced a number of measures
to improve financial disclosure and accounting standards, including the require-
ment of combined financial statements that cover all companies under the effective
control of the same business group, regardless of the level of shareholdings.
Another reform would improve the prudence of corporate governance by guaran-
teeing the voting right of the shareholders.
Major reforms that have continued since the economic crisis are summarized in
table 4.2. These institutional reforms, combined with increased scrutiny by
investors in the postcrisis period, have led to substantive improvement in the cor-
porate governance of Korean firms. Gone are the days when directors on corporate
boards left their official stamps with the company so that decisions made by con-
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trolling shareholders could be formally approved without much ado. Although
some loopholes in regulations on the transaction of shares remain, attempts to
expropriate minority shareholders are no longer likely to go unnoticed. The threats
of litigation and damage to reputation are also forcing accountants, auditors, and
creditors to become more cautious in their dealings with their corporate customers. 
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Table 4.2 Major Reform Measures Related to Corporate Governance in Korea in the Post-
crisis Period
Policy challenges Specific measures adopted
Improve transparency Mandated combined financial statements for the top 30 business 
groups (January 1998, starting with business year 1999)
Adopted international accounting and auditing standards 
(GAAP and GAAS, December 1998)
Mandated board resolution and disclosure for large-scale 
inter-subsidiary transactions (December 1998)
Strengthened law enforcement against “window dressing” and 
poor auditing
Mandated establishment of a committee for appointing 
independent auditors (January 2000)
Enhance the Made it possible to hold de facto directors (chongsu) 
accountability and accountable for their decisions and introduced fiduciary 
independence of the duty and cumulative voting (December 1998)
board of directors Mandated appointment of outside directors: at least one person 
(1998), no less than one-fourth of the board (1999), no less than 
one-half of the board (2000, for financial institutions and large 
listed companies)
Mandated establishment of an auditing committee (December 
1999) 
Protect the property Lowered filing requirements for motion to dismiss directors and 
rights of minority auditors (February 1998)
shareholders Lowered filing requirements for derivative action suits (May 
1998)
Lowered filing requirements for inspection of accounting books 
(February 2001)
Lowered requirements for recommending outside directors 
(February 2001)
Liberalize mergers Abolished mandatory tender offer (February 1998)
and acquisitions Abolished ceiling on equity investment by foreigners (May 
1998)
Strengthen the role of Allowed banks to exercise voting rights on stocks in their trust 
creditors in corporate accounts (September 1998)
governance Mandated periodic assessment of corporate credit risks (March 
2001)
Gave the KIC the right to investigate unlawful activities on the 
part of financially distressed firms (March 2001)
Improve the financial Induced reduction of debt-to-equity ratio through Capital 
soundness of firms Structure Improvement Plans (1998–99)
Prohibited intersubsidiary loan guarantees (February 1998)
Improving Bankruptcy Procedures
For more efficient functioning of failing firms’ market exits, reorganization proce-
dures should be implemented quickly. Since the surge in the number of bankruptcies
during the financial crisis, laws related to bankruptcy, including the Corporate Reor-
ganization Act, and the Composition Act have been revised. In February 2003, the
government submitted a proposal for a recovery and bankruptcy law that integrated
corporate reorganization, composition, and bankruptcy. The integrated bankruptcy
act removes previously misused negotiation procedures and simplifies the bank-
ruptcy process by focusing on corporate reorganization. Also, mergers and acquisi-
tions among bankrupt firms will be promoted to expedite recovery and retirement of
inefficient firms, all to support market competition.
Removing Anticompetitive Regulations
The main role of a government in securing a competitive market system is to ensure
fair and equal opportunities to every firm. Market monopolies can be created and
maintained by the government’s artificial barriers to entry, as well as by technical rea-
sons such as economies of scale. Firms with a monopolistic status produced by artifi-
cial barriers to entry usually use their advantages in socially less productive ways,
such as lobbying, to maintain their monopolies. Consequently, the government needs
to remove artificial barriers to entry and induce price competition among firms. The
Korean government has attempted to remove various institutions that inhibit com-
petition; for example, in February 1999, the government dissolved 20 cartels engaged
in price collusion, limitation of sales volumes, and partitioning of sales areas. In 2004,
the Second Cartel Reformation Act was legislated to abolish anticompetitive laws
and systems. The series of institutional reforms that have been implemented is
expected to pave the way for fair competition in the market.
Promoting Openness: Korea as a Northeast Asian Economic Hub
For Korea, a country highly dependent on international trade, the continuous open-
ing of its market is a catalyst for strengthening the country’s economic constitution
by maximizing competition. The Korean government recognized the importance of
opening up the nation, and it continued to accelerate its globalization trend by par-
ticipating in multilateral and bilateral free trade negotiations. The promotion of free
trade areas (FTAs), aligning with strategically vital trading partners, helps secure
the strategic position of domestic companies by securing a stable export market
and overcoming high trade barriers within the region (see box 4.1). FTAs also con-
tribute to the attraction of FDI. FTAs with major countries should further encourage
investors to set up production bases in Korea, which may open the door for non-
tariff exports with those countries. Korea formed an FTA with Chile in 2004 and is
currently working on other possibilities with countries that show potential interest.
Labor Market Reforms
Korea’s well-trained and hard-working labor force was a key contributing factor
for successful industrialization beginning in the early 1960s, and high economic
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growth gave new employment opportunities. During this period, until late 1987,
wages often increased more than the productivity growth rates (figure 4.6), but this
was mostly the result of the labor shortages caused by rapid economic growth. The
situation has gradually changed as the economy has matured, and the labor market
conditions in terms of labor supply and demand have become tighter than before.
The Democratization Declaration on June 29, 1987, marked not only a political turn-
ing point for Korea, but also a shift in the nation’s labor sector. The wage increase in
the post June–29 Declaration period was determined by the institutionalized labor
union, not by the market (Yoo 2004). Wage increases that were higher than the pro-
ductivity growth undermined the competitiveness of the economy. The tension
between labor and management, together with increasing wages, emerged as a
major obstacle to attracting foreign investment. The financial crisis and restructur-
ing efforts thereafter struck a serious blow to Korea’s labor force. Large-scale lay-
offs, which had been rare during the development era, became common, and this
elicited strong national interest in how to maintain the right balance between labor
flexibility and social security.1
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Box 4.1 Korea as a Northeast Asian Hub
Using Korea’s geographical potential and creating a systematic framework for eco-
nomic cooperation among Korea, China, and Japan are essential to making Korea an
economic hub of northeast Asia. Forging economic partnerships among the three coun-
tries is a mid- to long-term goal of the government, which plans to develop Korea as an
economic hub of northeast Asia. 
One of the critical aims of the Korean government regarding globalization is to
expand growth engines by strategically attracting foreign capital and advancing the
economic system. In particular, Korea not only has developed a top-notch manufactur-
ing industry, it also has enhanced service industries such as transports and logistics,
banking, and so forth. Besides developing infrastructure such as airports, harbors, and
housing complexes, the government is moving forward with core tasks: (a) adjusting
the allocation of investment in transportation facilities, (b) encouraging logistics-spe-
cialized companies with international competitiveness, (c) clarifying and planning opti-
mal logistics transactions, (d) developing human resources specialized in logistics, (e)
improving the international logistics support system and attracting foreign logistics
companies, (f) building a logistics information system, and (g) bolstering the level of
logistics infrastructure, such as constructing a northeast Asian railroad network. 
Source: Government of the Republic of Korea 2004.
1. Labor issues are an area where many conflicts of interest and differences in views and
philosophies exist. Most of the expositions in the next sections are excerpted from the gov-
ernment’s official positions (Government of the Republic of Korea 2004).
After 1987, real wage increases, determined by labor unions, were higher than produc-
tivity growth, thereby undermining the competitiveness of the Korean economy.
Enhancing Labor Market Flexibility
The term labor market flexibility refers not only to adjustments in employment, but
also to job-training programs and the infrastructure that enables job seekers to find
work. Korea’s labor market changed to become more flexible, in part because of the
enactment of managerial dismissal rights (the right to dismiss labor for managerial
reasons) in the Basic Labor Conditions Act of March 1998, before which managerial
dismissals were recognized only in special cases. Labor market flexibility in Korea
has been primarily a concern of management, a way of weathering the financial cri-
sis rather than an issue demanding legislation. Because of that, the newly intro-
duced managerial dismissal program has been largely replaced with honorary
retirement programs, and managerial dismissal has been permitted only in very
limited circumstances. This situation has resulted in a heavy reliance on nonper-
manent workers who are irregularly and temporarily employed.
The reform of the labor market also needed to include strengthening the protec-
tion of vulnerable workers, expanding employment benefits, and addressing the
youth unemployment problem. This challenge was addressed by the establishment
of employment centers, an increase in the number of job counselors, and the imple-
mentation of the Work-Net facility for job seekers. These measures have contributed
substantially to increasing labor market flexibility. 
The coexistence of unemployment among the young and shortages in the work-
force in small- and medium-size firms suggests that there may be a mismatch
between demand and supply in the labor market, as well as reduced numbers of
jobs as a result of business depression alone. One reason for the mismatch in the
labor market lies in the education system. Although the structure of the labor mar-
ket changed substantially, school education nonetheless fell short of the needs intro-
duced by changes in the labor market. In 1990, the rate of high school graduates
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entering college was 33.2 percent, while in 2003, it stood at 79.7 percent. During the
period 1995–2003, the number of college graduates grew by 180,000; however, these
graduates have not proved capable of commanding the skills necessary to work in
the industrial field. This was why education-sector reform had to accompany the
nationwide economic reforms.
Korea is rapidly becoming an aging society. Shifts in the paradigm caused by
this rapid transformation to an aging society require countermeasures based on
sound employment policies. To alleviate the increased social burden stemming
from an increasingly dependent senior population, the overall labor force partici-
pation rate should be raised. To that end, women, especially highly educated
women, should be actively encouraged to join the workforce. The government
planned to provide a better environment for women to participate in the labor mar-
ket, including provision of child care and eradication of gender discrimination.
Because countermeasures to an aging society usually bring about few immediately
visible results, long-range measures should be pursued.
Improving Labor-Management Relations
The current government has proposed the construction of socially integrated labor
relations as a policy target. Having socially integrated labor relations means that
transparent management and constructive labor have equal importance, recogniz-
ing each other as partners, cooperating, and considering each other’s position for
the sake of the national economy. The government established the Committee for
the Advancement of Labor Relations in May 2003 and initiated the process for
improving labor relations. The committee devised a plan to advance labor-related
acts through internal discussion and subsequent reports to the concerned govern-
mental body. In September 2003, the government announced its own version of the
plan to renew labor relations, which contains basic directives and conceptual
approaches. 
The aims of reform in labor relations were to minimize the social costs stemming
from labor disputes, create a more flexible and stable labor market, and reduce
inequities among the various working classes. The government’s directive contains
major policies and approaches to meet those goals. To minimize social costs, for exam-
ple, the government proposed the implementation of systems, institutions, and tra-
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Reform of the Korean tertiary education system necessarily accompanied labor market
reforms because Korean university graduates, although increasing in number, were not
appropriately trained to match the current industrial needs of the Korean knowledge
economy.
To offset the economic effects of an increasing elderly dependency ratio due to the rapid
aging of the Korean population, various policy measures were implemented to encour-
age women to join the labor force.
ditions that comply with global standards. These approaches reflect the government’s
objective of dealing with its own labor unions as entities with rights and responsibil-
ities in solving problems, provided they are within the boundaries of the law. 
Public Sector Reforms
Redefining the role of the government has at least two important implications.
First, because the government sector constitutes a significant portion of the econ-
omy, the redefinition of its role will have a substantial influence on the entire econ-
omy. Second, one of the most important roles of the government is to provide an
environment within which economic agents act and operate. The redefinition of the
government’s role will change this environment and affect the activities of the eco-
nomic agents. The government should respect what the private sector and the com-
petitive market is able to do by providing level playing fields for private sector
firms, creating sound macroeconomic environments through institutional reforms,
and providing public goods, including information. Korea did well in this regard
after the crisis. An efficient and service-oriented government has been achieved,
including improved public sector management, such as in the tax system and
administration, more transparency in budget processes and human resource man-
agement, and greater outsourcing to the private sector.
Restructuring the Institutional Regime 
Being a reliable government means achieving administrative efficiency by having a
more flexible and open system, enhancing transparency, and improving the quality
of the administration serving economic agents. Although the effort to reform the
government was initiated by Kim Dae-Joong’s government, more active reform has
been carried out since the current Roh government came to power. To achieve these
administrative goals, the Roh government established the Presidential Committee
on Government Innovation and Decentralization in April 2003. The committee con-
sisted of both private and government agencies. The government also set up sev-
eral task forces and established a reform team in each governmental department.
These bodies were expected to carry out administrative reforms autonomously and
systematically through flexible coordination with the presidential committee. 
By continuing systematic and continuous administrative reform, the govern-
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The aims of improving labor–management relations were to minimize the social costs of
labor disputes, create a more flexible and stable labor market, and reduce inequities
among the various working classes.
Since the 1997 crisis, the Korean government has been allowing the market mechanism
to work and the private sector to take the lead in spurring economic activity.
ment hopes to improve the delivery of public services, increase government open-
ness, advance democratic participation, and increase government transparency.
The most important institutional variable that the government is planning to con-
trol is corruption. In particular, using the crisis as momentum, Korea has attempted
to eradicate the connection between business sectors and government or politi-
cians. One of the most important efforts of the government in fighting corruption
has been the establishment of an independent body, the Korea Independent Com-
mission against Corruption, in 2002, based on Korea’s Anticorruption Act. The gov-
ernment recognized that eradicating corruption is one of the most urgent tasks, and
it must be accomplished if the nation wishes to become a fair society and a globally
competitive economy. The functions of the commission include formulating and
assessing policy, making institutional improvements, responding to whistle blow-
ers, and educating business about and promoting its activities. 
Maintaining Fiscal Soundness and Privatization in Fiscal Reforms
One of the factors that enabled Korea to recover from the financial crisis in a short
period is the soundness of its budget and fiscal system. As of 2002, the total debt of
the central government reached about 21 percent of GDP, which was about twice
the level of debt before the crisis. Nevertheless, it was much lower than the OECD
average, which was as high as 74 percent of GDP. However, the liability backed by
the government increased rapidly because of the restructuring of the financial sec-
tor after the crisis. Although the government managed the fiscal system success-
fully, the burden on the government was not lessening. Since 2000, after the
recovery, the central government has managed its budget with a surplus. One of
advantages of maintaining a sound budget is having the flexibility to use fiscal pol-
icy if need be. The priority of the government’s expenditures was the expansion of
the social safety net and investment in education, S&T, and R&D. This continued
trend of maintaining the soundness of the central government’s budget has pro-
vided government flexibility and helped the government deal with the expenditure
priority, which contributed to the economy’s getting back to the growth track. 
Privatization of public corporations helped to increase government revenues
and increased the competitiveness of firms by introducing more competition and
market principles. In 1998, the government began the plan to privatize 11 public
corporations to reduce government intervention in the market, improve the quality
of service, increase government revenue, and stabilize the foreign exchange mar-
kets. As shown in table 4.3, eight corporations had undertaken the procedure for
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By sustaining a budget surplus, the Korean government had the flexibility to implement
fiscal policies when necessary, and this contributed to the rapid recovery from the 1997
financial crisis.
2. The revenue from the sales of public corporations is not categorized as government
revenue in the reformed government fiscal statistics.
Table 4.3 Privatization Plan for Public Corporations
Number Sales Number Govern- Profit 
of (billion of ment (billion 
Timetable Enterprise employees won) subsidiaries share (%) won) Results 
Immediate (by Pohang Steel and Iron Corporation 19,294 9,718 16 26.7 729 Privatized in October 2002
end-1999) Korea Heavy Industries and 
Construction Corporation 7,851 3,008 3 84.3 45 Privatized in December 2000
Korea General Chemical 263 15 1 98.8 –57 Liquidated in November 2000
Korea Technology and Banking 163 438 1 10.2 2 Privatized in January 1999
National Textbook Corporation 739 52 0 40.0 4 Privatized in November 1998
Step-by-step Korea Telecom Corporation 58,556 7,784 13 71.2 80 Privatized in May 2002
Korea Tobacco and Ginseng 
Corporation 7,573 4,243 1 35.3 226 Privatized in  October 2002
Korea Electric Power Corporation 33,036 13,116 7 58.2 561 Government share reduced
to 54 percent
Korea Gas Corporation 2,891 2926 5 85.7 –336 Government share reduced
to 51 percent
Daehan Oil Pipeline Company 385 34 2 48.8 –44 Privatized in November 2000
Korea District Heating Company 1,044 203 3 72.2 1 Government share remains at 
72 percent
Source: Ministry of Planning and Budget (various years).
Notes: Data are from 1997 and include holdings of government-capitalized public enterprises.
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privatization as of the end of 2002.2
Improving the Social Welfare System
Since the financial crisis, the government has gained heightened awareness of the
need for welfare participation, and has sought social stability for all people within the
framework of growth and distribution. Korea’s welfare expenditure was 9.8 percent
of the GDP in 1999 and, assuming that the current trend is maintained, expenditures
will increase to 14.5 percent in 2020 and 20.6 percent in 2030. If the welfare expendi-
ture increases rapidly as the aging of society progresses, not only will the fiscal deficit
and national debt increase, but the burden of tax and social insurance expenses will
also increase. This will distort the economy and reduce economic growth.
Korea’s four major social insurance programs—pension, health insurance,
employment insurance, and workers’ accident compensation insurance—began to
legally cover the majority of the Korean people in the late 1990s. With regard to pub-
lic assistance, the minimum living standard, which was introduced in October 2000,
guarantees minimum living conditions for all citizens. The standard replaced the
Living Protection System, in which living expenses were paid in a limited amount
according to the demographic characteristic. Although the government obligation
expanded and household obligation was reduced, with the introduction of the min-
imum living standard for all citizens, the obligation of households remains large.
The role of the government has been limited because various requirements were
placed on the beneficiaries in addition to the criteria of income and assets.
Venture Business Policy
Korean economic restructuring since the financial crisis has proceeded in a way
that was favorable to venture businesses. The Korean government has acknowl-
edged the importance of small and medium-size firms based on the firms’ use of
new, innovative technology. By systematically supporting such firms, the govern-
ment would nurture cutting-edge technology, advance the industry structure, and
increase employment. This section briefly reviews the venture policy that the
Korean government implemented.
After the financial crisis, many large firms went bankrupt, and surviving large
firms have restructured their businesses. Taking advantage of this opportunity for
a niche business and the rapid IT growth, venture businesses, which were flexible
and specialized, could grow rapidly. Labor market restructuring after the financial
crisis also had a favorable effect on the venture business industry. In particular, the
retirement of workers with accumulated know-how provided promising venture
businesses with a competent labor force through the reallocation of human capital. 
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Small and medium-venture business firms that commercialize new technologies and
ideas are necessary to sustain innovation and the use of frontier-level technologies in
the Korean industrial sector.
After the crisis, the Korean government restructured the economic system to make
it flexible and gave higher priority to policies that would nurture technology-based
small and medium-size firms. The government’s support for new venture businesses
also served as an alternative plan to solve the unemployment problem caused by the
crisis and modify the resource allocation structure that had focused on large firms.
Growth of Korea’s Venture Industry and Venture Capital Market
Beginning and developing venture businesses requires a stable supply of risk capi-
tal. Therefore, it is necessary to have the capital market and a supporting system
that can undertake risk and efficiently allocate the resources. In the early 1980s,
markets that could allocate resources to the venture business industry did not exist
in Korea. Accordingly, the Korean government actively promoted the formation of
venture capital markets that could allocate the resources to the venture business
industry as part of the government initiative. Nevertheless, the government-driven
venture capital firms did not play a primary role until the mid-1990s because all the
necessary conditions had not been satisfied; no sufficiently promising investment
opportunities existed, and there was no proper capital market to recoup the return
on the investment. 
However, after the mid-1990s, the rapid diffusion of the Internet and outstand-
ing development in the IT sector triggered the burst of growth in the venture indus-
try. In particular, as venture businesses secured many kinds of new technologies in
the IT industry, the venture capital industry had the opportunity to expand the
existing market and pioneer new markets. Because the global IT industry was at the
start-up stage, Korean IT venture businesses were not technologically inferior to
firms in developed countries, and entry barriers were low. Thanks to the remark-
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Table 4.4 Number of Registered Venture Firms by Industry, 1999–2005
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Manufacturing 3,48 5,363 6,889 5,679 5,234 5,487 6,754
(70.49) (60.96) (60.47) (64.70) (67.96) (68.90) (69.40)
Data processing, 
software 1,248 2,925 3,715 2,390 1,832 1,783 2,054
(25.29) (33.25) (32.61) (27.23) (23.79) (22.40) (21.10)
R&D, services 69 213 333 286 278 323 410
(1.40) (2.42) (2.92) (3.26) (3.61) (4.10) (4.20)
Construction, 
transportation 65 144 206 172 117 133 194
(1.32) (1.64) (1.81) (1.96) (1.52) (1.70) (2.00)
Retail 26 74 116 119 144 146 184
(0.53) (0.84) (1.02) (1.36) (1.87) (1.80) (1.90)
Others 48 79 133 132 97 95 136
(0.98) (0.90) (1.17) (1.50) (1.25) (1.20) (1.40)
Total 4,934 8,798 11,392 8,778 7,702 7,967 9,732
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
Source: Small and Medium Business Administration (http://www.smba.go.kr).
Note: Percentage of total businesses is shown in parentheses.
able worldwide development of the IT industry, the commencement and growth of
venture businesses based on new IT technology became active and the investment
in the IT sector by venture capital firms increased dramatically (see table 4.4).
Recognizing the venture businesses as a new economic power group, the Korean
government opened the KOSDAQ (Korea Securities Dealers Automated Quota-
tion) market so that venture businesses could easily finance their required funds
and venture capital firms could recover their investment. The direct financial mar-
ket, especially a stock market, was essential for the development of venture busi-
nesses and the venture capital industry because the commercial bank–oriented
indirect financial market had critical limitations on the financial support for firms
in new technology. Thus, to develop the KOSDAQ market as a venture-centered
stock market and differentiate it from the Korean Stock Exchange, the government
set more relaxed requirements in the KOSDAQ than in the KSE. 
More specifically, with the explosive growth of the U.S. National Association of
Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) system, the venture capital
market was stimulated by the 1999 policy promoting the KOSDAQ market, and
that growth brought about the venture industry boom in Korea. The growth of the
KOSDAQ market inspired the establishment of venture businesses and accelerated
the flow of venture capital into the market. This helped cause the healthy circula-
tion of venture capital, which led to the establishment and growth of venture busi-
nesses and the KOSDAQ market boom. The rapid growth of venture-related
markets contributed to the advancement of Korea’s venture capital market, which
was initially formed by the past Korean government. Additionally, it helped the
KOSDAQ market serve as the capital supplier and function as a new resource dis-
tributor. In this regard, the rapid growth of the venture capital market was signifi-
cant for the Korean economy. As shown in figure 4.7, Korea ranks among the
leading OECD countries in venture capital investment as a share of GDP. 
In addition, by establishing the Act on Special Measures for the Promotion of the
Venture Business, the Korean government prepared a legal basis to back up various
supports for new technology or knowledge-intensive firms. Through this law, the
government relaxed many regulations associated with these firms, thus helping to
create venture businesses. The law also allowed venture businesses to be officially
certified as technology-intensive small and medium-size firms, which was useful in
various aspects of business, including financial aid, technological support, tax aid,
labor changes and location. This policy was based on the government’s judgment
that the developing IT technology paradigm was more suitable to small, flexible
firms; therefore the government encouraged the allocation of economic resources to
the newest industries, such as new technology–based or knowledge-intensive
industries.
The venture business industry has grown rapidly because of the provision of
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Firms in new technology faced difficulties in obtaining loans from commercial banks,
thus the government formed the KOSDAQ market so that venture businesses and ven-
ture capital firms could more efficiently finance venture investments.
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Note: Data for Ireland are for the period 2000–02. Data for Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan are from 1998–2001.
business opportunities by developments in the IT industry, the start of the KOS-
DAQ market, and the Korean government’s policies, which nurtured venture busi-
nesses during the years of restructuring after the financial crisis.
The financial crisis was a painful disaster, but the crisis became a turning point
for the venture business industry. In fact, venture businesses, as well as large
firms, had a lot of difficulties as a result of the overall economic restructuring and
depression following the financial crisis. However, in late 1998, as soon as inter-
est rates and exchange rates went down and were more stable and the real sector
started to recover, many funds in the market flowed into the stock markets with
the expectation of rapid economic recovery. Attracted by new technology–based
industries, many investors traded on the KOSDAQ market rather than the KSE,
which was oriented to the traditional industries in which the restructuring
process has continued.
Adjustment of the Venture Boom 
A dark outlook for venture businesses loomed in 2000. With the crash in NAS-
DAQ, the stock prices of venture businesses in KOSDAQ also began to fall
steadily. To make matters worse, the illegal activities of some venture businesses’
chief executives and venture capitalists, along with unfair trading practices in
KOSDAQ, led to the KOSDAQ index falling drastically. The market for initial
public offerings was depressed, and many venture businesses had difficulty get-
ting financing through the stock market. Furthermore, this depressed venture
capital market constrained the additional financing of venture businesses in need.
This drastic depression was fundamentally due to the excessive valuation
and myopic overinvestment in venture businesses. The excessive inflow of
funds and high expectations held by investors (without systematic considera-
tion of the businesses’ profitability) pushed the stock market into a bubble. The
Korean government’s excessive intervention also made it more serious.
Although the new market and technological opportunities had emerged from
the rapid IT development, the competence of the venture businesses and ven-
ture capital firms did not improve significantly within that short time. Thus,
investments in the stock market expanded too quickly for the promising new
technology–based venture businesses to grow. However, even though many
had warned about the risks involved in the venture investment fund, the gov-
ernment’s excessive intervention in the markets helped expand the bubble.
After the bubble burst in 2000, Korea’s venture industry underwent an adjust-
ment period, as shown in table 4.5. Since 2001, the number of firms decreased or
stabilized, operating income stagnated, and total liabilities decreased and then
slightly increased. However, since 2003, the mood of the markets related to ven-
ture businesses has become more optimistic. The required investigation of list-
ings in KOSDAQ was enforced, and investments were made only in businesses
based on concrete profit models.
Generally, fluctuation in the stock market can be viewed as a natural phenome-
non. The adjustment process is therefore a stage during which the market restores
its original function. In the long run, this adjustment will get rid of obstacles to the
development of venture-related markets (venture business market, venture capital
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market, and KOSDAQ market). It also will provide a good opportunity to develop
healthier markets and restore the markets’ primary function of efficient resource
allocation.
Venture Policy—Evaluation and Policy Implications
The rapid development of venture capital and venture-related businesses was
important for the Korean economy. Among other things, it provided a foundation
on which human and material resources would be distributed to small and
medium-size technology-oriented business rather than to conglomerates, with their
demand for the factors of production, including labor and capital. In the process of
restructuring after the financial crisis, the conglomerate-oriented industrial struc-
ture was losing its significance, and the areas dominated by large-scale companies
in the past were transferred to venture business. However, a development policy
based on the government’s direct support is not recommended; an efficient market
system can develop only when the government acts as a fair supervisor and
improves the financial market’s efficiency. The foundations of the venture industry
and the development of the venture capital market are, above all, knowledge, tech-
nology, and entrepreneurship. Therefore, the Korean government should attempt
to lead in expanding knowledge capacity through education, basic science, and
original technology support. In addition to expanding financial support for univer-
sities and research institutes, the government needs to foster organizations’ inno-
vative and management capabilities to increase efficiency in the investment.
Summary and Assessments
The 1997 crisis served as an important turning point for the Korean economy. The
government exerted its utmost efforts to establish the market’s discipline in eco-
nomic activities and consequently minimize government intervention in the mar-
ket. The economic reforms since 1997 have three main objectives: encouraging a
market-oriented economy, improving the institutional regime, including the gov-
ernment sector reform; and making the transition to an advanced KBE. The struc-
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Table 4.5 Performance Trend of Venture Firms Listed in KOSDAQ, 1998–2003
(millions of won)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Number of firms 171 234 244 379 340 373
Total assets (A) 6,296,057 12,484,547 19,318,401 28,718,219 24,245,793 26,678,148
Operating 
income (B) 516,997 972,341 1,211,966 1,048,571 1,052,473 1,302,817
B/A*100 8.21 7.79 6.27 3.65 4.34 4.88
Total liabilities (C) 4,273,547 5,806,513 7,091,118 11,184,646 9,550,174 9,933,722
Cash end of 
year) (D) 361,081 681,707 1,217,975 1,561,178 1,188,488 1,351,337
Risk (C/D) 11.84 8.52 5.82 7.16 8.04 7.35
Source: KOSDAQ (http://km.krx.co.kr).
tural reforms have been extensive, covering most areas of the economy, including
the financial, corporate, labor, and public sectors. The reforms to shape a new eco-
nomic framework are summarized below.
First, in the wake of the crisis, the Korean government gave top priority to
restoring confidence in its financial sector. Through the liquidation of troubled
institutions, removal of nonperforming loans, and recapitalization of promising
institutions through the injection of public funds, the financial health and prof-
itability of the financial industry have been greatly improved. The number of finan-
cial institutions at the end of 1997 was 2,101, but the number decreased to 1,507 as
of January 2003. Along with the restructuring, helped by the large-scale injection of
public funds, the total amount of bad loans fell to W 31.8 trillion in 2002, from the
highest point, W 66.7 trillion in 1999. At the same time, the share of bad loans out of
total loans sharply decreased from 11.3 percent in 1999 to 1.9 percent in 2004. The
restructuring of the financial sector had been implemented as planned. In that
regard, the financial crisis was a blessing in disguise in that it acted as a catalyst for
change (Kang 2004). 
However, more tasks remain. What had been done was mostly about “hard-
ware” reform, which forced the cleaning up of bad loans and ailing financial insti-
tutions. Despite the relatively successful financial restructuring, Korea should put
more emphasis on developing a sound and transparent financial system based on
international best standards and promoting the financial industry as a KBE. As
revealed in the accounting scandals in major conglomerates, the problem of trans-
parency in the financial markets continues, and protecting investors from unfair
trade practices in the securities market needs to be further addressed. Conse-
quently, the domestic financial industry has not gained adequate confidence from
domestic and overseas investors, in spite of the restructuring that has taken place
during the 10 years since the financial crisis.
Second, reforms in the corporate sector have focused on eliminating inefficien-
cies and encouraging firms to reinvent themselves on the strength of their core
competencies. Special efforts have been made to improve the corporate governance
system, revise bankruptcy procedures, and remove anticompetitive regulations.
Specifically, the Korean government introduced a number of measures to improve
financial disclosure and accounting standards and enhance the prudence of corpo-
rate governance by guaranteeing the voting rights of the shareholders. These insti-
tutional reforms, combined with increased scrutiny by investors in the postcrisis
period, have led to substantive improvement in the corporate governance of Korean
firms. The Korean government also removed various institutions that inhibit com-
petition to provide a more market-friendly environment for entrepreneurial activi-
ties. In addition, recognizing that globalization is a catalyst of structural reforms,
the Korean government is actively pursuing free trade agreements with many trad-
ing partners. By doing so, the government ultimately aims at developing Korea as
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Korea turned the 1997 financial crisis into an opportunity for major, widespread eco-
nomic reforms.
an economic hub of northeast Asia. 
Third, the basic purpose of labor sector reforms was to make the market princi-
ples work properly, including competition and the establishment of and respect for
private ownership and property. It is believed that market principles tend to flour-
ish where the flexibility of the labor market is maximized. As a result, labor market
reforms focused on labor market flexibility that can support economy-wide restruc-
turing. The Labor Standards Act was revised to legalize layoffs in February 1998.
Through the Tripartite Commission—composed of representatives of employers,
employees, and the government—labor unions dropped their blanket objection to
unemployment, which gave support to the government’s efforts to make the labor
sector more responsive to market forces. 
The current government has proposed the construction of socially integrated
labor relations as a policy target. The government established the Committee for
the Advancement of Labor Relations in May 2003 and initiated the process for
improving labor relations. The aim of reform in labor relations is to minimize the
social costs stemming from labor disputes, create a more flexible and stable labor
market, and reduce inequities among the various working classes. Mutual trust and
reliability can take root in labor and management relations by establishing partner-
ships based on transparent management and participatory labor.
Along with labor sector reforms, Korea’s social safety net was quickly reorgan-
ized and enhanced by means of expanded coverage of unemployment insurance
and other measures. The social policies that were introduced to remedy the side
effects of restructuring have continued. The government is developing a compre-
hensive and productive social welfare system that will not be a drain on the econ-
omy but will provide security in a way that ultimately benefits the economy. In
addition, to alleviate the increased social burden stemming from an increasingly
dependent senior population, the government should raise the overall labor force
participation rate. To that end, women, especially highly educated women, should
be actively encouraged to join the workforce. 
Fourth, the public sector managed by the government was a central actor in the
country’s economic and social development. The earlier positive and active role
played by the government after the 1997 crisis had been subject to criticism because
of the excessive growth of bureaucracy and the procrastination in making the tran-
sition to an open economic system. The most important change regarding the role
of the government since the 1997 crisis was the reestablishment of the government
philosophy that the government would respect what the private sector and the
market can do. The government has concentrated on providing a level playing field
for the private sector and sound macroeconomic environments through institu-
tional reforms and the provision of public goods, including information. 
Like the importance of adopting the market-based approach, opening up is
essential to narrowing Korea’s knowledge and institutional gaps compared with
advanced countries (Government of the Republic of Korea 2004). Korea has made
great strides in this regard in the wake of the economic crisis. Various measures
have been taken to eliminate remaining barriers against imports and foreign com-
panies’ investing in Korea. Especially as regards inbound FDI, the old policy stance
of controlled, prudent accommodation was replaced by active promotion, resulting
in a surge of foreign investment. However, the vestige of the old Korean system as
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a semiopen–semiclosed society is still strong. 
It is essential for Korea to maintain the newly gained momentum of opening up
and pursue it further, including greater acceptance of foreign cultures, mindsets,
and social practices. To that end, complementary measures should be devised to
open up the trade and finance sector, along with all-dimensional efforts to create a
social environment hospitable to foreigners. More specifically, regulations and insti-
tutions that are not in line with global standards should be abolished or improved
swiftly. Human capital and culture should also be opened to the outside to expand
international exchanges and cooperation. To encourage inbound foreign invest-
ment, more proactive measures should be taken. Barriers to foreigners’ entry into
R&D, education, and government procurement should be scrapped. Because the
exchange of human resources is the most effective way of encouraging an open
mindset, obsolete and exclusive clauses of the immigration law should be revised
to aid the inflow of a foreign workforce. Active introduction of foreign culture and
exchanges of different cultures are needed to globalize Korean culture as well. 
Reforms to address the soundness of the budget and fiscal system have also con-
tributed to helping the economy get back to the growth track. The government has
strived to radically change the system into one that is more decentralized and par-
ticipatory. To create more social cohesion and meet rapidly changing fiscal
demands, especially for social welfare, the fiscal system will also undergo an exten-
sive review from the ground up. 
Finally, in the process of overcoming the 1997 crisis, the Korean government
made a special effort to find, nurture, and develop venture businesses to reduce
unemployment and encourage the development of the next generation of indus-
tries. Economic restructuring has been favorable to venture business firms. After
the financial crisis, many large firms went bankrupt, and surviving large firms
restructured their businesses. Taking advantage of this niche business opportunity,
combined with the rapid IT growth, venture businesses that had a flexible structure
and specialized in a specific business could grow rapidly. The labor market restruc-
turing also contributed to the surge in growth of the venture industry by diverting
workers with the accumulated know-how to promising venture businesses. 
However, the excessive valuation in the stock market and the myopic overin-
vestment in venture businesses led to a drastic depression in the venture industry.
Because of the government’s intentional market making from the start, and its reg-
ulatory policies that allocated financial resources to technology-based small ven-
ture businesses, the venture capital market in Korea achieved some quantitative
growth, but it is unsatisfactory from a qualitative point of view. Future government
policy should focus on transferring responsibility from the government to the mar-
ket. Taxation, financial support, and control should be entrusted to the market to
improve the self-sustaining capability of venture businesses. The government’s role
should be confined to establishing regulations to ensure fair play and to monitoring
and supervision to make sure the regulations are followed. 
With all of the above mentioned reforms implemented or being implemented,
the economic and institutional regime in Korea has improved significantly. Figure
4.8 illustrates the performance in the  Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM)
indicators for the economic regime of the Republic of Korea, the G-7, and the high-
income country average, for the most recent year, predominantly 2006. Korea is at
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par and even exceeds performance compared to the average high-income country
for some variables, such as gross capital formation, low interest rate spread, and
low cost to enforce a contract. However, for a number of indicators, Korea still has
a lot of catching up to do relative to the G-7 and high-income countries, such as
soundness of banks, which was still weak because of transparency issues. Similarly,
Korea has a lot of ground to catch up in terms of exports of goods and services and
domestic credit to the private sector. 
In summary, although it is widely recognized that these large-scale reforms con-
tributed to the Korean economy’s recovery from the 1997 crisis, Korea still faces a
number of challenges, which call for additional structural reforms, in maintaining
its high growth potential. Most important, the stagnation of domestic demand since
the end of 2002 and slowing inputs of capital and labor have raised concerns about
Korea’s growth prospects. Sustaining high growth rates in Korea increasingly
depends on productivity improvement, especially through technological innova-
tion. Therefore, upgrading the innovation system and transforming the economy
into a knowledge-based one is essential to promote faster productivity gains and
enhance its high growth momentum. In addition, the government should further
promote competition and entrepreneurship and deregulate the market to encour-
age the creativity of the private sector.
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Figure 4.8 KAM Custom Scorecard—Economic and Institutional Regime
(most recent year)
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Source: KAM, December 2006 (www.worldbank.org/wbi/kam).

5
Information and Communication Technologies for
a Knowledge-Based Economy
Dongpyo Hong, Sangwon Ko, and Alexey Volynets
This chapter examines the ICT pillar of the knowledge economy—or more specifi-
cally, the information infrastructure of the Republic of Korea and its evolution over
the past four decades. It details the policies that the government implemented to
develop the modern information infrastructure currently in place. The second part
of the chapter looks at the ICT production industry in Korea. Although the ICT pro-
duction industry is not part of the information infrastructure, it does provide a
unique example of how the various elements of the knowledge economy interacted
to produce a dynamic industry that substantively contributed to Korea’s economic
growth. 
Overview 
To a very substantial degree, the shift toward a KBE has been driven by ICTs. Gov-
ernments around the world are formulating policy frameworks for developing this
strategically important sector and using ICTs to promote economic growth. 
Korea’s ICT-related polices have spanned three areas: building information
infrastructure; promoting industrial activities, including capacity building of the
ICT industry; and ensuring fair competition. The country has become the leader in
the development of broadband networks and succeeded in joining the ranks of
advanced countries in terms of overall informatization level. Korea also has seen
rapid increase in the use of ICTs, with ICT expenditures increasing from 6.4 percent
of GDP in 2001 to 6.9 percent in 2005. As seen in figure 5.1, Korea’s ICT expenditure
now ranks seventh among the OECD countries. 
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Korea’s ICT-related polices have spanned three areas: building information infrastruc-
ture; promoting ICT industrial activities, including capacity building of the ICT indus-
try; and ensuring fair competition.
The primary objectives of the Korean government were to provide a vision of
the future and increase awareness of the benefits and usage of ICTs while minimiz-
ing market intervention. For example, the e-government initiative, apart from
improving the efficiency of delivery of government services, encouraged Koreans
to use ICTs, thereby narrowing the digital divide. 
On the supply side, the government took the initiative by providing the seed
money for infrastructure development and ardently adhered to the best global stan-
dards in privatization, market liberalization, and competition policy. In particular,
Korea’s vision of creating the virtuous cycle, initiated by facility-based competition,
had remarkable success. Availability of affordable and modern information infra-
structure promoted growth of the service sector, which, in turn, created more
demand for high-end equipment and terminals and promoted the manufacturing
sector. This virtuous cycle continued improving with the underlying, procompeti-
tion regulatory measures.
Korea’s ICT industrial policy has focused on three main areas: R&D, human
resource development, and ensuring the availability of venture capital. The public
sector finances less than 10 percent R&D expenditure in ICT, but it plays an impor-
tant role in coordinating private and public efforts in R&D, with emphasis on sup-
porting small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) through its ICT promotion
funds.
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Figure 5.1 ICT Expenditure (Share of GDP), Selected OECD Countries, 2005
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Source: World Bank SIMA database.
Korea’s ICT industrial policy has focused on three main areas: R&D, human resource
development, and ensuring the availability of venture capital.
With the accelerating employment growth in the ICT industries from 1997 to
2000, Korea’s human resource development policies focused mainly on expanding
the number of potential entrants to the labor market who were equipped with ICT
skills. After undergoing the decline of ICT sector employment in 2001, however, the
emphasis of the policies shifted from quantitative expansion to qualitative
improvement of ICT workers. Fostering ICT professionals who meet the industry’s
rapidly changing skill requirements became the top policy priority.
The Korean government has also been an important player in domestic ven-
ture capital fund-raising. In the short run, government efforts help to stabilize the
amount of funds raised for the venture capital industry, which is heavily focused
on the ICT sector. In the long run, however, it might displace private efforts for
fundraising and impede the development of the industry. Because of this effect,
the Korean government has been moving the policy focus from government fund-
raising to promoting the venture capital industry.
This chapter examines ICT policies and lessons learned in informatization pro-
motion, R&D, human resource development, promotion of SMEs in ICT, venture
businesses development, and deregulation. It also reviews the development of the
Korean ICT industry in terms of output, export, and employment.
Developing an Advanced Information Infrastructure
Modern information infrastructure is a key foundation of a KBE. Korea has built one
of the most sophisticated information superhighways in the world. One reason for
Korea’s success was a comprehensive policy approach that strived to create a virtu-
ous cycle, where a modern information infrastructure enables advanced applications
and content sharing—which, in turn, creates even more demand for infrastructure.
Korea took a methodical path of developing its telecommunications market by
means of privatization, liberalization, and encouragement of competition. The prin-
cipal objective was to expand and improve the infrastructure and provide quality
services at lower rates, hence increasing consumer and social welfare. This founda-
tion turned out to be the essential market and regulatory element for building a
thriving telecommunications market in Korea.
The Early Stages: Separation of Business and Policy Functions 
During the 1970s, the Korean telecommunications sector struggled to keep pace
with the rapid economic growth, which revolved around industrial sectors. The
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Korea’s approach to developing information infrastructure includes the creation a vir-
tuous cycle, where a modern information infrastructure enables advanced applications
and content sharing—which leads to even more demand for infrastructure.
To increase efficiency in the information infrastructure sector, Korea introduced compe-
tition by deregulating and liberalizing the sector and privatizing government-owned
telecom operators.
existing telecommunications infrastructure and capacity were well short of meet-
ing the increasing demand for subscriber lines and call traffic. The result was seri-
ous congestion in voice telephony services. Teledensity in 1980 was at only 7.3
percent (figure 5.2). Users had to wait for months for connection, and the tariffs
were very high. The government set new policy objectives that included develop-
ing and expanding telecommunications infrastructure and capacity to relieve the
congestion, improving the efficiency of telecommunications services, and accu-
mulating technology for equipment and terminal manufacturing.
Telecommunications service is a natural monopoly that exhibits economies of
scale. Another noneconomic consideration, safeguarding national security, was
also a factor. As such, it was natural that the government provided telecommu-
nications services directly to the public. However, as with many government
operations, it was inefficient, and so the government established the govern-
ment-owned Korea Telecommunication Authority (KTA) in December 1981 to
separate the policy and operational functions. The establishment of the KTA
marks the beginning of moving the market environment toward liberalization
and increased competition. Before this, the Ministry of Post and Telecommuni-
cation carried out the integrated functions. The separation aimed at improving
the efficiency of the services provided by allowing flexibility in business deci-
sions and by reducing red tape. It allowed more freedom in the compilation and
execution of the budget and in human resource management. The government,
however, concentrated on the role of regulating the monopoly operator and
began implementing promotion policies.
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Privatization of Telecom Operators
Korea was one of the early movers to fully privatize an incumbent monopoly oper-
ator. Before 1990, three monopoly firms served each telecom subsector: Korea Tele-
com (KT) for fixed-line services, Korea Data Communication Corporation (Dacom)
for data services, and Korea Mobile Telecom (KMT) for wireless services. In 1990,
the government’s share of KT was reduced to 49 percent; KT became a fully private
company in 2002. Dacom and KMT (which became SK Telecom), were fully priva-
tized in 1993 and 1997, respectively. 
Privatization provides profit incentive for stockholders and management,
which, in turn, increases productive efficiency. Privatization also makes the regula-
tory process more transparent and unbiased because the regulatory body becomes
independent from the operators. 
Liberalization of Telecommunication Services
Korea took a sequential but rapid path to liberalization of the ICT services sector.
During the Basic Telecom Negotiation of the Uruguay Round WTO negotiations in
1994, Korea committed to the full liberalization of the resale-based sector and par-
tially committed to the schedule of step-by-step reduction of the limit of foreign
ownership of facility-based operators. In addition, the Reference Paper of the WTO
Basic Telecommunication Agreement was also adopted by the Korean government.
The paper guided governments in the implementation of various regulatory meas-
ures concerned with competitive safeguards, and ensured interconnection, alloca-
tion of scarce resources, provision of universal services, and transparent licensing.
Korea’s policies and regulatory framework were notable in their pursuit of this
textbook method of the global standard. The well-designed liberalization policies
resulted in the transfer of technology and innovation and investment funding from
foreign operators, resulting in faster growth of the market and providing proper
incubation of competitive domestic operators.
Introduction of Market Competition
The government’s next task in the telecommunications sector was to improve effi-
ciency by introducing competition and market mechanisms. World trends sug-
gested this course. In the United States, American Telephone and Telegraph
Company (AT&T) had been structurally separated. In the United Kingdom and
Japan, British Telecom (BT) and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
(NTT) had been privatized. In a number of countries, competition was being intro-
duced and markets were being liberalized.
Step-by-step entry of new telecommunications operators and gradual foment-
ing of a more competitive market environment constituted the basic framework of
Korea’s competition policy (table 5.1). Another objective was the diversification of
services, which included fixed-line voice telephony, data communication, and
mobile communication.
The first phase of the market structure reform began in 1990. Dacom’s entry into
the international call market in 1990 was the first form of competition in telecom-
munications services. Shinsegi Telecom’s entry into the mobile market in 1994 and
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Dacom’s entry into the long-distance market in 1995 opened those markets for com-
petition. Multiple licenses were granted for trunked radio and paging services.
After this first phase, except for local telephony, every subsector of telecommunica-
tions services had at least a duopoly market structure. The second phase in induc-
ing competition began in 1996, when 27 new licenses in seven subsectors were
granted, including three personal communication services licenses. In 1997, the
entry of Hanaro Telecom finally provided competition in the local telephony mar-
ket. In the same year, resale-based operation in the fixed-line voice market was
allowed.
The government also implemented institutional measures. The Korea Commu-
nication Commission (KCC) was established in 1992 to oversee the market and
monitor any anticompetitive practices. The KCC’s other regulatory functions
included resolution of disputes among operators, consumer protection, and inter-
connection. To achieve a healthy competitive environment in telecommunications,
an interconnection scheme must be fair and transparent. In particular, switching
the tariff scheme from a rate-of-return method to a cost-based method was a signif-
icant step. Unbundling network components in the interconnection contract was
another measure to ensure fair competition.
The efforts of the Korean government in developing the telecommunications
sector and making it more efficient resulted in a significant decrease in the cost of
telephone calls. In particular, the cost of a three-minute phone call to the United
Sates dropped by 84 percent, from US$4.88 in 1996 to US$0.76 in 2004 (figure 5.3).
Facility-Based Competition for the Information Age
The key feature that distinguishes Korea’s deregulation and competition policy in
the telecommunications services sector from other countries was its reliance on
84 Korea as a Knowledge Economy
Step-by-step entry of new telecommunications operators and gradual fomenting of a
more competitive market environment constituted the basic framework of Korea’s com-
petition policy.
Table 5.1 Developing Competition in Telecommunications Services
1981 Establishment of KTA
1990 Competition introduced in value added services
Entry of Dacom into international market
1992 Competition introduced in paging services (10 new operators)
1994 Second cellular license issued (Shinsegi Telecom)
1995 Competition introduced in long-distance market (Dacom)
1996 26 new licenses granted: 3 personal communication services; 6 trunked radio   
systems; 11 second-generation cordless telephone; 2 dedicated line; 1 paging, 
third international operator (Onse); and 3 wireless data transmission
1997 10 new licenses granted: 1 local operator (Hanaro), 1 long-distance (Onse), 6 
trunked radio systems, 1 paging 
Resale-based competition introduced
Source: Authors.
facility-based competition. Facility-based competition between telecom service
providers results when new entrants into the sector build their own facilities to pro-
vide services, as opposed to service-based competition, where the entrant uses the
facilities of the incumbent. In contrast to Korea, the United States and Europe used
service-based competition efforts to encourage competition and were successful
only in the long-distance and international markets, but not local markets.
Korea is one of the few countries that use multiple operators in all markets of the
telecom services sector. For local telephony networks, there are KT and Hanaro. In
mobile services, five network-based operators were licensed, of which three remain
in competition: SK Telecom, Korea Telecom Freetel (KTF), and LGTelecom. The
astonishing success in the broadband Internet service market was also credited to
facility-based competition, where KT’s and Hanaro’s xDSL and Thrunet’s cable
modem services provided fierce competition. The government’s laissez-faire
approach, with minimal regulation, also contributed to the sector’s growth. 
Facility-based competition has proven to be viable even though there was a con-
cern that the large fixed costs of constructing multiple broadband networks would
incur high social cost and reduce profitability. The economic value created from the
competition far exceeds the cost of network construction when effective network
competition fosters successful competition in the content sector as well. Indeed,
facility-based competition has many advantages.
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The key feature that distinguishes Korea’s deregulation and competition policy from
other countries is its reliance on facility-based competition.
First, regulations that encourage network competition are more effective in
inducing true competition, and network competition will accelerate network
enhancements for each end user’s full satisfaction in the delivery of the content and
applications. 
Second, facility-based competition provides incentives for the profit-maximiz-
ing operators. It facilitates achievement of the optimal level of investment, because
each operator chooses its own optimal network size and appropriates the return
from the investment in the additional facilities. 
Third, the network and service in telecommunications form a virtuous cycle in
which the network competition promotes the service and content industries, which
in return would attract more network subscribers. As a result, such industries as e-
commerce, online gaming, and Internet broadcasting have flourished in Korea.
This virtuous cycle becomes a key driver and the objective of telecom policy in the
information age. 
In the absence of facility-based competition, the vertical structure would allow
the incumbent monopoly network operator to extract the downstream rent. It could
be prohibitive for content providers to have proper incentives in such an environ-
ment. Korea’s experience indicates that for effective competition in both the net-
work and content sectors to be realized, facility-based competition should be in
place, along with proper regulatory safeguards against market failure. Also, as the
source of economic value shifts from network to content and application, a com-
petitive environment in the content and application sectors becomes pivotal and
should attract more regulatory attention.
Development of Special-Purpose, High-Speed Networks
Korea’s investment in the advanced networks began with the first Korea Informa-
tion Infrastructure (KII) Plan of 1994 (see table 5.2), which has since been updated
several times. The KII Plan includes the completion of the Test-Bed Network, the
Korea Information Infrastructure–Government (KII-G), and the Korea Information
Infrastructure–Public (KII-P) Plans. KII-G is the backbone network predominantly
for government agencies; it was developed by telecommunications service
providers using public funds. KII-P is the advanced network for the public at large;
it was developed by telecom providers using private funds. The Korean govern-
ment also built the Test-Bed Network to encourage the development of state-of-the-
art network technologies and applications and accumulate premarket testing
experience in building, operating, and managing high-speed information net-
works. 
For the three stages of the KII projects, the Korean government invested US$620
million, which amounted to 3.6 percent of the total investment for the whole KII
Plan from private and public investment. As a result, Korea could acquire a national
information infrastructure with state-of-the-art technology and supreme speed and
bandwidth on the local loop, not to mention on the national backbone.
The KII-G project initiated investments in the national information superhigh-
way. As of April 2004, a total of 31,632 governmental organizations, such as national
and local administrative offices, educational institutes, research institutes, and
medical institutions, use this network at a discounted price. The approach, called
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“Invest First, Settle Later,” was a win-win strategy in which private companies
could undertake a large-scale investment in the new and unproven broadband
technology using public funds; it also enabled the public sector to attain lower net-
work costs. The KII-G project also created the physical infrastructure necessary for
the e-government projects undertaken in the early 2000s. With the completion of
the KII-G project, most of the national and local administrative offices could ration-
alize the formation of their own information networks. In addition, all the elemen-
tary, middle, and high schools in Korea (10,432 schools) would have two megabits
per second (mbps) access, regardless of their location, on which to build their indi-
vidual educational information systems.
The KII-P project proceeded on the basis of experience gained in the establish-
ment and operation of the KII-G. It was built using private funds raised by the
telecommunications service providers to meet the demands for high-speed infor-
mation and communications services. The KII-P project placed particular emphasis
on building advanced local loops, and to build the infrastructure efficiently and
economically while actively responding to technological developments and chang-
ing demands, diverse implementation methods were used. For example, networks
in commercial and densely populated areas were built with optical cables, and net-
works extending to subscriber premises were built partly using optical cables and
partly by digitizing and enhancing the speed of existing telephone lines or CATV
networks or by building new wireless local loops.
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Table 5.2 Accomplishments of the KII-Projects, by Stages 
1st stage 2nd stage 3rd stage 
KII (1995–97) (1998–2000) (2001–03)
KII Test-Bed •2.5 gbps test: •2.5 gbps test: •40 gbps test: 
Network backbone between backbones in backbones in six 
Seoul and Taejon five cities cities
KII-G Backbone •80 local call areas •All 144 local call •Upgrade band-
networks (up to 5 gbps) areas (up to width up to 
5 gbps) 40 gbps
ATM switches •ATM test-beds in •ATM networks •Ensuring quality 
5 areas in all 144 local of service of the 
call areas network (multi-
protocol label 
switching)
KII-P Backbone •Optical cables to •Optical cables to •Upgrade band-
all cities and counties rural villages width up to 
(up to 40 gbps) (up to 40 gbps) 320 gbps
Local loops •Fiber to the office •ADTV, CATV •ADTV, CATV, 
to major buildings (FTTC: 10% of fiber to the home
all local call (FTTC: 90% of all
areas) local call areas)
Source: MIC 2004, p. 25. 
Note: ADTV = advanced-definition television; ATM = automated teller machine; CATV = cable tele-
vision; FTTC = fiber to the curb; FTTH = fiber to the home; gbps = gigabits per second. 
Figure 5.4 shows that Internet penetration in Korea, measured by the number of
Internet users per 1,000 persons, has increased dramatically since 1990. In 1990,
only 0.23 person of every 1,000 persons was using the Internet. By 2005, this num-
ber had increased to 684 persons per 1,000. In addition, since 1999, Korea’s Internet
penetration rates have been higher than the OECD average and also have the high-
est rate among the East Asian newly industrializing economies (NIEs), a good indi-
cation that the Korean government’s proactive efforts in encouraging Internet use
are paying off. 
Promoting Broadband Internet Access
As of June 2004, the number of subscribers to Korea’s broadband Internet service
reached 36 million, implying that broadband Internet is accessible in 24 percent of
the population, the highest in the world (figure 5.5). Many facilities-based service
providers are now operating in the market, driving down the tariffs. Users of xDSL
accounted for 57.3 percent of broadband Internet services, 34.3 percent are cable
modem users, and local area network (LAN) users’ share is 8.2 percent. 
Four factors account for the successful takeoff and continued growth of the
broadband Internet service market in Korea. 
First is the competition among the different technologies. Broadband Internet
service was classified as a value added service, free of regulation regarding entry
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Source: Constructed based on data obtained from World Bank SIMA database.
and pricing.1 Almost concurrently, full service providers (FSPs) entered the market,
setting flat-rate retail charges at levels low enough to induce dial-up users to switch
to broadband. Also, facility-based competition encouraged the expansion and
upgrading of access networks, including fiber to the curb, fiber to the office, and
fiber to the home, which was an indispensable part of the advancement of the infor-
mation society. 
The second factor is the urban geography of Korea, which allowed households
to be efficiently wired for broadband Internet connections. Nearly 48 percent of
total households live in apartment complexes that allow economies of scale in the
market operations of FSPs. Also, in the case of the asymmetric digital subscriber
line (ADSL), the issue of distance does not apply, because more than 90 percent of
households are located within a radius of four kilometers around KT’s wire centers.
One of the key reasons why ADSL subscription rates rapidly caught up with that of
cable modems is that Hanaro Telecom used a preemptive strategy that targeted
densely populated apartment complexes with more than 300 households. Similarly,
KT extended its existing copper local loops in anticipation of a large number of new
potential customers.
The third factor is the government’s early commitment to building an extensive
and modern information infrastructure. Beginning in 1999, the government pro-
vided FSPs with public loans at prime rates to reduce their financial burden of
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1. Although in July 2004, broadband Internet service was classified as a facility-based
service.
investing in such access networks. To further promote the penetration of the broad-
band network, the government coined the unique Cyber Building Certificate sys-
tem in 1999. The idea originated from the concept of the “cyber apartment,” which
was created by Hanaro Telecom as a new marketing strategy. Certificates are being
issued to buildings equipped with high-speed telecommunications capacity (LAN),
depending on their bandwidth. As of May 2003, 2,146 certificates have been issued
to cyber apartments or cyber buildings. 
The fourth factor is the voice over Internet protocol and other services that have
greatly increased versatility and attractiveness of the broadband connection.
Promoting ICT Literacy, Content, and Applications
To promote and take advantage of development of advanced telecommunications
networks, the Korean government has exerted enormous effort to providing public
services through the Internet. This stimulated the demand for the newly rolled-out
high speed networks among citizens and businesses.
At the beginning of 2001, the government established a special committee for
implementing e-government initiatives, which was under the direct control of the
president of Korea. Since then, the government has invested more than US$250 mil-
lion over two years and selected 11 major e-government projects for implementa-
tion (table 5.3). The committee led these cross-agency projects, thus providing a
solid basis for a successful e-government implementation.
The Special Committee for e-Government set these principles and the direction
for the e-government initiatives: (a) focus on national priorities, (b) integrate inter-
agency-related initiatives into a single government-wide initiative, (c) maximize
the sharing of information across agencies and eliminate overlap of duties, and (d)
promote the use of IT based on business process reengineering. Under the princi-
ples and direction formulated by the special committee, extensive administrative
processes have been refocused to provide citizen-centered government services
via the Internet through the expansion of information sharing across government
agencies.
The Government for Citizens (G4C) system has been established to connect the
database networks of many government agencies and streamline government
processes for delivering services to citizens. For example, the Home Tax Service
through the Internet allows taxpayers to file tax returns, receive electronic bills, and
process payments from their homes via the Internet. The database networks for
health insurance, pension insurance, industrial accident compensation insurance,
and unemployment insurance policies, which are the four major social insurance
systems in Korea, have been interconnected into a seamless network. 
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The Special Committee for e-Government had these principles for implementing e-gov-
ernment initiatives: (a) focus on national priorities, (b) integrate interagency-related ini-
tiatives into a single government-wide initiative, (c) maximize the sharing of
information across agencies and eliminate overlap of duties, and (d) promote the use of
IT based on business process reengineering.
The government has also heavily invested in public awareness programs to rap-
idly increase the number of Internet users. Between 2000 and 2003, 13.9 million peo-
ple benefited from a basic ICT education program, and an additional 5 million
people are expected to benefit from the program from 2004 to 2008. This campaign
has particularly targeted information have-nots—the disabled, the elderly, house-
wives, manual workers, and those engaged in agricultural and fishing industries.
In parallel, KT committed to provide broadband Internet service (one mbps) to all
farming and fishing villages by 2005. 
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Table 5.3 Major e-Government Initiatives
Objectives e-government initiatives
Upgrade government- 1. Set up information sharing in five major government services, 
wide services for including resident registration, real estate, and vehicle records. 
citizens and private 2. Created a G4C system to establish a government-wide service 
businesses processing system
Established a Social Insurance Information Sharing system for 
health, pension, unemployment, and industrial accident com-
pensation 
3. Built a Home Tax Service system that enables online filing of tax 
returns, electronic bill payment, tax consultation, and issuance 
service for tax-related certificates
4. Established a government e-procurement system to achieve 
transparent procurement processes
Improve the 5. Built a National Finance Information System for budget plan-
effectiveness of ning and allocation, accounting, and settlement of accounts and 
administration made financial information available through an interagency 
network
6. Built a National Education Information System for the electronic 
distribution and management of records across schools, offices 
of education, and the Ministry of Education and Human 
Resources Development
7. Proceeded with the Local Government Information Network 
System project for 21 service areas
8. Built a Personnel Policy Support System to manage the hiring, 
promotion, and compensation of civil servants in a fair and sys-
tematic way
Establish an 9. Expanded the use and distribution of e-approvals and 
infrastructure for e-documents between agencies 
e-government 10. Expanded the use of electronic signatures and seals to establish 
a reliable e-administration
11. Constructed a government-wide integrated computer network 
in project-specific stages (since November 2002, the redesign 
plan for work processes and the strategic plan for IT has been 
formulated)
Source: Special Committee for e-Government 2003, p. 13.
Universal ICT literacy is a national priority. Korea completed LAN installation
and Internet connection in all of the nation’s 10,064 schools by the end of 2000. The
next step was to improve teachers’ ICT literacy, develop new curriculum and teach-
ing methods using ICTs, and produce new educational content using ICTs. At least
once every four years, every teacher now participates in a training program on
ICTs, which takes place at the Information and Communication Officials Training
Institute established to provide ICT education for government officials. 
Flexible Financing Mechanisms for Informatization Initiatives
The promotion of informatization requires large-scale investment and calls for the
long-term cooperation of various organizations, thus it is difficult to carry out the
projects within the general budget. The Informatization Promotion Fund (IPF) was
established in 1996 as a special vehicle to overcome the budgetary restrictions and
promote informatization projects.
The goals of the IPF are to roll out broadband networks, promote e-government,
support R&D and standardization, and educate workers in ICTs. The fund, based
on government budgetary and private sector contributions, allows profits from ICT
fields to be reallocated into the ICT sector. From 1993 to 2002, the IPF reached a total
of US$7.78 billion. About 40 percent of the fund (US$3.06 billion) came from the
government budget, 46 percent (US$8.95 billion) came from private firms, and 14
percent (US$1.13 billion) came from miscellaneous profits and interest receipts. A
total of US$5.33 billion was invested between 1994 and 2003. Of that, 38 percent was
invested in ICT R&D, 20 percent into informatization promotion, 18 percent in ICT
human resource development, 15.1 percent in broadband infrastructure and pro-
motion, 7 percent in infrastructure in the ICT industries, and 3 percent in standard-
ization.
The fund is managed by the MIC (overall management), the Institute of Infor-
mation Technology Assessment (specific project management), and the Fund Man-
agement Council (evaluation). The chair of the council is vice minister of the MIC,
and its members are directors general of related ministries.
The IPF played a key role in the balanced promotion of informatization policy to
create demand and in the ICT industry policy for expansion of the supply base. 
Outcome of Information Infrastructure Development 
Figure 5.6 displays the KAM spidergram for ICT indicators using data for Korea
and the average for the G7 and High Income countries for the most recent year. As
expected, Korea’s performance in the ICT pillar of the knowledge economy is very
balanced and very strong, with a number of the indicators being at par with and
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Because the promotion of informatization requires large-scale investment and the long-
term cooperation of various government organizations, the Informatization Promotion
Fund (IPF) was established to overcome the budgetary restrictions and provide the nec-
essary long-term financing for informatization projects.
even exceeding that of the G7 and High Income country averages. Korea is partic-
ularly strong in internet penetration, cost of internet access, e-government ser-
vices, and extent of business Internet use, with these variables scoring above the
90th percentile.
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Figure 5.6 ICT Indicators—Republic of Korea, G-7, and High Income Countries
Variable
Total telephones per 1,000 
   people, 2004 1,302.80 8.11 1,350.06 8.3 1,374.27 8.52
Main telephone lines per 1000 
   people, 2004 541.90 8.94 562.34 9.13 496.11 8.61
Mobile phones per 1,000 
   people, 2004 760.90 7.42 787.71 7.55 878.15 8.3
Computers per 1,000 
   people, 2004 544.90 8.73 564.86 8.85 479.61 8.31
Households with television (%), 
   2004 93.00 6.36 97.3 8.18 96.35 7.54
International Internet bandwidth 
   (bits per person), 2004 1,484.50 7.74 5,207.33 8.9 5,475.39 8.93
Internet users per 1000 people, 
   2004 656.80 9.62 555.16 8.83 480.68 8.43
Price basket for Internet (US$ per 
   month), 2003 9.70 9.32 16.76 7.39 21.21 5.8
Availability of e-government 
   services (1–7), 2006 5.46 9.36 4.58 7.87 4.55 7.77
Extent of business Internet use 
   (1–7), 2006 6.10 9.83 5.36 8.61 4.93 7.94
ICT expenditure as % of GDP, 
  2005 6.91 6.35 6.65 6.01 6.05 4.93
Actual Normalized Actual Normalized Actual Normalized
Korea, Rep. of G-7 High income
Total telephones per 1,000 people
ICT expenditures as % of GDP
Households with television (%)
International Internet bandwith
(bits per person)
Computers per 1,000 people
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Main telephone lines per 1,000 people
Internet users per 1,000 people
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Source: KAM, December 2006 (www.worldbank.org/wbi/kam).
ICT Adoption and Economic Growth
ICTs can be viewed as general purpose technologies that can affect economic
growth of the whole industry through two channels. First, the rise in ICT invest-
ments leads to capital accumulation, which is directly linked to economic growth.
Second, ICT investments can enhance productivity growth within industries.
Changes in production, management, and organization that are accompanied by
ICT investment further improve productivity.
Bank of Korea statistics show that ICT investments, including computers,
peripherals, networking, and software, sharply increased their share in overall
facility investments from 24 percent in 1995 to 34.5 percent in 2004. According to
Hong and others (2003a), the contribution of ICT investments to overall GDP
growth was about 3.5 percent for the period 1990–95; that contribution rose to 17.7
percent of economic growth from 1995 to 2000. 
The effects of ICT investments on productivity growth cannot be easily identi-
fied across the industry as a whole. Some researchers have categorized industries
into ICT high-use industry and ICT low-use industry and found that the produc-
tivity of the former was higher than that of the latter (see table 5.4). 
According to Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002), the effects of ICT invest-
ments on productivity may differ among businesses, because complementary
changes in organizational structure and job process may be incurred differently. In
other words, in addition to the ICT investment, complementary changes such as
human resource investment, incentives, and decentralization play a pivotal role in
enhancing productivity. Hong (2004) pointed out that ICT investment could have
only limited effects on productivity because of the partial correlation between ICT
investments and changes in job processes and internal organization in Korea.
Challenges Ahead: Convergence and Effective Competition
Korea’s current tasks are to balance continued network enhancement and ensure
effective competition. There is a trade-off between network enhancement, which
helps achieve production efficiency, and effective competition, which helps distri-
bution efficiency. Because convergence is a trend in telecommunications, the net-
work becomes more sophisticated as well as faster. It becomes unavoidable that,
even without anticompetitive practices, the incumbent operator has a greater
advantage in supplying convergent services. This has a detrimental effect on com-
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Table 5.4 Productivity Growth of ICT High-Use and Low-Use Industries 
(percent) 
Labor productivity growtha 1994–98 1998–2001 1994–2001
ICT high-use industry 9.1 5.6 8.0
ICT low-use industry 4.0 2.6 0.9
TFP growthb 1993–97 1998–2001 2002–04 1993–2004
ICT high-use industry 2.0 1.2 3.1 1.2
ICT low-use industry 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.1
Sources: a. KISDI 2004; b. Park and Ha 2005.
petition, so that the dominant operator in the market tends to gain market share.
The convergent trend also makes the design and implementation of competition
policy more complicated. Thus, another challenge for the Korean government is to
keep the regulatory framework up to date in a rapidly changing telecommunica-
tions market.
The possible directions in the era of convergence are as follows: New market
definitions for and classification of telecommunications services are needed to
accommodate convergence. The regulatory framework for the market structure
and effective competition, such as licensing, cross-subsidization, and bundling,
needs to be more sophisticated. During the transitional phase, traditional regula-
tory measures still need to be implemented; however, uniform regulation should be
avoided. Careful analysis of market conditions and relevant effects should precede
each policy or regulatory measure to allow flexibility. 
Development of the ICT Industry in Korea
Enthusiastic adoption of ICTs by Korean industries and rapid emergence of a com-
petitive ICT production sector helped Korea to recover from the economic crisis
and take off on a new phase of development. Although the ICT industry in Korea
underwent a stagnant period after 2001, the value of ICTs as a future growth engine
should not be underestimated. Especially as the boundary between industry and
products collapses because of broadband networking and convergence, a second
momentum is being formed. This second part of this chapter analyzes the develop-
ment of the Korean ICT industry as a high-value-added sector with substantial
export potential.
Growing Importance of the ICT Industry
In the 1990s, the ICT industry in Korea had the highest growth rates of any major
industry and became the new engine for growth. The Bank of Korea estimates that
the share of the ICT industry in Korea’s GDP rose from 7.7 percent in 1997 to 16.2
percent in 2006. A better way to evaluate the importance of the ICT industry is to
look at its contribution to real GDP growth. Since 1998, the ICT industry has con-
tributed more that more than a 1 percentage point increase to GDP annually. Table
5.5 shows that the growth rate of the ICT industry has been much higher than that
of the overall economy, and its contribution to GDP growth remains high.
The main driver for the rapid growth of the ICT industry was the enhancement
in productivity attributed to continuous technology development. As table 5.6
shows, researchers have consistently reported that TFP growth in the ICT industry,
more than 10 percent in the 1990s, exceeded TFP growth in other industries by a
large margin during that decade. In particular, the difference between TFP growth
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Intensive and rapid adoption of ICTs by Korean industries and rapid emergence of a
competitive ICT production sector helped Korea to recover from the economic crisis
and take off on a new phase of development.
in ICTs and in other industries is estimated to have widened after the financial cri-
sis of 1997, partly because the TFP growth in non-ICT industries has fallen since the
crisis.
The ICT Industry and Korea’s International Trade
The significant contribution of the ICT industry to the growth of the national econ-
omy was mainly attributed to rapidly expanding ICT exports. The share of ICTs in
Korea’s total exports rose from 23.1 percent in 1998 to 29.4 percent in 2004. The
quality of key ICT products such as dynamic random access memory (DRAM),
mobile handsets, liquid crystal display (LCD) monitors, and set-top boxes has risen
to the global standard. 
Improvements should be made in two areas of ICT trade for Korea’s ICT exports
to continue to lead the national economy. First, trading partners for ICT products
should be diversified. Korea’s exports and imports in the ICT industry depend
heavily on five major trading partners: China, Hong Kong (China), the United
States, Taiwan (China), Japan, and Germany. As of 2004, those nations accounted
for 65.1 percent of total ICT exports and 75.9 percent of total ICT imports. This
heavy reliance on five major trading partners implies that the future of Korea’s ICT
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Table 5.5 Contribution of the ICT Industry to Economic Growth, 1997–2006
(percent of GDP)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Growth rate 
of the ICT 
industry
11.6 23.0 35.3 33.8 10.5 17.6 14.2 17.5 13.5 13.3
Growth rate 
of GDP 4.7 6.9 9.5 8.5 3.8 7.0 3.1 4.7 4.2 5.0
ICT industry 
share of GDP





0.5 1.1 2.2 2.6 1.0 1.8 1.6 2.2 1.9 2.0
Source: Bank of Korea 2006.
Note: 1997–2006 statistics were calculated at 2000 constant prices.
The main driver for the rapid growth of the ICT industry was the enhancement in pro-
ductivity attributed to continuous technology development.
Table 5.6 Estimates of TFP Growth in the ICTs and All Manufacturing Industries in Korea
(percent) 
Period 1991–97 1998–2000 1991–2000
All manufacturing industries 2.8 1.5 2.3
ICT industry 11.5 7.0 10.0
Source: Hong and others 2003.
industry depends on the economic situations of those nations. Increasing the num-
ber of trading partners is necessary to sustain the growth of the ICT industry and
diversify the risks. 
Second, Korea needs to diversify export products. Key products leading Korea’s
ICT exports include mobile communications handsets, memory semiconductors,
and LCD monitors. These products represented more than 50 percent of ICT
exports (27.7, 22.8, and 6.9 percent, respectively) in 2004, reflecting their high con-
tributions to Korea’s exports. However, too much reliance on several items in
exports should be relieved. 
Composition of the ICT Industry 
In 2004, the total production of the ICT industry in Korea was W 230 trillion, Yet the
sector development is very unbalanced. Polarization is the term used in Korea to
explain the widening gap between advanced and underdeveloped sectors in the
economy. 
First, the software and computer service industry is underdeveloped in contrast
with the world-class ICT manufacturing industry. As shown in table 5.7, ICT hard-
ware accounts for 72 percent of total ICT production as of 2004. The Korean econ-
omy has been globally competitive in assembly and mass production operations,
and this traditional strength has again surfaced in the ICT manufacturing industry. 
Table 5.8 compares ICT industries in Korea and the United States in terms of
value added and employment. The value added by the software and computer ser-
vice industry accounted for about 6 percent of the total value added in Korea’s ICT
industry in 2004, whereas it accounted for 39 percent in the United States in 2002.
The proportion of value added of the ICT equipment industry shows a greater dif-
ference: 72.2 percent in Korea compared with 28.4 percent in the United States. Dif-
ferences between the two nations in the software employment share of the ICT
industry were smaller than those of value added, reflecting Korea’s low labor pro-
ductivity in that sector.
Second, a weak ICT components and materials industry, in comparison with the
final ICT goods industry, poses some problems for the Korean ICT industry’s long-
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Table 5.7 Composition of ICT Industry Production, 1997–2004
(trillion won)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
ICT service 17.0 19.6 24.5 31.6 36.3 43.0 41.6 46.0
(22.6) (21.8) (20.8) (21.3) (24.2) (22.7) (20.6) (20.0)
ICT hardware 55.0 65.6 86.8 105.9 99.1 127.7 141.6 164.9
(72.8) (72.9) (73.7) ( 71.4) (66.0) ( 67.6) (70.2) (71.8)
Software 3.5 4.7 6.5 10.7 14.7 18.2 18.4 18.7
(4.6) (5.2) (5.5) (7.4) (9.8) (9.7) (9.1) (8.1)
Total 75.5 89.9 117.8 148.2 150.1 188.9 201.6 229.6
Growth rate 27.1 19.0 31.1 25.8 1.3 25.8 6.7 13.9
Source: KAIT 2005.
Note: ICT service includes telecommunications and broadcasting services. Software includes pack-
aged software and computer-related services. Numbers in parentheses denote percentage of total ICT
production.
term growth. The import-inducing coefficients of key ICT components range from
0.45 to 0.55, about four times larger than that of Japan’s electric and electronics
industry (0.13). About 70 to 80 percent of the trade deficits with Japan are from the
components and materials industry, 40 percent of which are occurring in the ICT
industry (Kim 2004). 
Because intermediate components need to be obtained from abroad and at a
higher cost, the immature components and materials industry tends to imply that
the ICT final goods industry may eventually become less competitive, which would
hamper economic growth. Rodrik (2004) has emphasized the role of the intermedi-
ate goods industry (components and materials) in economic growth and technol-
ogy development. There also is a strong mutual dependence between the final and
intermediate ICT goods industries. The specialization and diversification of the
components and materials industry lead to the enhancement of the productivity of
the finished goods industry, which in turn increases demand for components and
materials. The failure to establish a virtuous cycle results in a lack of mutual reliance
and can cause the ICT industry, and hence the economy, to suffer from low growth
in the long run.
Third, a sizable gap exists between large ICT firms and ICT SMEs in Korea. Table
5.9 illustrates that employment, revenue, value added, and labor productivity of the
ICT-manufacturing SMEs are lower than those of non-ICT SMEs. In 2005, the share
of large conglomerates in the whole manufacturing industry in terms of the number
of establishments is just 0.6 percent; their shares in the ICT manufacturing industry
and in the components and materials industry are 2.1 percent and 2.6 percent,
respectively. As a result, the share of large businesses in terms of employment and
sales is much higher in the ICT manufacturing industry and ICT components and
materials manufacturing industries than in the manufacturing industry as a whole.
The same is true for value added. The labor productivities of large firms are 3.0
times, 3.6 times, and 3.2 times larger than those of the SMEs, in the manufacturing,
ICT manufacturing, and ICT components and materials industries, respectively.
Besides the higher productivity of large ICT companies, the disparity can be
partially explained by the fact that the Korean ICT industry is capital intensive as
well as R&D intensive. Therefore, it is easier for large firms to run ICT industries
because they have more access to financial resources. For example, Dedrick and
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Table 5.8 Comparison of the Structure of ICT Industries
Korea (2004) United States (2002)
Value Share of Share of Value Share Employ- Share of
added industry Employ- industry added of value ment industry 
(billion total ment total (US added (100 total 
won) (%) (persons) (%) billion) (%) persons) (%)
ICT equipment 80,903 72.2 444,177 66.1 235.9 28.4 16,248 34
ICT service 24,544 21.9 118,198 17.6 272.1 32.7 11,931 25
Software and 
computer 
services 6,551 5.8 109,970 16.4 323.7 38.9 19,610 41
Total 111,997 100.0 672,345 100.0 831.6 100.0 47,790 100.0
Source: KAIT 2005; U.S. Department of Commerce 2003.
Kraemer (1997) analyze how the management style of some large firms (chaebols)
work in their favor. The president of a chaebol has full authority over the company
and can take it into a risky new business without worrying about the threat to stock
prices or about achieving consensus among the management team. In contrast,
SMEs, especially high-tech start-ups, usually do not have sufficient cash or tangible
assets to be taken as collateral, so the (usually conservative) commercial banks are
cautious about extending loans to start-ups. 
The polarization in the ICT industry by firm size may also be partially attributed
to unfair trade practices—such as the unilateral request by large conglomerates to
lower unit prices or unfair contracts that prohibit SMEs in the components industry
from contracting with competing companies that assemble finished goods. If this is
the case, it may limit technology innovation in SMEs. 
Capacity-Building Initiatives for the ICT Sector 
Research and Development
R&D in ICTs has been one of the key factors contributing to the growth of the ICT sec-
tor in Korea. Keeping pace with technological change and remaining globally com-
petitive, Korea’s ICT sector has continuously increased its investment in R&D.
During the period 1994–2005, the average annual growth rate of R&D expenditure on
ICTs was about 22 percent. In 2005, R&D investment in ICTs accounted for about 47
percent of total R&D spending in Korea (see figure 5.7). Business enterprises had the
largest share of R&D spending in the ICT sector: about 89 percent in 2005 (table 5.10).
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Table 5.9 Distribution of ICT Components and Materials Businesses, 2005 
Number Value 
of Employ- Revenue added Labor 
establish- ment (million (million produc-
Classification ments (persons) won) won) tivity
Manufacturing Large 662 683,200 428,252,729 151,564,208 221.8
business (0.6) (23.7) (50.1) (48.2)
SME 117,156 2,197,803 425,981,059 162,876,715 74.1
(99.4) (76.3) (49.9) (51.8)
Total 117,818 2,881,003 854,233,788 314,440,923 109.1
ICT Large 172 239,190 121,636,898 56,640,876 236.8 
manufacturing business (2.1) (50.3) (74.4) (78.3)
SME 8,116 236,640 41,764,288 15,731,339 66.5
(97.9) (49.7) (25.6) (21.7)
Total 8,288 475,830 163,401,186 72,372,215 152.1 
ICT component Large 126 172,086 71,858,281 38,022,730 221.0 
and materials business (2.6) (55.5) (74.3) (79.8)
manufacturing SME 4,779 137,902 24,812,638 9,635,824 69.9
(97.4) (44.5) (25.7) (20.2)
Total 4,905 309,988 96,670,919 47,658,554 153.7
Source: National Statistical Office 2006.
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate percentage share in category.
Because of the private sector’s aggressive investment in R&D for ICTs, the gov-
ernment has been able to focus on a few strategic ICT areas that are expected to
bring higher social return. As of 2003, the government’s ICT development pro-
grams were composed of three priority areas. 
The Leading Technology Development Program focuses on strategic R&D proj-
ects that require long-term investments that the private sector would not engage in
without the government’s support. The list of technologies under the program
includes next-generation mobile communications, digital television and broadcast-
ing, optical subscriber networking, and embedded software. In general, about half
of the government’s R&D resources for the development of leading technologies is
given to national research institutes (Yoon and others 2002), but cooperative
research with private enterprises and universities is highly encouraged.
The Industrial ICT Development Program provides financial assistance to pri-
vate ICT firms that focus on the development of applied technologies that can be
commercialized within a short time. To facilitate the commercialization of R&D
results, the government gives higher priority to proposals for joint R&D projects
between public research institutes and private enterprises. 
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Source: MOST, Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), Korea Information
Strategy Development Institute (KISDI). 
Table 5.10 Composition of R&D Expenditure in ICT, 1997–2005
(percent) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Business R&D 86.5 90.9 94.5 94.9 89.1 84.5 87.7 89.0 89.3
Public R&D 13.5 9.1 5.5 5.1 10.9 15.5 12.3 11.0 10.7
Source: MOST, ETRI, and KISDI. 
Note: All values appear as a percentage of total R&D expenditure in ICT.
The New Technology Support Program is designed to help new SMEs in the ICT
sector. SMEs often face financial difficulty in developing innovative ideas and tech-
nologies. Firms with innovative ideas or patents and in business for fewer than
three years may participate in the program. If the technology development sup-
ported by the program is successful, the program also provides management assis-
tance and helps find investors to bring the products or services to their full market
potential. 
Human Resources
The rapid expansion of the ICT sector in the Korean economy has increased
demand for R&D personnel. To increase the number of researchers in the IT field,
the Korean government has designed a long-term support program that provides
funds for the development of ICT research centers at private and public universi-
ties. To foster qualified researchers, the government offers fellowship programs
that give students and researchers opportunities to study abroad in distinguished
academic institutions.
In 2003, the government introduced a supply chain management model into its
program of fostering ICT professionals. The program focuses on fostering profes-
sionals who will be able to meet the rapidly changing ICT skill requirements. The
government also helped ICT-related schools improve their equipment and educa-
tion curricula. Assistance was provided for ICT internships so that more students
could gain on-the-job experience. 
ICT Venture Enterprises and Venture Capital
The number of venture business firms in Korea has rapidly increased since the
financial crisis. Although the number of certified venture businesses decreased
drastically after 2001, they still take a large share of overall ventures. ICT start-ups
accounted for about 42 percent of the certified ventures at the end of 2003. 
Start-up investment companies (SICs), account for the majority of venture capi-
tal industry in Korea.2 Unlike a typical U.S. venture capital firm, which is a limited
partnership operating a small amount of partnership funds at any given time,
Korean venture capital firms are incorporated joint stock companies with their own
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To accommodate the rapidly increased demand for R&D personnel, in terms of both
quantity and quality, in the ICT sector, the Korean government facilitated the develop-
ment of ICT research centers at universities and provided scholarships to distinguished
foreign academic institutions.
2. The venture capital industry in Korea is composed of two kinds: SICs and new tech-
nology financing companies (NTFCs). NTFCs are registered with MOFE and are engaged in
broader areas of financing activities, such as leasing, factoring, consumer credit, and private
equity investment.
financial resources for investment. However, they can also form investment funds
with outside money, which comes mostly from the government, institutional
investors, and corporations. 
Both the number of SICs and the amount of funds the SICs manage have
increased significantly since 1998. The IT industry is the single most important area
of investment for venture capital. As figure 5.8 shows, venture capital investment in
IT-based firms reached up to 70 percent of total venture capital investments during
the IT boom (1999–2000). As in the United States, many venture capital companies
claim IT investment as their specialty and continue to focus on the IT industry
despite the market’s recent sluggishness.
Since the Korean economy experienced a downturn, venture businesses have
had difficulties. However, recent evidence shows that venture businesses in some
sectors are doing better than others. Specifically, the profits of firms in Internet ser-
vice and parts manufacture have increased, whereas those in software, computing
service, and semiconductor equipment have decreased and are even experiencing
losses. Software and computing service ventures suffer from chronic deficits
because most governmental procurement processes award contracts to the lowest
bidder, and usually it is the incumbent firms that are able to offer the lowest bids. 
Despite overall dynamic development of venture capital fund-raising, there are
some problematic outcomes. First, because the business environment has not been
favorable for the start-ups since 2001, the return on investment for start-ups has
also decreased. Thus, the size of start-up funding was greatly reduced, and fund-
raising had to depend heavily on the government. The SMBA shows that the por-
tions of the public sector funding for the start-up investment fund increased from
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IT 22.3 389.9 1,268.60 512.7 337.4 321.4 314.1 300.7
Non-IT 42.9 196 565.7 376.6 279.3 290.4 249.8 364.4
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Source: Small and Medium Business Administration (SMBA; various years).
2004 to 2005, which were 34.1 percent and 46.5 percent, respectively. Second, the
policy has been one dimensional, failing to consider the different characteristics of
industries and different developmental stages of firms. For example, business per-
formance by industries differs because of sectors’ individual characteristics. And in
various ways, the government has been supporting even the firms for which ven-
ture capital firms play a role. Such government actions may impede the develop-
ment of the venture capital industry. Finally, venture capital fund-raising has
focused only on providing assistance for start-up firms, and it does not provide any
assistance for the restructuring of existing firms. Thus, many inefficient start-up
firms are unable to restructure. 
Hence, a new paradigm is needed for setting policy to promote start-up ven-
tures. The government can play an important role for some ventures, but not all. It
would be enough for the government to focus on the early-stage firms; then it could
give venture capital firms opportunities in the ventures in the expansion stage.
Conclusion and Further Challenges
Since the mid-1990s, Korea has pushed nationwide informatization. The govern-
ment has consistently tried to take balanced approaches to three policy areas: build-
ing information infrastructure; promoting industrial activities, including
expanding the ICT knowledge base; and ensuring fair competition. As a result,
Korea now has one of the world’s top broadband Internet infrastructures.
However, despite the relatively well-advanced information infrastructure, Korea
has yet to translate the rapid diffusion of informatization into qualitative results,
such as enhancement of labor productivity and industrial competitiveness. For
example, although Korea is top among OECD countries in terms of informatization,
its use of ICT is not comparable to such information infrastructures (Figure 5.9). 
In general, Korea’s ICT sector is characterized as hardware-oriented in that it has
grown with massive capital investment by large firms. Hence, the sector shows
industrial competitiveness in mass-producible products such as semiconductors
and displays, but shows weaknesses in generic technologies and in core parts and
components that are segmented in markets. Korea needs to build on its strengths
and correct its weaknesses to make its ICT industry more competitive.
The ICT sector is expected to continue to lead global economic growth in the
future; therefore, enhancing the competitiveness of the ICT industry is critical to
national economic growth. Foremost, the government must emphasize continuing
informatization and building up next-generation information and communications
infrastructure, thus strengthening the foundation for Korea as a leading informa-
tion economy. More important than investment in physical infrastructures, Korea
should effectively address the polarization issue in the ICT sector. In relation to the
divergent performances between the ICT and non-ICT industries, more effective
use of ICT and infrastructures by non-ICT industries is very important to enhance
the productivity of other industries. 
With regard to the divergence of productivity growth between large enterprises
and SMEs in the ICT industry, it is important to strengthen the innovative capabil-
ities of smaller firms that fill the gap left by the large firms. One specific area of sig-
nificant policy importance is the intermediate goods sector in the ICT industry. A
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strong mutual dependence exists between final ICT products for which Korea has
competitive advantages and ICT components and parts for which Korea is rela-
tively weak. Korea’s entry into ICT services and software, which necessitates many
years for Korean companies to accumulate core competencies, will remain the coun-
try’s most daunting long-term challenge. 
The future of Korean ICT policy may be summarized in its IT 839 policy.
Telecommunications services, infrastructure, equipment, software, and content
are the elements that make up the vertical and horizontal value chains of the IT
industry. Under the value chains, the introduction of new-generation broadband
services will prompt investment in the building of three essential networks. And
these networks will pave the way for the rapid growth of nine new sectors, creat-
ing a synergistic effect (MIC IT 839 strategy). By launching nine flagship R&D
projects, Korea plans to change its ICT sector from a fast follower to a world-lead-
ing innovator. The broadband convergence network, the Korean version of a next-
generation network, will link 90 percent of the population with at least a 20-mbps
broadband network.
With this plan, Korea may become the first country to set the broadband Internet
as a universal service. Korea is the leading country in launching many new services,
including satellite and terrestrial digital multimedia broadcasting and wireless
broadband. Users in Korea will soon embrace an era of convergence that is charac-
terized by the seamless interoperability of many different advanced networks.
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Source: OECD 2005a. 
Note: Chart indicates the score on the business usage subindex of the World Economic Forum Net-
worked Readiness Index 2003–04.
Government continuously adjusts the IT 839 strategy to reflect changes in tech-
nology and market environments. For example, recently adjusted strategy empha-
sizes the software sector, reflecting the growing importance of the software sector
for job creation and balanced growth. The government’s role as the facilitator of dif-
ferent market elements will be extended to that of a vision provider under IT 839.
The IT 839 strategy is expected to shape the future of the IT industry and make a
great contribution to laying the foundation for Korea’s new growth momentum. It
will transform the Korean IT industry, moving it away from a “catch-up” develop-
ment model of the past to become a world market leader. 
Information and Communication Technologies for a Knowledge-Based Economy       105

6
Meeting Skill and Human Resource 
Requirements
Anna Kim and Byung-Shik Rhee
Education has been a key factor in the rapid economic growth of Korea over the
past four decades. Since the 1960s, the government-led economic development
plans have been directly reflected in education policy and planning. The govern-
ment has been generally successful in providing and expanding the education sys-
tem based on the industrial needs of human resource. As a result, Korea’s education
system developed in tandem with the various stages of economic development,
complementing the other pillars of the knowledge economy. The focus of the gov-
ernment’s educational plan has moved from primary to secondary education and
finally to the tertiary level, according to the nation’s economic advancement. The
rapid expansion of education in terms of quantity and, to a lesser extent, quality is
the most salient feature of Korean educational development during the country’s
industrialization. 
However, the recent transition to an advanced KBE and the problems in the edu-
cational system that originated in the industrialization process require a new policy
framework in education. Until now, the full potential of Korea’s human resources
has not been fully realized because of the rigidity and inflexibility of the education
and training systems. The pool of human resources in Korea is large enough,
because of efforts to expand educational opportunities, but the availability of ade-
quately and appropriately trained human resources is limited. From this point,
Korea’s education and training systems have failed to play their required roles.
Therefore, establishing a new system of education and training that meets the skill
requirements for a KBE is a new challenge for Korea. 
This chapter characterizes the Korean education model during the industrial-
ization process. It contrasts the developmental model that Korea had implemented
during the high-growth era before the financial crisis of 1997 and the human
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Korea’s education system developed in tandem with the various stages of economic
development, complementing the other pillars of the knowledge economy.
resource development model aimed at a KBE, which Korea has pursued to over-
come the crisis and sustain economic growth afterward. This chapter discusses
Korea’s achievements in education, as well as remaining tasks, with the common
theme of this report—how Korea has narrowed the institutional and knowledge
gaps compared with other countries that are considered to be global leaders.
The Korean Education System
Since Korea launched an economic development program early in the 1960s, indus-
trialization and urbanization have accelerated. With the poor natural resources
available, Korea’s strong family structure and high respect for education have been
the driving force behind the country’s rapid economic development. Koreans’
strong belief in education is attributed in large part to the emphasis on credentials
that prevails in Korean society. Education has also played a major role in laying the
foundation upon which democratic principles and institutions are based. It has pro-
moted political knowledge, changed political behavior patterns, and shaped polit-
ical attitudes and values. At the same time, education has imbued the people with
commitment to modernization and citizenship. Increased educational opportuni-
ties have made upward social mobility possible, and the middle class has expanded
as a result (Kim, A. 2003).
The formal education system in Korea follows a single track of six years in ele-
mentary school, three years in middle school, three years in high school, and four
years in college or university. Elementary education is free and compulsory. Upon
reaching the age of six, children receive a notification of admission to a school in
their residential area. Upon entrance to elementary school, children automatically
advance to the next grade each year. Free, compulsory middle-school education
began in 1985 in farming and fishing areas and gradually was expanded nation-
wide. Middle-school graduates have two options: to attend an academic general
high school or a vocational high school. Those who are admitted to a vocational
high school cannot transfer to an academic high school. But there is no restriction
on vocational high-school graduates entering higher education institutions. There-
fore, overall student selection and screening in Korea are reserved until candidates
are selected for universities and colleges. Everyone is encouraged to participate in
the competition for higher education. This system of contested mobility resulted in
a continuous increase in the demand for educational opportunities and thus pushed
the government to extend the provision of such opportunities.
Educational Expansion in Elementary and Secondary Education
The Korean education system has been successful at the primary and secondary
levels in providing equal educational access to students, irrespective of their gen-
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The rapid expansion of education in terms of quantity and, to a lesser extent, quality is
the most salient feature of the Korean educational development during the country’s
industrialization.
der, geographical location, and socioeconomic background (see figures 6.1 and 6.2).
The rate of pupil retention is nearly 100 percent in the lower grades. The school-age
population is now forecast to grow at a slower pace, thus easing the tax burden of
financing education. This outlook suggests a strong likelihood that public resources
will be available for upgrading the provision of educational services.
Expansion of Higher Education
The rate of educational expansion is more remarkable at the tertiary level (see fig-
ure 6.1 and table 6.1). Until the 1970s, the college admission quota was strictly
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Figure 6.2 Korea—Gross School Enrollment Rates by Sex, 2005
Source: World Bank Edstats database (www1.worldbank.org/education/edstats/).
regulated by the government, which set up the quota based on the analysis of
demand for human resources. However, in 1980, the government abolished col-
lege entrance examinations and expanded educational opportunities for higher
education. During the 1990s, the government initiated diversification and spe-
cialization of higher education institutions to accommodate the diverse needs of
society. For this purpose, standards and conditions for granting university char-
ters were loosened, and the numbers of institutions and of students increased
steeply after 1996.
Quality Performance
Korea’s education system has achieved quality improvements in tandem with
quantitative expansion, though to a lesser extent for the former. For example, the
most recent published results (2003) of periodic international tests in mathematics
and science, such as the OECD’s PISA (Programme for International Student
Assessment) and TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study),
showed the qualitative evidence for the highly competitive knowledge and skills of
15-year-old students of Korea (see figures 6.3a and 6.3b). 
Similarly, the efficiency index shows that the efficiency of secondary education
in Korea ranks second, following Finland, among OECD countries. The index was
calculated by running the regression of reading literacy of the 15-year-old students
on the cumulative expenditure per pupil for children ages 6 through 15 (see figure
6.4). This result indicates that Korean students show relatively high performance,
although Korea’s cumulative expenditures per pupil are below the OECD average
(OECD 2004c). 
However, the PISA survey results unveil an interesting feature of Korean stu-
dents: individually they show high performance in academic achievement, but
they have a relatively low sense of affiliation with their schools. This lack of affilia-
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Table 6.1 Number of Higher Education Institutions, by Institution Type, 2005
Number of institutions
Institution type National/Public Private Total
University (4 years) 26 147 (85) 173
Junior college (2- and 3-year 
vocational college) 14 144 (91) 158
University of education 11 — 11
Industrial university 8 10 (56) 18
Technical university 0 1 (100) 1
Air and correspondence 
university 1 — 1
Cyber college and university 0 17 (100) 17
Corporate university 0 1 (100) 1
Misc. school (college & university) 0 5 (100) 4
Total 60 359 (86) 419
Source: KEDI/MOE & HRD 2005. 
Note: Percentage of total that is private is in parentheses.
— = n.a.






































































































Figure 6.3a PISA 2003 Mathematics and Science Scores, Selected Countries
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Source: Gonzales et al. 2004.
tion is partly attributable to the low credibility of the public education system.
Moreover, Korean students show relatively low scores in all of the 13 affective char-
acteristics and particularly low scores in motivational preferences and volition, self-
related beliefs, and preference for cooperative learning. This indicates that the high
performance of Korean students is driven not by their internal motivation but by
external factors, and it explains why Korean students lose the positive learning atti-
tude that generates consistent and creative learning and research during their col-
lege years, as soon as they finish the college entrance exam.
Korea’s overall performance in the education arena can be seen in figure 6.5,
which displays the KAM spidergram for education indicators using data for the
Republic of Korea and the average for the G7 and high-income countries for the
most recent year. Korea’s performance in the education pillar is relatively strong,
with 6 of the 14 indicators ranking in the 80th percentile and above. These are the
average years of schooling, tertiary enrollment, Internet access in schools, eighth-
grade achievement in science and mathematics, and extent of staff training. In addi-
tion, the performance is well balanced, with all but one of the indicators,
professional and technical workers, ranking above the 50th percentile.
When compared to the average G7 or high-income country, Korea also stands
up relatively well. Korea performs relatively better than the the average G7 or
high-income country in terms of the quality of mathematics and science educa-
tion, internet access in schools, tertiary enrollment, and average years of school-
ing. On the other hand it is relatively weaker in the quality of management
schools, brain drain and as mentioned, the availability of professional and tech-
nical workers.
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Source: OECD 2006. Education at a Glance. Paris: OECD
Note: Relationship between performance in mathematics and cumulative expenditure on educational
institutions per student between ages of 6 and 15 years, in U.S. dollars, converted using purchasing power
parity (PPP). 
Main Features of Educational Development
The Korean Model of Educational Development
In the late 1940s and the 1950s, education policy focused on establishing educational
infrastructure and expanding primary and secondary education, which are critical
to supplying industry with a skilled workforce. The most conspicuous feature of
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Variable
Adult iiteracy rate (% age 15 
   and above), 2004 97.90 6.59 99.77 8.22 96.68 5.95
Average years of schooling, 2000 10.84 9.26 9.68 8.67 9.20 7.38
Gross secondary enrollment, 2004 90.90 6.28 102.73 8.80 102.18 8.72
Gross tertiary enrollment, 2004 88.50 9.84 60.84 8.28 56.19 7.64
Life expectancy at birth, 2004 77.10 7.58 79.46 9.12 78.57 8.26
Internet access in schools (1–7), 
   2006 6.40 9.66 5.53 7.09 5.61 8.02
Public spending on education 
   as % of GDP, 2003 4.60 5.04 5.14 6.42 5.59 7.17
Professional and technical workers 
   as % of labor force, 2004 17.98 4.20 24.71 6.38 26.25 7.35
8th grade achievement in 
   mathematics, 2003 589.00 9.39 517.00 7.18 513.48 6.86
8th grade achievement in 
   science, 2003 558.00 9.39 528.20 7.35 516.24 6.02
Quality of science and math 
   education (1–7), 2006 5.10 7.84 4.96 7.52 4.94 7.46
Extent of staff training (1–7), 2006 5.20 8.36 5.17 8.25 4.99 7.80
Quality of management schools 
   (1–7), 2006 4.30 5.09 5.36 8.19 5.10 7.67
Brain drain (1–7), 2006 3.70 6.09 4.70 8.22 4.67 7.96
Actual Normalized Actual Normalized Actual Normalized
Korea, Rep. of G-7 High income
Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above)
Average years of schoolingBrain drain
Quality of management schools
Extent of staff training
Quality of science and
math education
8th grade achievement in science
8th grade achievement in mathematics
Professional and technical workers as % of labor force
Public spending on education
as % of GDP
Internet access in schools
Life expectancy at birth
Gross tertiary enrollment
Gross secondary enrollment




Source: KAM, December 2006 (www.worldbank.org/wbi/kam).
Figure 6.5 Education Indicators
educational development in the 1960s was the quantitative expansion of student
enrollment and the number of schools. Vocational high schools were established in
the 1960s to provide training in craft skills for the growing labor-intensive light
industries. During the 1970s, one of the priority areas of economic development
plans was the strengthening of vocational education. Vocational junior colleges were
set up to supply technicians for the heavy and chemical industries (HCIs).
During the 1970s and 1980s, higher education was expanded in two ways:
increased student enrollment and diversified institutions of higher education. As jun-
ior colleges took a larger share of tertiary education, their programs were diversified
to meet industrial needs. Education reform in the 1980s included such measures as
abolishing university entrance examinations, renovating school facilities, and intro-
ducing incentives for teachers. The availability of human resources became increas-
ingly strained in the 1980s. The increased rate of the economically active population
dropped sharply in that decade compared with the previous decade, and labor
demand continued to increase as the economy grew at a high average annual rate of
10 percent in the second half of the 1980s. The changes in labor demand toward a more
skilled and high-caliber workforce in the 1980s—brought about by the rapid economic
growth—called for strengthening science and engineering education in universities.
The rapid economic growth had a strong effect on human resource development
in two ways. On the industrial side, rapid industrialization affected skill formation
in workplaces; in particular, industrial deepening in a short time required substan-
tial effort to upgrade workforce skills and knowledge. On the supply side, the edu-
cation and training system needed to change to meet the new requirements of the
industry. Hence, Korea’s education and training system responded to the growth of
the Korean economy through rapid expansion of student enrollment capacity,
which caused the imbalance between quantitative expansion and qualitative
improvement of education and the skill mismatch between public training and
industrial needs. Korea’s education system is a good example of a transformation
for national development. The main features of the changes in the Korean educa-
tional development model are shown in table 6.2.
Key Success Factors and Limitations of Previous Development
As discussed in the previous section, education has played an important role in
Korea’s successful industrialization. The government was right to expand the edu-
cation system based on the needs of the industry and mobilize private resources for
this purpose. However, the government-led, supply-side educational policy and
planning caused rigidity in the education and training systems and an imbalance
between quantitative expansion and qualitative improvement, which turned out to
be restraints on Korea’s transition to a KBE.
Government’s Strategic Approaches to Educational Expansion
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After the provision of universal primary education, secondary and tertiary enrollment
were expanded in accordance with the human resource needs at the various stages of
economic development.
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Table 6.2 Korean Educational Development Model, 1948–2004
Year 1948–60 1960–80 1980–2000 2000–04
Challenges at the Establishment of national Educational planning for Enhancement of lifelong Human resources innovation
national level infrastructure economic development learning
Strategy • Implementing a government- • Focusing on traditional • Reaching out to the non- • Tightening up the loosely 
initiated approach institutions of higher traditional education connected system of human 
education sector resource development
• Continuing the government- • Using a government-led, • Implementing a government- 
initiated approach partial market approach and market-coordinated 
approach (market influence 
increased)
Primary tasks • Building elementary • Improving teaching • Developing highly skilled • Improving quality or relevance 
and activities schools quality (elementary and human resources in of university education
• Developing vocational secondary education) national strategic fields • Increasing research productivity
schools • Increasing college (information technology, • Enhancing the efficiency of the 
• Developing human graduates with biotechnology, S&T, human resource development 
resources in medicine, engineering majors and so on) system
engineering, agriculture, • Developing medium- • Developing a system of • Focusing on regional develop-
and teacher education skilled human resources lifelong learning ment and innovation
Resources • Seeking foreign assistance • Increasing educational • Increasing research funds • Restructuring at government, 
(tools) (UN Korean Reconstruction period for new elementary in S&T system, and institutional levels
Agency, Office of the and secondary teachers • Creating diverse types of • Infusion of financial support 
Economic Coordinator, (2 to 4 years) higher education from the government (BK21, 
USOM = U.S Operations • Creating vocational institutions post-BK21, NURI)
Mission, and so on) colleges • Introducing credit-bank 
• Mobilizing private system
resources for expansion of 
the education sector
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Note: BK21 = Brain Korea 21; NURI = New University for Regional Innovation.
The Korean government emphasized primary education at a very early stage of
its educational development, before its high-growth phase. In 1954, the govern-
ment established the six-year plan for accomplishing compulsory education. After
achieving universal primary education, the government shifted its investment
emphasis to secondary education in the 1960s and 1970s and then to higher educa-
tion in the 1980s. As the social demand for secondary education increased because
of universal primary education, and as the demand for skilled human resources
increased with the shift to HCIs, the government had to invest more in secondary
education for constructing school buildings and hiring more teachers. And as the
number of high-school graduates increased and the average income of households
rose, the social demand for higher education increased dramatically.
In 1968, the government abolished the middle-school entrance examination and
instead introduced a system of student allocation in which primary-school gradu-
ates were assigned to a middle school through a lottery system. With the elimina-
tion of the middle-school entrance exam, the flow of students into and out of the
middle-school system greatly increased, and, consequently, competition for
entrance into the elite high schools became severe. In 1974, the government again
responded by adopting the High School Equalization Policy, which was intended to
make every high school equal in terms of the students’ academic background, edu-
cational conditions, teaching staff, and financing. A new admissions policy, which
is still in effect in most metropolitan areas, replaced each individual high school’s
entrance exam with a locally administered standardized test and a lottery system.
The abolition of the secondary entrance examinations brought about a great
increase in secondary education opportunities.
Higher education expanded rapidly in the mid-1950s because of the govern-
ment’s laissez-faire policy regarding increases in enrollment quotas. The aim of the
policy was to accommodate the demand for higher education, which was sup-
pressed during Japanese rule. However, the laissez-faire policy resulted in the over-
supply of college graduates and high unemployment rates among the graduates.
Thus, the government exercised tight control over the enrollment quotas for each
college and university. As a result, college enrollment increased slowly until the
1970s. During the 1970s, the government selectively expanded the enrollment quo-
tas in the fields of engineering, natural sciences, business and commerce, and for-
eign languages, but it basically maintained the policy of slow expansion. Higher
education greatly expanded during the first half of the 1980s under a policy of
adopting a graduation enrollment quota system and expanding enrollment quotas.
Higher education continued to expand during the 1990s. The main areas of expan-
sion were two-year vocational colleges and the fields of engineering and natural
sciences at four-year colleges and universities.
In general, the government’s expansion policy for higher education has been
effective in terms of supplying high-quality white-collar workers and R&D per-
sonnel according to each stage of economic development. Specifically, the gov-
ernment’s control over the enrollment quotas during the 1960s and 1970s played
a key role in balancing the demand and supply of college graduates in the labor
market, consequently reducing inefficiency in the national economy and social
problems that resulted from the oversupply and underemployment of college
graduates.
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The Steady Increase of the Education Budget and Efficient Public Funding
The growth rates of the education budget have outpaced those of the GDP, and the
government has put a high priority on education spending over the years. From
1963 to 2005, the government’s spending on education increased more than 29 times
in real terms, and the GDP and the government’s overall budget increased 20 times. 
As shown in figure 6.6, the share of education budget out of total government
budget had remained around 15 percent in 1960 but it has increased over the years,
reaching more than 20 percent in 2000s. 
The share of in-school expenditures for primary education has steadily
decreased since 1963, and those for middle and high schools have increased slightly
since 1982. The share of in-school expenditures for higher education increased from
14.3 percent in 1963 to 31.2 percent in 1982, decreased to 27.3 percent in 1990, and
increased again to 30.2 percent in 1994. For secondary and higher education, a sub-
stantial amount of funding came from the private sector, such as households and
private foundations. At the secondary level, the private share is more than 40 per-
cent, and at the tertiary level, it’s over 70 percent. Because of budget constraints, the
government encouraged private foundations to establish secondary schools and
higher education institutions. Expenses for school operation were funded through
user fees. Private financing therefore accounts for about two-thirds of total direct
costs in education. Also, households in Korea cover much more of education costs
(76.7 percent) than do their counterparts in most European countries (see figure
6.7), which is on average about 21.4 percent (MOE and KEDI 2004a).
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The government’s expansion policy for higher education effectively supplied high-
quality white-collar workers and R&D personnel in line with industrial needs at each
stage of economic development.













































Eduation budget (billion won in 2,000 prices)
Share of education budget out of total government budget (%, right axis)
Source: Ministry of Education & Human Resource Development and Korea Educational Develop-
ment Institute, Statistical Yearbook of Education, various issues.
Note: GDP deflators were used to change nominal education budgets into 2000 prices.
The net effect of educational expansion between 1965 and 1990 showed that sec-
ondary school enrollment and investment in education had a positive relationship
to Korea’s economic growth (McMahon 1995). Expansion of secondary school
enrollment and public investment in secondary education were very important in
offsetting diminishing returns on investment in physical capital; thus, the invest-
ment in education contributed significantly to sustaining the growth of per capita
income. Human capital investment has been successful from an economic point of
view: it has enabled the timely supply of human resources and offset the diminish-
ing returns to physical capital investment (Paik 1999).
Private Funding for Education
Primary education in Korea has been treated as a collective good, and it has been
mostly publicly funded (see figures 6.8 and 6.9). For secondary and higher educa-
tion, a substantial amount of funding came from the private sector, such as house-
holds and private foundations, as mentioned above. The heavy reliance on private
funding in secondary and higher education has an important policy implication.
Inducing the private sector to play a more active role in providing educational ser-
vices at the secondary and higher education levels would offer a leverage effect,
allowing limited government resources to be spent on prioritized areas. Until recent
years, by leaving higher levels of education to the private sector and targeting pub-
lic resources for primary education, Korea has been able to address one of the main
equity issues: basic education for all.
118 Korea as a Knowledge Economy





























































































































Source: OECD. 2006. Education at a Glance. Paris: OECD.
By encouraging the private sector to shoulder a significant portion of total education
costs, Korea has been able to offer universal primary education.
However, the central government has also supported private-school founda-
tions through tax benefits. For example, private-school foundations are regarded as
nonprofit organizations, so they can save on corporation tax, which for-profit
organizations cannot do, and they are allowed to receive tax-exempt donations and
endowments. In addition to these benefits, governments have promoted private
schools through loan systems. The Korean Foundation for the Promotion of Private
Schools was established in 1989 to support private schools in improving the educa-
tional environment. Long-term loans with low interest rates are provided for pri-
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vate schools at any level. Table 6.3 summarizes some statistics of school loans
requested and provided for the past 15 years. The Foundation and its loans have
turned out to be so successful that even given the limited financial resources at the
government level, the education sector has expanded dramatically with the help of
private resources.
Quality Teaching for High Performance
Despite larger class sizes, Korean pupils’ achievement levels have been very high
compared to those in other OECD countries, as shown in international comparisons
of student achievement such as PISA and TIMSS (see figures 6.3a and b). Consider-
ing that the numbers of students per teacher and per class in Korea are higher, the
Korean education system can be judged to be efficient, at least at the primary and
secondary levels. This implies that Korean teachers were able to provide high-qual-
ity education according to international standards, despite larger class sizes and,
therefore, much lower cost per student. The Korean government has provided
diverse incentives to recruit competent people for the teaching profession. Until
1990, public colleges charged no tuition for students training to become teachers.
Students were also supported for boarding and other educational expenses. Job
security was another factor in recruiting high-quality young people for the teaching
profession, especially in times of rapid economic and labor market restructuring.
This phenomenon can be clearly observed in the increasing number of high-school
graduates with high scores applying for teacher colleges. 
However, qualitative achievements of the Korean students are viewed more
skeptically. That is, although the Korean school system has successfully responded
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The Korean Foundation for the Promotion of Private Schools extended long-term loans
with low interest rates to private schools at any level.
Table 6.3 Size of Loans to Private Schools, 1990–2004
Percentage of 
Requested Provided loans granted
No. of Amounts No. of Amounts No. of Amounts 
Year schools (million won) schools (million won) schools (million won)
1990–94 673 475,447 403 150,900 59.9 31.7
1995 139 156,139 126 65,000 90.6 41.6
1996 148 236,360 142 100,400 95.9 42.5
1997 141 341,165 136 123,050 96.5 36.1
1998 172 492,070 167 126,000 97.1 25.6
1999 130 283,230 120 110,200 92.3 38.9
2000 106 250,030 98 113,940 92.5 45.6
2001 78 198,700 72 114,420 92.3 57.6
2002 87 218,390 80 132,420 92.0 60.6
2003 76 235,060 71 99,930 93.4 42.5
2004 88 302,374 82 124,940 93.2 41.3
Total 1,838 3,188,965 1,497 1,261,200 81.4 39.5
Source: MOE & KEDI 2005.
to the changes in social demand, the very purpose of education—to cultivate stu-
dents’ innate abilities, interests, and creativity and to educate them as a whole per-
son—has been neglected. This neglect has come about mainly because education has
been preoccupied with preparing students for the entrance exams to higher levels of
school, especially college level. Teacher-centered one-way teaching, rote memoriza-
tion, and the lack of diversity of educational programs have had a negative impact
on the development of individual students’ innate abilities and creativity.
Koreans’ Meritocratic Values and Strong Educational Zeal 
Besides the success factors explained in the preceding section, Koreans’ sociocultu-
ral and educational values should be emphasized as driving forces for their coun-
try’s educational development. Koreans’ educational attitude is more than
enthusiastic, and it is almost obsessive, regardless of socioeconomic status. Korean
parents are willing to sacrifice for their children’s education, which is expressed as
a high propensity to spend for education (table 6.4). Educated Korean mothers do
not hesitate to take on drudgery to make more money for their children’s tutoring.
They wait in front of the cram schools (private institutes to prepare students for col-
lege entrance exams) at midnight to pick up their children and stay up all night
with their children while they study for exams. Their lives are stopped temporarily
until their children go to college. This phenomenon has often been called “educa-
tion fever” in Korea.
Many factors explain education fever and the intense competition for education,
especially for higher education. Among them are historical factors such as the Con-
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Although the Korean school system has successfully responded to the changes in social
demand, the very purpose of education—to cultivate students’ innate abilities, inter-
ests, and creativity—has been neglected.
Table 6.4 Divisions of and Trends in of Educational Expenditures, 2003
(percentage of GDP)
Public versus. private educational expenditures
Total expenditures Primary and Higher 
on education secondary education education
Total Public Private Public Private Public Private
Korea 7.5 4.6 2.9 3.5 0.9 0.6 2.0
United States 7.5 5.4 2.1 3.9 0.3 1.2 1.6
United Kingdom 6.1 5.1 1.0 4.0 0.6 0.8 0.3
Japan 4.8 3.5 1.2 2.7 0.3 0.5 0.8
Average of OECD 
countries 5.9 5.2 0.7 3.6 0.3 1.1 0.4
Source: OECD. 2006. Education at a Glance. Paris: OECD.
Education has an intrinsic social value in the Korean culture. This cultural factor has
contributed significantly to the high propensity for private spending in education.
fucian tradition and the repressed educational opportunities during the Japanese
colonial period. In addition, socioeconomic factors play a role. The obsession with
education is attributed in large part to the importance of credentials in the current
Korean society. Diplomas are frequently regarded as the most important criterion
for employment, marriage, and interpersonal relationships. Educational achieve-
ments are considered a way to upward social mobility in Korea, and this has
pressed the government to offer more educational opportunities to the public. 
In this sociocultural background, the public policies for educational develop-
ment have largely been successful, given the scarce public funding for education. 
Education Policy—Response to the Needs of a 
Knowledge-Based Economy
Limitations of Previous Development
Government policies for teacher education and recruitment, such as high salaries
and other benefits that upheld the quality of teaching, seemed to be effective despite
limited resources for improving schooling conditions. By exempting from taxes the
acquisition and sale of properties and by providing subsidies and loans to cover the
shortage of remuneration and operating costs, policy incentives to mobilize the pri-
vate sector provided more educational opportunities with the limited public
resources. And contributions from households, which were motivated by socioeco-
nomic and cultural factors, were important for successful implementation of
national education development policies. 
Under these conditions, Korea’s education system has responded well to the
basic educational needs of the population and was successful in delivering the
human resources required for Korea’s industrialization efforts. However, the rule-
driven and teacher-centered education policies caused a sheer quantitative expan-
sion of the education system without increasing quality, diversity, and relevance. In
that policy context, educational institutions could not provide educational services
to flexibly meet the changing socioeconomic demand in a KBE, which led to skill
mismatches between labor demand and supply. 
Also, in spite of the successful quantitative expansion, quality improvement did
not follow suit. The government’s investment in education increased steadily but
not enough to finance the necessary quality enhancements. The public investment
is much below that of the average in OECD countries; the investment gap is mostly
supplemented by private sources (figure 6.10).
In addition to the increased investment in education, Korea’s education system
needs to cultivate creativity. The education reforms since the late 1990s have suc-
cinctly stated the challenges faced by Korea (Presidential Commission on Educa-
tion 1995): “Korean education, having registered a marked growth in quantitative
terms in the era of industrialization, will no longer be appropriate in the era of
information technology and globalization. It will not be able to produce persons
who possess high levels of creativity and moral sensitivity, which are required to
sharpen the nation’s competitive edge in the coming era.” In that context, the
Korean government began education reform to increase educational autonomy and
accountability to meet the challenges of a KBE.
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Current Issues in Education
Since Korea started economic development plans in the 1960s, it has been able to
achieve high economic growth by increasing the input of labor and capital, which
required the government to play an active role. In this government-led strategy,
which is based on the growth of large-scale industry, the government has been
highly centralized and interventionist. The approach has been reflected in Korea’s
educational development process. Rigid government control over the education
system included the curriculum, examination system, tuition fees, number of stu-
dents, and so forth for both public and private schools. The result of these top-
down education policies has been the loss of autonomy and lack of accountability
by individual institutions. 
As a result, strategic partnerships and connections, along with the institutional
and organizational structures that govern such partnerships, among knowledge-
producing institutions such as corporations, universities, and research institutions
are weak. Such systemic weakness is also found in the international exchange of
people and knowledge, such as the debilitated establishment of foreign universities
and research institutions in Korea and inadequate participation in joint interna-
tional research projects. In addition, the brain drain from Korea has accelerated
with the increased international competition for highly skilled workers.
Universities have focused on the traditional mission of training scholars and the
leaders of society. They have remained passive in the practical application of knowl-
edge and failed to respond effectively to job market realities. The universities have
not succeeded in specializing in a manner that reflects the uniqueness of local
industry and culture—consequently, their role as a center for creating and dissemi-
nating knowledge in the local community has remained weak. Therefore, the train-
ing of high-quality human resources and the acquisition of advanced technology
have relied on such alternative means as overseas education.
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Source: World Bank SIMA database.
Owing to the expansion of compulsory education and the universalization of
higher education, the quantitative basis for supplying human resources is relatively
strong in Korea. In contrast, the educational environment has not improved, with
the quality of university education and the capabilities of university research
remaining poor. 
Korea has a large pool of highly educated workers. More than 80 percent of
high-school graduates go to college, but there is a problem of imbalance between
academic fields. Professional schools, including law and medical schools, are much
preferred to the science and engineering faculties. There is an increasing demand
for college students who will develop the core competencies needed in the KBE of
the 21st century. However, Korean universities are not improving college students’
competencies in critical thinking, communication, self-motivated learning, leader-
ship, problem solving, or cooperation (Kim and Rhee 2003).
The financial crisis of 1997 and the corporate restructuring that followed sharply
raised the unemployment rate, to 6.8 percent in 1998 and 8.4 percent in the first quar-
ter of 1999. The unemployment rate decreased afterward, but new entrants into the
labor market increasingly face difficulties in finding jobs, and switching occupations
and seeking reemployment is increasing among the adult population. Jobs for young
members of the workforce tend to be less available, so many young people lose the
opportunity to experience work and start improving their professional skills. 
Meanwhile, although the proportion of women who are economically active has
been increasing it was still less than 55 percent. In particular, participation of highly
educated women is very low compared to that in advanced industrial countries
(figures 6.11 and 6.12). Both development and use of women are low in the engi-
neering and S&T fields. Job creation remains low in the high-value-added areas in
which women have relative advantages.
Separation between the education and training system and the labor market
made the use of human resources ineffective. The basic information infrastructure
for creating links between the education and training system and the labor market,
such as forecasting the supply of and demand for labor, information on employ-
ment, the certification system, and so forth, needs further development. The mis-
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match between employment and academic training is serious; there is also a mis-
match of skills between supply and demand in the workforce, so that highly edu-
cated people are employed in low-level jobs.
Responding to these issues, primary and secondary education now focus more
on excellence and creativity than on generality, and tertiary education provides
competitive, high-quality education and research. In that context, Korea’s educa-
tion policy and system have been moving forward from the past industrial model
toward a knowledge-based model since the mid-1990s, as shown in table 6.5. 
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Because of weak university-industry linkages, Korean university graduates are not
appropriately trained for Korea’s current industrial needs.
Table 6.5 Comparison of Educational Models in Industrial Economies and KBEs 
Classification Industrial model Knowledge-based model
Government role Provider of education Facilitator
and training
Human resources Labor force Knowledge and skills
input
Governance and Bureaucratic and centralized Deregulated and decentralized
management
Leading sector Central government and Education institution, industry, 
education institution and local government
Policy priority General education and equity Higher education, lifelong learning,
in educational access excellence, and competitiveness




Higher education draws more attention and importance in government education
policies as the economy is transformed toward a KBE. A clear shift has occurred,
with government increasing its spending on the higher education sector more than
on primary and secondary education. This policy change is caused by two factors.
On one hand, because the government recognizes the quality of human resources
as the key factor in further economic growth, it regards the higher education sector
as the key player in achieving that growth. On the other hand, the performance of
the current higher education system in Korea is perceived to be lower than expected
in terms of the efficiency of educational spending. These observations call for
reforms in the higher education system.
Regulatory Reform
Higher education institutions have insisted that they must have a high degree of
freedom from external intervention and of control to perform effectively. The gov-
ernment has steadily carried out such regulatory reforms in higher education since
the mid-1990s. As existing laws and regulations on higher education have been
revised to give more power to higher education institutions, the Ministry of Educa-
tion and Human Resources Development (MOE & HRD) is expected to do more
planning, coordination, financing, and evaluation. 
The main thrust of recent regulatory reforms in higher education is to make the
institutions more entrepreneurial and responsive by granting a greater level of
autonomy in setting the number of students to be admitted, hiring teaching staff,
and managing academic affairs. For example, until 1998, the number of students
admitted to colleges and universities was determined by the government based on
educational conditions, such as student-faculty ratio, and human resources require-
ments at the national level. Beginning in 1999, private universities, with the excep-
tion of medical schools, teachers’ colleges, and universities located in and around
the Seoul metropolitan area, were allowed to determine the number of administra-
tive personnel or professors by submitting a proposal stating their standards and
plans. Regulatory reforms in the late 1990s also resulted in allowing foreigners to
become professors at national public universities, opening the doors to high-qual-
ity human resources from overseas. Since 2002, colleges and universities have been
permitted to set the amount of tuition fees, depending on each university’s specific
financial situation.
Despite government efforts, higher education laws, policies, and practices still
have regulatory elements regarding many areas in which institutions of higher
education are generally considered to have autonomy (Rhee 2003). For instance,
institutional activities such as the establishment of universities, organization, cur-
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Higher education reform focuses on encouraging tertiary institutions to be more entre-
preneurial and responsive to industrial needs by granting a greater level of autonomy
in both academic and administrative affairs with regard to students and staff.
ricula, student selection, and staffing are regulated by the Higher Education Act
and the related enforcement decree.1
Academic Restructuring
Korea has achieved a stage of mass higher education, but it is not easy to see any dif-
ferences among colleges and universities. Because most institutions of higher learning
are interested in quantitative expansion, they underestimate the important missions
given to them, such as quality assurance and specialization in unique characteristics.
Now, similar departments, colleges, and graduate programs can be easily found in
almost all universities. To make the higher education system more diverse, the govern-
ment pushes colleges and universities to identify their unique strengths and then revise
their curriculums, strategic focus, and missions accordingly. During 1998–2002, approx-
imately W 730 billion were granted to support universities’ restructuring activities.
Furthermore, the government recently announced a University Restructuring Plan
(2004). The key objectives of the plan are to (a) lay the foundation for improving the
quality of higher education beyond the growth in quantity, (b) improve the efficiency
of tertiary education investment, (c) develop human resources that meet the needs of
society, and (d) support development of Korean universities to become world-class
institutions (MOE & HRD/KEDI 2004b, 2004c). To achieve these goals, the govern-
ment provided W 80 billion to 23 institutions of higher education in 2005 and will con-
tinue to support them until 2008 if they maintain their qualifications for the project.2 In
addition to the financial incentives, colleges and universities undergoing restructuring
or downsizing will be given favorable credits on applications for government-funded
higher education projects, such as BK21 and NURI (see boxes 6.1 and 6.2). 
Although it is too early to tell whether the government’s university-restructuring
initiatives will succeed, a fair number of colleges and universities are in the process
of restructuring and downsizing. In 2005, 8 national colleges and universities in local
provinces were consolidated into 4 universities, and 38 institutions of higher educa-
tion announced their intention to downsize their enrollments by about 10 percent
over the next three years. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the isomorphic
institutions of higher education will be able to become distinctive.
Upgrading Research Capability
Until recent years, most applied research has been left to the government research
institutes and private sectors. The institutions of higher education in general were
not really interested or willing to build up competencies in engineering and sci-
ence. To strengthen the research capacity of universities, the MOE & HRD set up a
plan suggesting two large projects: the second phase of BK21 (2006–12; see box 6.1)
and the Five-Year Plan for the Development of Basic Sciences (2005–09). Korea’s
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1. In Korea, the basic rules regarding operation, financing, and status of teaching staff
for education systems, including schools and lifelong education, must be stipulated by law
according to article 31, paragraph t of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea.
2. Two main conditions to be eligible for the restructuring project are downsizing as
planned and putting more internal resources into the fields with competitive advantage. 
aim for the two projects is to have about 15 universities with world-class reputa-
tions by 2010. The post–BK21 will be more specialized for S&T, whereas the five-
year plan is for the humanities and social sciences. The former project is being
planned in close cooperation with the ministries dealing with high-tech or national
strategic industries, with consideration of the industries’ intersectoral character
(Jang 2004).
However, at the beginning, BK21 was under strong criticism that it favors a
small number of large-scale, research-oriented universities. One critic even argued
that it is designed to support Seoul National University (Park 2000). Nevertheless,
it is evident that BK21 has greatly improved research capacity of universities. Lee
(2002) showed that the amount of research funds that went into BK21 project teams
had a positive relationship with research productivity measured by research papers
per faculty member. It is also known that the number of research papers written by
the faculty members involved in BK21 and published in the Science Citation Index
(SCI) journals, such as x increased from 3,765 in 1998 to 7,477 in 2003, or about 42
percent of the SCI journal articles of the nation (MOE & HRD/KEDI 2005).
Strengthening the Link between Universities and Industry
In a historical sense, there has been poor interaction between universities and busi-
ness at the technical level. One reason is that most large firms have built up their
own training and education facilities. As Korea enters the knowledge-based society,
the product cycle of knowledge grows shorter and the creation of knowledge deter-
mines the future of the entire nation. In this setting, the establishment of a national
innovation system that can create, share, and spread new knowledge is welcomed
as a novel national strategy and must be based on active exchange and cooperation
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Box 6.1 Brain Korea 21
BK21 is a national human resource development project that aims to fulfill the demand
for high-quality human resources, which Korea will need to thrive in the fierce compe-
tition of the knowledge-based society of the 21st century. The ultimate objective of the
project is to meet the needs of the times for creative and high-quality R&D human
resources.
The seven-year project, which started in 1999 has contributed greatly to improving
the research capability of universities and developing excellent human resources. For
the past six years, universities involved in BK21 have changed their administrative sys-
tems and improved student selection methods to move toward becoming research-ori-
ented institutions. For example, they enhanced research capability by introducing pay
for performance based on professors’ research achievements, thus creating a favorable
environment for research.
The second phase of the BK21 project began in February 2006, and is scheduled to
continue until 2012. Based on the research infrastructure built during the first phase of
the project and the “selection and concentration” strategy, the second phase will focus
on the S&T sector that will have more direct impacts on nation’s economic develop-
ment. Support will be provided for the development of high-caliber researchers (in par-
ticular, students in their master’s degree and doctoral programs), international
exchange and cooperation, and innovative curriculum development.
among human resources of universities, government research agencies, and private
industry.
In an effort to foster proactive collaboration and create a channel for communi-
cating the demands and needs of industry to the education community, the gov-
ernment is formulating a new industry-academia collaboration system, which is
based on the Act on the Promotion of Industrial Education & Industry/Academia
Collaboration. Taking into consideration the diverse regional characteristics and
unique circumstances of universities and industries, the MOE & HRD has classified
cases of industry-academia collaboration into three groups (see table 6.6). Policy
implementation and financial support will be closely tied to the collaborative sys-
tem to eventually create a university system that fully incorporates the industry-
academia collaboration framework.
In addition to financial support, the government introduced two new features
into the higher education system. One is a contract-based education system that
enables close ties between industry and academia. This system has been estab-
lished to allow the needs of the industrial sector to be directly reflected in the oper-
ation of the university curriculum. For example, new majors as well as departments
may be established under contract between universities and private enterprises.
The contract may stipulate matters related to the student quota, student selection
process, curriculum, teaching and learning processes, and so forth. Upon gradua-
tion, students enrolled in the program will receive favorable employment opportu-
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It is imperative the Korea develop a national innovation system whereby knowledge is
generated and shared, and R&D is coordinated and collaborated on by universities,
government research agencies, and the private sector.
Table 6.6 Types of Collaboration between Industry and Academia
Type 1 Human resources endowed with world-class research 
and development capabilities
• Project to upgrade universities that conduct research in their graduate 
schools, turning them into research centers (BK21, 1999–2005): W 1.5 trillion
• Project to support academic research environment (2002–04): W 660 billion
Type 2 Human resources for high-tech development
• Innovation project (NURI) to reinforce the capabilities of universities outside 
the Seoul metropolitan area and vicinity (2004): W 220 billion
• Project for the specialization of universities in the Seoul metropolitan area 
(2004): W 60 billion
Type 3 Human resources for industrial technology
• Selection of universities to be industry-academia collaboration universities 
by each region (2004): W 30 billion
• Project to identify unique characteristics of junior colleges (2004): W 175 
billion
Source: Yoon 2003. 
nities from the companies. The other feature is a school-enterprise system that
enables the practical application of the research conducted through the industry-
academia collaboration (Jang 2004).
It is fair to say that the link between universities and industry is expected to get
stronger because a new regional governance system, the Regional Innovation Com-
mittee (consisting of key stakeholders in each major city and each province) has
been set in place to facilitate communication among the key stakeholders. Financial
support from both central and local governments is available; however, the collab-
oration among them is not as active as expected. 
Provision of Lifelong Learning for Human Resource Development (HRD)
Human resource development was a relatively new term in Korea in the early 1990s,
but its origin can be traced to early vocational education programs under the first
economic development plan (1962–66). Now human resource development is
widely perceived by both employers and employees to be one of the key factors for
long-term corporate success and individual growth. 
Government initiatives in the early years included supports for establishing
training institutions such as the Korea Productivity Center (KPC), Korea Manage-
ment Association (KMA), and Korea Standards Association (KSA). During the
1980s, these institutions began to develop systematic training programs tailored to
Korean firms. The first national training conference was held in 1980 to discuss
visions for and strategies of training in Korea. Since then, many companies have
established their own training departments and training centers with instructors
trained by the KPC, KMA, and KSA. To help establish systematic training pro-
grams, magazines on personnel management and vocational training were pub-
lished in 1989 and 1990 to provide basic theories, methods, and information to
human resource development practitioners. 
In the early 1990s, the human resource development profession also became
involved in developing a professional certification process and established under-
graduate, graduate, and continuing education programs for its practitioners. Train-
ing and development programs expanded to include training in skills and technical
expertise, management, organizational development, global business, customer
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Box 6.2 New University for Regional Innovation
NURI is a government-funded project for local universities that is aimed at diversifica-
tion and specialization, higher employment rates for local university graduates, and
creating a greater role for local universities as centers of regional innovation by strength-
ening ties within a region with local governments, companies, and research institutions. 
The government will invest W 1,360 billion in the NURI project, and the fund will be
allocated to 13 cities and provinces based on population and number of students and
universities. The project, which started in 2004, has not yet been assessed for its achieve-
ment. In 2004, 112 project groups were selected for their outstanding achievements. The
MOE & HRD plans to conduct annual assessments and an interim assessment (in the
third year of the project), which will include an assessment of budget execution and per-
formance versus targets and make recommendations.
satisfaction, quality control, cultural issues, and multimedia use. This period
brought about significant changes that affected the growth of the human resource
development field until the economic crisis in 1997.
The economic crisis in 1997 forced Korean firms to restructure, with the side
effect of reducing resources and opportunities for employee training. According to a
survey on corporate training in the top 200 companies (MOE & HRD/KEDI 1998),
more than 70 percent of the companies reported decreases in training expenses.
Employers in Korean firms had a dilemma in that the only way to overcome the eco-
nomic crisis was to have companies invest in human resource development to pro-
vide core competencies of a globally competitive level; however, they were reluctant
to invest their limited resources in human resource development. What was worse,
many firms had eliminated their human resource development staff, and as a result,
their expertise was to some extent lost from those firms’ business functions.
The government’s policy foci and tasks have changed in accordance with
changes in the human resource development environment (see table 6.7). In recent
years, the development and use of competent and adaptable human resources have
grown in importance. Individuals invest financial and other resources in their life-
long learning as a strategic imperative to survive and enhance employability in the
era of ongoing downsizing. Business enterprises now find themselves competing to
attract, develop, and retain employees to build knowledge-based organizations.
Many firms participate in the lifelong learning movement in Korea. The Korean gov-
ernment has made great efforts to transform the nation into a knowledge-based soci-
ety by developing regional learning societies in cooperation with local governments.
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Table 6.7 Shifts in the Human Resource Development Paradigm in Korea 
1960–80 1980s 1990s 2000–05
Environment •National •Continuous •Globalization •Networked 





Human resource •Vocational and •Outreach •Strategic human •Individuals’ 
development technical programs resource right to lifelong
education development learning
Focus of •Investment in •Investment for •High per- •Investment in
government vocational the disadvan- formers and learning for all
policies high schools taged experts
and colleges
Major policy •Financial •Training •Cost-saving •Creation of
tasks supports for for the policies ubiquitous 
vocational and unemployed (e-learning) learning envi-
technical •Training •Encouragement ronments
education supports of private •Learning 
for SMEs sector accounts
investment •Learning 
partnerships
Source: Prepared by Korea Research Institute for Vocational Education and Training.
Conclusion
The Korean economy has made enormous progress over the past four decades, and
education has played a pivotal role. The primary lessons of those experiences are
straightforward: investment in human resource development pays off in the long
run and is even more crucial in the KBE. It is clear that the early governments were
fully aware of the importance of human resources in rebuilding the economy that
was demolished during the Korean War, because they strategically invested in
human resource development.
What Korea has implemented as part of its human resource development may
have some implications for developing or underdeveloped countries that are in the
process of restructuring their educational systems to narrow the economic gap
between themselves and countries that are economic leaders. Progressive quantita-
tive expansion from compulsory elementary to higher education should be first,
followed by qualitative improvements in each educational level. However, it does-
n’t necessarily mean that this model should work for developing or underdevel-
oped countries, because they may have different problems in a world that has
changed substantially. In Korea’s process, the government’s policy of intervention
turned out to be critical. For example, during the developmental stages in the 1960s
and 1970s, when the key industries, such as manufacturing, needed a skilled work-
force, the government responded by creating vocational high schools and voca-
tional colleges. Although expanding the educational system usually comes up first
as a handy policy option to revitalize the national economy, budget constraints are
always considered to be a limiting factor. Korea’s governments dealt with this issue
by using private resources. By having secondary and tertiary education be partially
funded by the private sector, they reduced financial burdens and didn’t harm
equity when the education sector experienced its dramatic expansion. 
Although Korea’s experiences worked out well, the Korean government faces
new challenges in maintaining cost-effective human resource development in
national strategic areas and lifelong learning. Reforming the higher education sec-
tor and establishing a lifelong learning system to upgrade human resource capabil-
ity are national tasks for all countries. Most governments, including Korea’s, are
under pressure to reduce the growth of public spending on education and find
other sources of funding for the expected expansion of their education system.
Thus, finance-driven reform measures have been introduced, and policies give pri-
ority to cost-effectiveness (Kim 2002). Following the policy framework, new reform
measures to increase educational quality and accountability, such as performance-
based funding for higher education, have been introduced in Korea. 
As a result of Korea’s previous success in establishing an education system infra-
structure and expanding higher education opportunities, the country is taking a
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Some key policy lessons can be drawn from the Korean experience in developing skills
and human resources for the KBE: (a) education and training are critical, (b) education
and training need to be relevant to the particular needs of industries and various sectors
of the economy, and (c) education and training need to develop over time to keep pace
with the changing needs of the economy.
new approach to educational reform that focuses more on qualitative performance
of the system in terms of both the quality of human resources’ skills and research
productivity. To achieve those purposes, the role of the government is changing,
from that of regulator to facilitator, and competition between educational institu-
tions is being enforced to make education and training systems more cost-effective
and productive. The active government intervention that once made educational
development possible is now counted as the main cause of the educational system’s
inefficiency. Similarly, current reforms emphasize the relevance of university edu-
cation and the responsiveness of higher education institutions to social and eco-
nomic needs. Thus, the new challenge for the Korean government in the current
education reform process will be to maintain consistent policies of deregulation
and decentralization. Finally, because the development of a KBE requires the cre-
ation of sustainable learning opportunities and learning societies, the public and
private sectors now have a mutual responsibility to develop learning partnerships.
To fulfill this purpose, private firms are becoming important partners in the learn-
ing society as they provide ever more opportunities for continuous learning to their
employees and their regions. The government’s role in this process will be to estab-
lish a learning infrastructure to foster learning and eliminate barriers to the creation
of a learning society. In short, knowledgeable workers, lifelong learning organiza-
tions, and a networked learning society have become, and will remain, key success
factors for individuals, organizations, and nations.
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7
Harnessing the Potential of 
Science and Technology
Sungchul Chung and Joonghae Suh
Considering the relationship between industrialization and S&T, the Republic of
Korea’s innovation system (KIS) has evolved in line with the stages of industrial
development in the country. When Korea launched its industrialization drive in the
early 1960s, it suffered from many of the problems that were common among poor
economies in those days. Korea, a resource-poor country, had neither the capital
nor the technology required for industrialization. It was then a barren land as far as
S&T were concerned. Korea thus had to opt for an outward-looking development
strategy—a development strategy reliant on foreign resources, capital, markets,
and technologies. 
The 1960s were a period of technological learning for the development of light
industries. During the 1970s, Korea focused on the development of heavy machin-
ery and chemical industries, and it was during this period that the government cre-
ated the Government Research Institutes (GRIs) in the fields of heavy machinery
and chemicals to compensate domestic industries for their technological weak-
nesses. At this stage, Korea relied on foreign sources rather than domestic R&D for
the technologies required for industrialization; therefore, its S&T policy was geared
to facilitating learning from foreign technologies while developing a domestic S&T
infrastructure. 
It was only in the early 1980s, stimulated by changes in economic environ-
ments, that Korea embarked on serious efforts to develop indigenous R&D. Indus-
trial development had reached such a stage that Korean industries could no longer
rely on imported technologies and cheap domestic labor to compete in interna-
tional markets. However, as Korean industries grew to be potential competitors in
the international market, foreign companies became increasingly reluctant to
transfer technologies to Korea, making it inevitable for Korea to develop an indige-
nous base for research and innovation.
To meet the challenge, Korea required a supply of highly trained scientists and
engineers, as well as financial resources, to support R&D activities that are by
nature uncertain and risky. Korea was fortunate in this respect, because, thanks to
Koreans’ aspiration for education, the country had a large pool of scientists and
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engineers and also because the large Korean conglomerates were financially able to
venture into new technologies. By the early 1990s, Korea’s R&D investment
exceeded 2 percent of GDP, of which private industries accounted for more than 80
percent. This was a period when Korea’s R&D grew rapidly, and the country’s
efforts to attain technological competence became successful. By the end of the
decade, Korean industries had emerged as new leaders in memory chips, cellular
phones, LCDs, and other technologies, and they established themselves in world
markets in such areas as shipbuilding, automobiles, home appliances, and telecom-
munications. 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 struck a serious blow to innovation in Korea.
Private businesses responded to the crisis by severely cutting R&D investments. To
counteract the economic effects of declining R&D investments in the private sector,
the government increased R&D spending to 5 percent of its budget, focusing on the
development of IT and related industries. During this period, IT sectors played key
roles in innovation in Korea, leading the country’s recovery from the economic cri-
sis as well as its move toward a KBE.
This chapter provides an overview of the research and development, and inno-
vation system of Korea. It also identifies the strengths and weakness of the system
and attempts to draw policy lessons for developing countries.. 
Industrialization and Technology Development
Initial Conditions
When Korea first launched its industrialization drive, it was an underdeveloped
country with a poor resource and production base, a small domestic market, and a
large population, and it depended on foreign powers for national security. The eco-
nomic situation in the early 1960s in Korea was more than bleak: Korea’s GNP in
1961 was only US$2.3 billion (in 1980 prices)—US$87 per capita. At the time, the
main source of income was the primary sectors, with the manufacturing sector
accounting for only 15 percent of GNP. International economic interactions were
also very limited. In 1961, Korea’s export volume was only US$55 million and
imports were US$390 million. All these indicate that Korea was then one of the
poorest countries in the world, suffering from all the socioeconomic problems that
poor countries faced in those days.
The S&T situation was even bleaker. There were only two public institutions for
scientific research and technological development: the National Defense Research
and Development Institute, which was created right after the end of the Korean
War, and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, which was founded in 1959.
On this base, the Korean government invested US$9.5 million on R&D in 1963,
employing less than 5,000 research scientists and engineers.1 As far as S&T were
concerned, Korea was a barren land.
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1. There are no statistics on R&D human resources for the early 1960s in Korea. The number
here is an estimate based on the figure for 1969, which was 5,337 (MOST 1984).
Technology Acquisition for Industrialization
In 1962, Korea launched the first five-year economic development plan This and
subsequent plans created huge demand for new technologies that were in no way
available from domestic sources. Lacking in technological capability, Korea had to
rely almost exclusively on imported foreign technologies. At the early stage, Korea
pursued two objectives in this respect: promoting the inward transfer of foreign
technologies and developing domestic absorptive capacity to digest, assimilate,
and improve upon the transferred technologies. Of the various alternative channels
for technology acquisition, such as FDI, foreign licensing, and importation of
turnkey plants, FDI is often advocated as an effective means for developing coun-
tries to acquire new production skills and management expertise, such as in the
case of Singapore. Unlike in other developing countries, however, FDI played a less
important role in Korea as a source of capital and technology in the early years of
industrialization.2 In contrast to the relatively minor contribution of FDI to Korea’s
acquisition of foreign technologies, combinations of arm’s length methods such as
reverse engineering, original equipment manufacturing (OEM), and foreign licens-
ing have been critical to transferring technologies and supplementing local efforts
(table 7.1).
Korea resorted to long-term foreign loans to finance industrial investments. The
Korean government brought in large-scale foreign loans and allocated them to
investments in selected industries, which led to massive importation of foreign cap-
ital goods and turnkey plants. To acquire the necessary technologies, industries
later reverse engineered imported capital goods. 
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When the S&T capability was at the earliest stage in the early 1960s, Korea focused on
promoting the inward transfer of foreign technologies and developing domestic capac-
ity to digest, assimilate, and improve upon the transferred technologies and adapt them
for domestic production.
In the early years of industrialization, Korea relied on reverse engineering, OEM, and
foreign licensing as means of tapping and assimilating foreign technologies.
2. FDI played a less important role because of government policy that restricted it in var-
ious ways, such as ownership restrictions, repatriation restrictions, technology transfer
requirements, and export requirements. Such a restrictive policy was used partly because
multinationals were then viewed by many Koreans as perpetuating economic and techno-
logical dependence, thus reinforcing the asymmetrical relationship between the industrial-
ized and the developing countries (Koo 1986; Vernon 1977; Stewart 1978). Also, foreign
investors did not view Korea as an attractive place for investment. Even though Korea had a
very open and liberal policy on FDI in the 1960s, few investments were made, primarily
because of questions about Korea’s political stability and economic outlook.
Private companies’ responses to such restrictive policies varied across indus-
tries. In the case of light industries such as shoes, clothing, textiles, and some inter-
mediate goods for import substitution as well as export, the major sources of
technological learning were OEM arrangements and technical training as part of
the importation of turnkey plants. Korean firms benefited most from the OEM
arrangements because they offered opportunities to work with foreign buyers who
provided everything from product designs and materials to quality control at the
end of production. This was especially so in the case of the garment and electronics
industries (Hobday 1995).
During the 1970s, Korea made massive investments in the machinery and
chemical industries. For the development of chemical industries, Korea relied
largely on importing turnkey plants, which included technical training programs
as part of the packages. In the case of heavy machinery, foreign licensing was an
important channel for technology acquisition (Chung and Branscomb 1996). To
compensate for the technological weakness of domestic industries, the govern-
ment created GRIs in the fields of heavy machinery and chemicals, such as the
Korea Institute of Machinery and Metals, the Electronics and Telecommunications
Research Institute, the Korea Research Institute of Chemical Technology, the Korea
Research Institute of Standards and Science, the Korea Institute for Energy
Research, and the Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute. These insti-
tutes worked with private industries to build the technological foundation for
industrial development.
In short, Korean industries were dependent more upon informal channels for tech-
nology acquisition than on formal channels. The Korean approach to technology
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To compensate for the technological weakness of domestic industries in the 1970s, the
Korean government created GRIs to work with private industries to developed the nec-
essary technological foundation for industrialization.
Table 7.1 Channels of Foreign Technology Transfer to Korea, 1962–2005
(US$ millions)
Sum of foreign 
licensing and Foreign Capital good 
FDI capital goods imports licensing imports
1962–66 45.4 316.8 0.8 316
1967–71 218.6 2,557.3 16.3 2,541
1972–76 879.4 8,937.6 96.6 8,841
1977–81 720.6 28,429.4 451.4 27,978
1982–86 1,767.7 52,162.9 1,184.9 50,978
1987–91 5,635.9 125,311.4 4,359.4 120,952
1992–96 8,405.2 228,160.8 7,317.8 220,843
1997–2001 57,850.8 265,228.0 13,192.4 252,034
2002–05 39,918.4 318,608.2 14,630.6 303,977
Source: National Statistical Office.
acquisition resulted in both positive and negative effects. On the positive side, this pol-
icy enabled Korea to acquire technologies at lower costs and precluded the constraints
often imposed by multinationals on local firms’ efforts to develop their own capabil-
ity. The approach was effective in maintaining independence from the dominance of
multinationals. The negative effect was that Korea had to give up an important access
to new technologies that might have been available through direct equity links with
foreign firms. By restricting FDI, Korea failed to set global standards in domestic busi-
ness operation. Much worse, large-scale foreign loans that had been used to finance
the massive importation of capital goods, plants, and foreign licensing contributed to
the financial crisis in 1997. The most important lesson here is that had Korea not had
its well-educated workforce, the country would not have succeeded in acquiring and
using technologies through informal modes of technology transfer.
Domestic Technological Activities
As industrial development continued into the 1980s, the technological require-
ments of Korean industries became more complex and sophisticated. At the same
time, advanced countries began to view Korea as a potential competitor in the inter-
national market. As a result, foreign companies became increasingly reluctant to
transfer new technologies to their Korean counterparts. To facilitate international
technological interaction of private industries, the government loosened its regula-
tion of FDI and liberalized foreign licensing during the 1980s. However, the dereg-
ulation and liberalization did not lead to significant increases in FDI inflow and
foreign licensing.
The government viewed this as a signal that to sustain the development, it
would have to build indigenous R&D capability. The government launched the
National R&D Program in 1982 and took various policy measures to promote and
facilitate private R&D activities (see box 2.3 in chapter 2 on the policy initiatives of
the early 1980s). Private industries responded to the policy by investing heavily in
R&D. Thus, the relationship between technology imports and R&D changed. The
ratio of technology imports to business R&D declined sharply, from about 40 per-
cent in 1981 to 20 percent in the mid-1980s, to 10 percent in the early 1990s, and
staying around 20 percent after 2000 (see figure 2.8 in chapter 2). This implies that
Korean industries turned to indigenous R&D for technology acquisition. R&D
investment has since undergone a quantum leap. Korea’s R&D investment, which
stood at only W 368.8 billion (US$526 million, 0.81 percent GDP) in 1981, rose to W
24,155 billion (US$23.6 billion, 3 percent of GDP) in 2005 (figure 7.1). Over a period
of 25 years, investment in R&D increased almost 19 times in real terms, with an
average annual growth rate of almost 12 percent. It can be seen from figure 7.2 that
Korea ranks sixth among the OECD countries in terms of GERD as a share of GDP.
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With increased technological capability, Korea became a potential competitor in the
global market, and, consequently, opportunities to assimilate imported technology
became less readily available. This necessitated the development of indigenous capabil-
ity for research and innovation.
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Consistent increases in R&D investment by the private sector over the past 40 years
have contributed significantly to the rapid increase in Korea’s GERD.
The rapid increases in total R&D expenditure were made possible by active
expansion of investment by the private sector. During the earlier years of industri-
alization, private sector R&D spending was negligible. In 2004, the private sector
accounted for 75 percent of the nation’s total R&D investment. Because private
industries lead R&D investment, R&D activities in Korea are very much focused on
applied research and technology development, reflecting the interest of private
industries. In the 1980s, about 83 percent of R&D funds were used for applied
research and technology development, and the share increased to 87 percent in the
1990s. Korea spends far less on basic research than advanced countries such as the
United States, Japan, France, and Germany. The general tendency is that the richer
a country is, the more it invests in basic scientific research; however, Korea’s invest-
ment in basic scientific research has declined over time despite economic growth,
which is against conventional expectations.
Many factors may have contributed to the rapid increase in private sector R&D
investments, but such an increase basically has been possible because Korean firms
have been put under market pressure for technology development. The govern-
ment contributed to such development in two indirect ways. First, the outward-
looking development strategy (export-driven) of the government drove domestic
industries to international markets, exposing them to fierce competition. To survive
the competition, they have had to keep up with technological changes by investing
heavily in R&D.
Second, the government’s industrial policy that favored large firms gave birth to
a unique business organization in Korea called the chaebol, a conglomerate that is
similar to the zaibatsu of Japan before World War II. Chaebols enjoy greater financial
affluence as a result of the economies of both scale and scope of their business oper-
ation. Chaebols, which are usually big international operators, have deeper pockets
and are able to engage in risky and expensive R&D projects that are unthinkable for
small and medium firms. This is explained by the fact that the top 20 firms receive
about 57 percent of the total industrial R&D investments in Korea (KITA 2004).
Most important, Korea has been able to increase R&D investments at such a rate
because it has an abundant, highly educated labor force that could meet the increas-
ing demand for R&D services in both the private and public sectors. Considering
that R&D investment by both developed and developing countries is more con-
strained by the lack of human resources than financial limitation, Korea clearly had
prepared itself well for development by investing heavily in education and human
resource development.3
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Korea’s export-driven development strategy compelled domestic firms to invest heav-
ily in R&D to remain globally competitive, resulting in increases in productivity and
efficiency.
3. OECD (2003d) emphasizes the importance of the supply of skilled scientists and engi-
neers as one of the framework conditions for achieving R&D spending targets.
R&D in Korea had been growing rapidly and continuously until Korea was hit
by the financial crisis in 1997. R&D was one of the most damaged victims of the cri-
sis. In a survey undertaken in early 1998, many companies responded that they
would cut R&D investments and R&D personnel by almost 20 percent in response
to the crisis. Actually, industrial R&D expenditures decreased by 10 percent in nom-
inal terms, from W 884.4 billion in 1997 to W 797.2 billion in 1998, and R&D per-
sonnel dropped by 15 percent, from 102,000 in 1997 to 87,000 in the next year. This
was a serious blow to the KIS. If the crisis had continued for several more years, the
KIS would have collapsed. Fortunately, however, Korea recovered from the crisis in
a relatively short time. It took only two years for the industrial R&D to recover and
rise above the level achieved before the financial crisis (see table 7.2). 
Two factors account for the rebound of R&D investment. One is the govern-
ment’s efforts to make up for the decrease in industrial R&D expenditures by
increasing government R&D expenditures. The government’s share of GERD
increased from less than 20 percent of total expenditures before the crisis to 27 per-
cent after the crisis. Government R&D funds flew into private industrial sectors—
in particular, small technology-based firms—and helped them maintain and
expand innovation activities. The other factor is the promotion of IT and IT-related
ventures that led to an IT boom in the early 2000s. The government’s commitment
to IT development is well reflected in the fact that the share of IT in government
R&D expenditures rose to 33.5 percent in 2002 from 13 percent in 1997. Such a pro-
IT policy fueled innovation in that sector, which then affected innovation activities
in other sectors. This policy not only helped the KIS recover vitality but also pro-
moted Korea’s transition toward an information society.
Government and Public Sector R&D
Since the early 1960s, the government has played a key role in Korea’s develop-
ment. The government first initiated S&T development as part of the national eco-
nomic development plan, and it has led the development, not just as a rule setter
but also as a target setter as well as a financier. As discussed in the preceding sec-
tion, S&T policy in Korea has been closely linked to industrial development, and
thus policy priorities have been adjusted in response to the changes in industrial
development targets. In the 1960s and 1970s, the government set specific policy
goals and led the private industries in pursuing the goals. However, as industrial
development proceeds, it has become increasingly difficult for the government to
intervene in economic and R&D activities because of the increased scale and com-
plexity of industrial activities. Therefore, the pattern of government intervention in
S&T has also changed from direct involvement as a target setter and commander-
in-chief type of leader to indirect involvement as a facilitator and promoter. This is
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Korea has been able to increase R&D investments at a rapid rate because of the avail-
ability of educated human resources to meet the growing demand for R&D services.
Indeed, it is often the case that the countries are constrained by the lack of adequately
trained human resources rather financial resources when it comes to investing in R&D.
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Table 7.2 Basic Statistics on Korea’s R&D, 1965–2005
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
R&D expenditure 
(in billion won) 2.1 10.5 42.7 282.5 1,237.1 3,349.9 9,440.6 13,848.5 24,155.4
Government 1.9 9.2 30.3 180.0 306.8 651.0 1,780.9 3,451.8 5,877.2
Private sector 0.2 1.3 12.3 102.5 930.3 1,698.9 7,659.7 10,387.2 18,106.8
Government versus private sector 61:39 97:03 71:29 64:36 25:75 19:81 19:81 25:75 25:75
University R&D NA 0.4 2.2 25.9 118.8 244.3 770.9 1,561.9 2,398.3
GRI R&D NA 8.9 28.1 104.5 367.2 731.0 1,766.7 2,032.0 3,192.9
Corporate R&D 0.2 1.3 12.3 81.4 751.0 2,374.5 6,903.0 10,254.7 18,564.2
R&D as percentage of GNP 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.6 2.0 2.5 2.4 3.0
Manufacturing sector R&D 
expenditure (in billion won) NA NA 16.7 76.0 688.6 2,134.7 5,809.9 8,584.9 16,463.7
Percent of sales NA NA 0.4 0.5 1.5 2.0 2.7 2.2 2.7
Number of researchers 2,135 5,628 10,275 18,434 41,473 70,503 128,315 159,973 234,702
GRI 1,671 2,458 3,086 4,598 7,542 10,434 15,007 13,913 15,501
Universities 352 2,011 4,534 8,695 14,935 21,332 44,683 51,727 64,895
Private sector 112 1,159 2,655 5,141 18,996 38,737 68,625 94,333 154,306
R&D expenditure per researcher
(in thousand won) 967 1,874 4,152 15,325 27,853 47,514 73,574 86,568 102,920
Researchers per 10,000 population 0.7 1.7 2.9 4.8 10.1 16.4 28.6 34.0 48.6
Number of corporate R&D centers 0 1 12 54 183 966 2,270 7,110 11,810
Source: Ministry of Science and Technology.
Note: GRI = government research institute.
NA =  not available.
a natural course of change in view of the growth of private industries in R&D and
of changes in management and information capabilities.
Evolution of Public Sector R&D
When the government first launched the National R&D Program in 1982, its R&D
expenditures were only W 263 billion, but the expenditures exceeded W 5 trillion in
2004, which implies 13.6 percent average annual growth rates (see table 7.2).
Together with the increases in investment, the nature of the National R&D Program
has also changed over time (see table 7.3). In the formative stage (roughly during
the first four years, 1982–85), the main objective of the program was to facilitate the
absorption of foreign technologies. In other words, the program’s focus was on the
development of technologies required for the local production of major products,
parts, components, and materials that were considered essential to industrial devel-
opment in those days. During this period, the National R&D Program relied totally
on a bottom-up approach for project selection, and priority was given to those pro-
posals involving private enterprises. 
The next five years, 1986–90, can be dubbed a takeoff stage, because the objec-
tive of the program was gradually switched from the simple internalization of for-
eign industrial technologies to the development of core technologies that private
industries were not able to tackle because of the technical and financial risks. The
program also aimed at building up a technological base for high-technology indus-
tries. Accordingly, project selections were partly linked to long-term technology
development plans.
At about the end of the takeoff stage (around the end of the 1980s and the early
1990s), other ministries began to establish their own R&D programs to solve the
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S&T and innovation polices in Korea have been closely linked to industrial develop-
ment, and thus policy priorities have been adjusted in response to the changes in indus-
trial development targets over the decades.
Table 7.3 Changes in the National R&D Program by Stages
Formation stage Takeoff stage Maturing stage 
(1982–85) (1986–90) (1991–)
National R&D Internalization of Development of Creative research,
Program foreign technologies core technologies future-oriented research
objective
Planning No planning: Based on a loose R&D planning,
bottom-up long-term plan technology foresight
Main actors GRIs Main: GRIs Main: GRIs, with 
Minor: Universities increased role of
and industries universities and 
industries
Source: MOST 1997b.
problems in the areas of their purview. The Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and
Energy launched the Industrial Base Technology Development Program in 1987
and the Alternative Energy Development Program in 1988. The MIC created the
Information and Communications Technology Development Program in 1989, and
several other ministries followed these actions in the subsequent years (see table
7.4). Until 1987, the National R&D Program of MOST was the only government-
sponsored R&D program, and MOST was the sole player in public sector research.
But with the emergence of other ministries on the scene, the role of MOST has been
reduced gradually. In 2003, the share of MOST in government R&D expenditures
stood at only 20.5 percent.
The rapid growth of government R&D investment is the result of increased
political pressure for economic and social contributions to the investment. The
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Table 7.4 Government Ministries’ R&D Programs 
Year 
Ministry initiated Major program Management agencies
MOST 1982 Specific R&D Program Korea Institute of Science and 
Technology Evaluation & 
Planning 
Korea Science and Engineering 
Foundation
Ministry of 1987, Industrial Base Technology Korea Institute of Industrial 
Commerce, 1988 Development Program Technology Evaluation and 
Industry, and Alternative Energy Planning
Energy Development Program
MIC 1989 ICT Development Program Institute of Information Technol-
ogy Assessment
Ministry of 1992, Environmental Engineering National Institute of Environ-





Ministry of 1994 Construction Technology Korea Institute of Construction 
Construction Development Program Technology
and 
Transportation
Ministry of 1994 Agricultural Technology Agricultural R&D Promotion 
Agriculture Development Program Center 
and Forestry
Ministry of 1995 Health and Medical Korea Health Industry 
Health and Technology Development Development Institute
Welfare Program
MOE & HRD 1983 Basic Scientific Research Korea Research Foundation
Support Program
question has been, What good do the government R&D programs do for the future
of the nation? At the same time, the private industrial sector, as a major financial
contributor, became increasingly skeptical about the economic value of the results
of government R&D investments. However, as individual ministries created their
own R&D programs, the problem of interministerial resource allocation emerged as
an important policy issue. In other words, the diversification of government R&D
programs brought up a new set of issues, such as duplication of research efforts,
delineation of R&D areas among different ministries, interministerial R&D priority
setting, and efficient allocation of the R&D budget. 
All of these issues boil down to the question of how to allocate the limited
resources and to which areas. The question is not only technological but also eco-
nomic and political, in that government R&D programs are justified only by the
taxpayers’ consent to the investment. To deal with the issues, in the mid-1980s, the
government adopted the concept of technology planning and evaluation in imple-
menting the government R&D programs. In other words, in setting priorities for
technology development, the government used a strategic approach based on long-
term planning. Industries and academia participated in the process so that the
interests of private industries and academia could be reflected in the planning of
the government R&D programs. During this period, collaborative research among
industry, academia, and the GRIs was first undertaken as part of the government
R&D programs. The International Cooperative Research Program was also
launched during this period. 
Yet it was not until 1992 that a Korean system of public sector R&D management
took shape. In that year, the government launched the Highly Advanced National
(HAN) Project, a 10-year, interministerial R&D program to develop core technolo-
gies for industrial development into the 21st century.4 The HAN Project was the
first government R&D program developed through a full cycle of planning, includ-
ing technology foresight, ex ante planning, and interministerial consultation.
Through these stages, the government R&D expenditures grew very rapidly, from
W 263 billion in 1982 to W 4,664 billion in 2003. As a result of this growth, MOST, as
a funder of R&D, has been reduced from being the sole player in public sector R&D
to just one of the major players. 
Government Research Institutes
GRIs are the major players in government R&D.5 They operate with the financial
assistance of the government but are independent, nongovernmental organizations
operating under the provisions of the civil laws and the Law for the Creation and
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4. OECD (1996, pp. 72–74) contains detailed explanations on the HAN project.
5. This section draws upon NSTC (2004), and the statistics cited are for 2002, unless oth-
erwise indicated.
Because of the cross-sectoral nature of innovation, the Korean government developed
the HAN Project, a 10-year, interministerial R&D program to develop core technologies
for Korean industrial development in the 21st century.
Promotion of the Government Research Institutes (1999). Therefore, GRI
researchers are not government employees.
Korea has 28 GRIs for S&T fields, and they conduct 42 percent of the govern-
ment R&D programs in terms of expenditure. GRIs employ about 8,600 scientists
and engineers, of whom about 40 percent hold doctorates and 50 percent hold mas-
ter’s degrees. Of the total R&D expenditures by GRIs in 2003, 45.5 percent was
devoted to technology development, 35.4 percent went to applied research, and the
remaining 19.1 percent went to basic research. More than 93 percent of research
funds came from the government, and the inflow of funds from industries was less
than 7 percent, signifying that despite the overwhelming industrial research orien-
tation of GRIs, industry-GRI research interactions are not that pronounced.
KIST, the first GRI, was established as an integrated technical center to assist
industrialization by finding solutions to simple technical and practical problems
and helping to internalize imported technologies. With the development of the
HCIs in the 1970s, the demand for technical support, such as that KIST provided in
the 1960s, increased in various industries. To meet the demand, in the 1970s, the
government spun off from KIST a number of specialized institutes in the priority
industrial areas: electronics, telecommunications, energy, machinery, chemicals,
shipbuilding, and marine resources. These institutes operated under the patronage
of the ministries that were responsible for the development of the respective indus-
tries. To accommodate these institutes as well as private R&D labs, the government
started the development of the Daeduck Science Town in the 1970s.
In the early 1980s, the environments surrounding GRIs changed rapidly. Private
industries began to establish in-house R&D systems to build up technological capa-
bility to cope with increasing market competition. Universities, which had been
heavily oriented toward reaching, also launched various efforts to develop research
capability. These two developments squeezed the position of GRIs, and the ground
for GRIs was much eroded. 
Debates on the Role of Government Research Institutes
Except in the early years, when business enterprises and universities were weak in
R&D, GRIs have been continuously criticized about their appropriate roles in the
KIS. Critics say that GRIs have not contributed as much as they have spent, and that
they have overexpanded their range of activities to claim more resources, causing
duplication among GRIs and leading to severe waste of resources. Another line of
criticism is that the demand for GRI services has changed and therefore the roles of
GRIs should be redefined. In response, the government downsized GRIs and
merged some of them to reduce overlaps. They then put GRIs under the jurisdiction
of MOST, in the hope of promoting interinstitutional flows of research personnel
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Even though the original objective for establishing the GRIs was to develop industrial
technologies together with the private sector, industrial-GRI research collaborations are
currently minimal. 
and resources.6 Along with this, they launched the National R&D Program and
enacted the Law for the Promotion of Government Research Institutes (1982), which
provided the legal base for GRIs. GRIs were transformed from industrial and tech-
nical research centers into institutions for government R&D.
After almost 20 years of operation, the criticisms of GRIs had not subsided, and in
the late 1990s, GRIs had to undergo another round of major reform and reorganiza-
tion. Reasons for the reorganization were that resources were being wasted because
of barriers to interinstitutional mobility that existed between and among GRIs. Also,
GRIs tended to work for the interests of their patrons (the ministries) rather than
those of the nation. This suggests that the reform of GRIs in the early 1980s failed to
accomplish its goals. The government again not only downsized GRIs, in terms of
both budget and personnel, but also redefined their functions and classified them
into three different groups that were put under three newly created research councils.
The research councils report directly to the prime minister’s office.7
In accordance with the amendment to the Framework Law for Scientific and
Technological Innovation, in 2004, the three research councils and their member
institutes were moved from the prime minister’s control and put under the NSTC
for better coordination. The GRIs’ R&D activities are now geared more to the devel-
opment of future-oriented technologies and technologies in the public domain, but
still the debates on the roles of GRIs have not come to an end. 
Universities
Universities are a rich pool of high-quality scientists and engineers. They have
about 60,000 highly qualified researchers, 38,000 of whom hold doctorates and
20,000 who have master’s degrees. Universities harbor more than 30 percent of the
total research force of Korea; however, doctoral level research scientists and engi-
neers are extremely concentrated in universities (72.3 percent; see table 7.2). 
Even though universities command the largest pool of qualified scientists and
engineers, they account for only 10.1 percent of the gross national R&D expenditures,
which is smaller than the combined share of GRIs and national labs (12.6 percent).
This reflects the situation of Korean universities and particularly that of research
environments. First, in many universities, professors cannot afford to engage in seri-
ous research because of excessive teaching obligations. Amazingly, the student-pro-
fessor ratio at Korean universities exceeds 34 to 1. Even at national universities, which
are in much better situations, the ratio stands at 29 to 1 (MOE & KEDI 1998). 
Second, many universities place more emphasis on teaching at the undergraduate
level, so graduate programs have not been well developed. Universities also are very
poor in research facilities, and university education is not linked to research. Kim
Young-Gul, an engineering professor, describes the situation: “Only a few academic
institutions in Korea provide anywhere near sufficient research support. In most uni-
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6. There were exceptions to this reform, and some GRIs were allowed to remain under
the patronage of individual ministries. 
7. Some GRIs were allowed to stay under MOST or other ministries if this was deemed
necessary for efficient operation. For example, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute is
under MOST, even after the reorganization.
versities, a newly recruited professor must start with an empty laboratory space and
very meager university support for expendable supplies and equipment” (1996).
Third, university professors are not put under pressure for research. Once
employed, they are almost automatically tenured. Even though they must meet
some requirements in order to stay at the teaching job, those could be met without
serious research efforts. Therefore, university research is very much concentrated in
a few top universities.
University R&D activities are more directed toward basic research than others
sectors’ (see table 7.5). Of the total R&D expenditures in universities in 2005, 35 per-
cent were devoted to basic research, 34 percent went to applied research, and 31
percent went to development. Naturally, universities rely more on the government
for research funds—85 percent of the university research funds are from the gov-
ernment. In 2005, about half of the funds were spent on engineering research,
whereas scientific research received only 19 percent. Other major areas are medical
science (16 percent) and agriculture (6 percent).
Overall, universities in Korea have not been as important in R&D as their for-
eign counterparts are. Various factors may be behind this, but the fundamental rea-
son is the extreme orientation of Korean universities toward teaching. To reorient
Korean universities toward becoming more research-oriented institutions, the gov-
ernment has taken various measures, including the BK21 program, which supports
selected universities in their transformation into research-oriented and graduate
education–oriented institutions. The MOE & HRD has been pouring W 90 billion
into the program every year since 1999. Universities also have been making efforts
to reform the education and research systems. BK21 and other government efforts
to upgrade university research and education have started to bear fruit in various
ways. Most significant is the growth of scientific publications, of which universities
are the major producers. Korea now ranks 15th in the world in terms of the number
of scientific publications, but what is more impressive is the fact that Korea
recorded the highest growth rate in science publication over the past decade. 
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Table 7.5 R&D Structure at Universities
1998 2000 2003 2005
12,650
R&D expenditure (11.2% of 15,619 19,327 2,398
(billion won) GERD) (11.3%) (10.1%) (9.9%)
Source of Government 52.1 60.4 75.1 84.6
fund (%) Industries 47.7 39.4 24.5 15.2
Foreign 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2
Type (%) Basic research 40.1 42.4 36.0 34.8
Applied research 33.8 30.5 32.8 34.4
Development 26.1 27.2 31.2 30.8
Areas (%) Sciences 18.5 20.0 18.9 18.9
Engineering 49.1 50.3 50.2 49.6
Agriculture 7.0 6.5 5.9 5.9
Medicine 17.6 11.4 16.3 16.0
Source: MOST.
Outcomes of R&D Activities
Evaluations of the results of the R&D efforts in Korea are mixed. Some critics say
that Korea’s R&D inputs, such as human resources and financial inputs, exceed
other countries’ but that its outputs lag way behind. Others say that R&D results
have not been effectively linked to industrial uses. All in all, the major criticism is
that Korea’s R&D investments have not been efficient enough to be economically
justified. Most of the criticisms are targeted at public research. However, those crit-
icisms are based on anecdotal evidence rather than formal analyses.8
Despite such criticisms, one cannot deny the positive contributions that the
R&D efforts have made. Rapid growth in R&D investment has led to a remarkable
increase in patent registration, both in Korea and abroad. The number of patents
granted by the Korea Industrial Property Office increased from 1,808 in 1981 to
49,068 in 2004, with an average annual growth rate of about 15 percent. What is
more encouraging is the growth of patents granted to Koreans. Only 12.8 percent of
the total patents registered in 1981 (232) were granted to Koreans, but the figure
rose to 72.6 percent in 2005, recording an average annual growth rate of more than
22 percent (see table 7.6).
Patents granted by the USPTO are sometimes used as an indicator of a nation’s
international technological competitiveness. Only five U.S. patents were granted to
Koreans in 1969, but that grew to 586 in 1992 and to 4,591 in 2005, which is equiva-
lent to 2.9 percent of all USPTO patents or 6.1 percent of USPTO patents granted to
non-U.S. entities for 2005 (figure 7.3). According to a patent analysis by the U.S.
Department of Commerce, Korea has established world prominence in technology
areas such as ICTs, pharmaceuticals, advanced materials, and automotive (Albert
1998). These advances indicate that Korea has been rapidly gaining in technological
competitiveness.
Another important development is the remarkable increase in the number of sci-
entific and technical articles published by Koreans in internationally recognized aca-
demic journals. Articles published by Koreans increased from only 27 in 1973 to 13,746
in 2003, which is relatively large compared to the other East Asian newly industrial-
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8. Two studies on the economic effects of R&D investments in Korea are Chung and Jang
(1993) and Nadiri (1993). The results in general support R&D investments, but the studies do
not provide any direct justification of R&D investments, such as costs and benefits of R&D. 
Table 7.6 Korean Patent Office: Patent Applications and Granted Patents
1981 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Applications National 1,319 2,703 9,082 59,236 72,831 122,188
Foreign 3,984 7,884 16,738 19,263 29,179 38,733
Total 5,303 10,587 25,820 78,499 102,010 160,921
Granted National 232 349 2,554 6,575 22,943 53,419
Foreign 1,576 1,919 5,208 5,937 12,013 20,093
Total 1,808 2,268 7,762 12,512 34,956 73,512
Source: Korea Patent Office.
ized economies (NIEs): 3,122 scientific and technical journal articles were published by
Singaporean authors, and the Taiwanese had 9,270 articles. However, note that when
the size of the population is taken into account, the Korean journal publication per-
formance becomes weaker when compared with the other NIEs (figure 7.4).
Figure 7.5 displays the KAM spidergram for innovation indicators using data for
Korea and the averages for the G7 and high-income countries for the most recent
year. As expected, Korea’s performance is at par with and even exceeds the high-
income country average for many of the indicators. Korea is particularly strong in sci-
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Figure 7.4 Scientific and Technical Journal Articles Published by East Asian Newly
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Figure 7.5 Innovation Indicators: Republic of Korea, G7, and High-Income Countries
Variable
FDI outflows as % of GDP, 2000–04 0.71 6.58 2.98 8.29 14.90 9.78
FDI inflows as % of GDP, 2000–04 1.04 1.89 2.23 3.90 14.46 9.58
Royalty and license fees payments 
   (US$/pop.), 2004 92.52 8.56 95.28 8.62 291.95 9.76
Royalty and license fees receipts 
   (US$/pop.), 2004 37.22 8.41 107.69 9.28 83.00 9.02
Science and engineering 
   enrollment ratio (%), 2004 41.09 9.88 21.59 4.24 23.79 5.76
Science enrollment ratio (%), 2004 10.25 5.35 8.80 3.81 10.76 5.99
Researchers in R&D/million 
   people, 2004 3,187.00 8.09 3,411.71 8.48 3,367.55 8.44
Total expenditure for R&D as 
   % of GDP, 2004 2.64 9.25 2.21 8.66 1.97 8.57
Manufacturing trade as % of 
   GDP, 2004 55.37 7.58 31.45 4.23 60.82 8.02
University-company research 
   collaboration, 2006a 4.60 8.28 4.64 8.49 4.30 8.02
Scientific and technical journal 
   articles/milion people, 2003 287.57 7.94 612.98 8.80 535.89 8.66
Availability of venture capital, 
   2006a 3.10 4.14 4.54 8.10 4.50 7.93
Patents granted by USPTO/
   million people, avg. 2001–05 88.44 8.86 146.45 9.43 86.64 8.84
High-tech exports as % of 
   manufacturing exports, 2004 32.80 9.34 19.67 8.16 17.69 7.87
Private sector spending on R&D, 
   2006a 5.10 9.22 4.91 9.14 4.43 8.06
Firm-level technology absorption, 
   2006a 5.90 8.97 5.51 8.06 5.48 7.87
Value chain presence, 2006a 5.50 8.25 5.83 8.82 5.15 8.07
Actual Normalized Actual Normalized Actual Normalized
Korea, Rep. of G-7 High income




Source: KAM, December 2006 (www.worldbank.org/wbi/kam).
a. Ratings are from 1 (worst) to 7 (best).
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ence and engineering enrollment, R&D expenditure, high-tech exports, and private
sector R&D spending, with these variables scoring above the 90th percentile. How-
ever, Korea shows some weak performance in three of the indicators: FDI inflows as
a share of GDP, science enrollment ratio, and the availability of venture capital.
R&D efforts also have contributed to the development of high-tech industries in
Korea. Because of their in-house R&D, Korean industries recently emerged as world
leaders in semiconductor memory chips, cellular phones, and LCDs and also estab-
lished themselves in the world market in the numerous areas such as shipbuilding,
home appliances, automobiles, and telecommunications, to name a few.
Supportive Measures for Industrial Technology Development
Overview
Korea has implemented various kinds of policy measures that aim to promote
industry’s technological activities. These measures can be broadly classified by
their characteristics into four schemes: NRDPs, infrastructural programs, institu-
tional support systems, and incentive systems (see table 7.7). The government’s
industrial technology policy has focused mostly on technology programs, and other
policy measures played a minor role. For example, as of 2000, the government as a
whole spent W 3 trillion on NRDPs, which accounted for 82 percent of the govern-
ment’s total R&D budget. To complement mission-oriented NRDPs, the govern-
ment has other policy measures intended to enhance technology diffusion and fill
the institutional gap between innovation actors. The list of policy tools for these
objectives includes educating and training research personnel, compiling and dif-
fusing technical information, encouraging establishment of cooperative R&D facil-
ities, and promoting spin-off activities from public research. The direct funding
from the government budget for GRIs is classified as institutional support. The
budget for GRIs is in general composed of two sources: on average, one-third of the
GRIs budget is funded directly by the government, and the rest is filled with rev-
enues from contract research projects that are mostly implemented under the name
of national R&D programs.9 Incentive measures are intended to induce and assist
private enterprises’ technology development activities. The measures include tax
exemption for firms’ R&D spending, financial support with preferential loans, and
subsidizing of technology development. 
Evolution of Korea’s Incentive Schemes for Industrial Technology Development
The first incentive measure, in which corporate tax was reduced or exempted for
FDI firms that satisfied a technology requirement, was applied in the early 1960s
(see table 7.8). Several incentive measures also were introduced during the 1970s. A
majority of supportive measures implemented during the latter period, however,
aimed to promote or facilitate technology transfer rather than internal R&D. The
list of incentives was considerably expanded or modified again during the 1980s.
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9. Institutional support funding enables GRIs to undertake more long-term, basic
research; contract research from NRDP are more mission-oriented.
The upsurge of incentive measures during this period was not accidental; rather, it
reflected the changes in private enterprises’ technological activities, which had acti-
vated in-house R&D at a much larger scale during the same period. Responding to
that trend, the government shifted its industrial policy to promoting in-house R&D
rather than importing technology. The change was formalized by the enactment of
the Industrial Development Law, which marked a turning point of industrial policy
from sectoral support to functional support. Since that time, the direction of incen-
tive policy has been moving toward more indirect incentives, such as emphasizing
construction of S&T infrastructure and human resources development. Further-
more, in accordance with the WTO’s subsidy rule, industrial policy emphasizes
R&D support while reducing conventional measures. 
Changes after the Financial Crisis
Quick Recovery of Industrial R&D
The financial crisis in 1997 and the restructuring efforts afterward have had an unex-
pected effect on Korean businesses. Profitability has become more important than
market expansion, and firms’ technological development spending is no exception.
Companies, particularly large firms, have endeavored to downsize and streamline
R&D laboratories in line with business restructuring. Large firms’ downsizing has
forced many R&D personnel to leave, and many of them have established small-
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Table 7.7 The Scheme of Korea’s Industrial Technology Policy
Infrastructure 
NRDPs and diffusion Institutional support Incentives
Objectives Develop Enhance intermediary Nurture GRIs Induce or assist 
core functions and fill the and strengthen private enter-
industrial gaps among innovation GRIs’ research prises’ technol-
technologies actors capabilities ogy develop-
ment activities
Tools Ministries’ Research personnel, Funding for Tax exemptions,
R&D technical information, GRIs’ opera- financial sup-
programs cooperative R&D tional expenses port, subsidy 
facilities, regional and basic for technology
R&D centers, spin-offs, research development
and so on
Effects Expand Facilitate diffusion Bring up Strengthen 
on knowledge and make better helper or industry’s own 
industry and the industry use of partner for technological 




Source: Author’s compilation. 
Table 7.8 Chronology of Major Technology Policies
Before 
the 1970s 1980s 1990s
1970s 1973 1974 1976 1977 1978 1979 1981 1982 1984 1986 1991 1992
R&D investment Technology development reserve funds system
promotion Tax credit or special depreciation for investment in equipment to develop technology and human resources
Duty abatement or exemption on goods for academic research
Tax credit for technology and human resources 
development expenses
Tax exemption for real estate of private
enterprises’ affiliated research centers






Technology Deduction and exemption of the corporate tax for the foreign investment accompanied by the technology requisite
transfer Reduction and exemption of tax amount on technology transfer income
promotion Income tax exemption for foreign technologists
Technology Provisional special consumption tax rate for 
commercial- technology commodities
ization Reduction and exemption of tax 
promotion for start-up venture SMEs
Source: MOST 1997c.
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Box 7.1 The Efficacy of Government Policies 
Despite the wide array of policy measures for industrial technology development, very
few studies have been done on policy effectiveness. Exceptionally, the late professor
Linsu Kim made persuasive judgments on three aspects of these: policies to create mar-
ket needs for technology development, policies to increase S&T capabilities, and poli-
cies to provide the link between demand and supply (Kim, L. 2003).
Demand-side policies can cover three areas: export promotion, competition policy,
and government procurement. Export promotion, by pushing firms into highly com-
petitive international markets, has been more influential than other policies in forcing
firms to expedite technological learning. Exporters also created capacity in excess of
local market needs to achieve economies of scale. This led to crises and forced them to
accelerate technological learning to maximize capacity use.
Competition policies also increased the need for technological effort. The govern-
ment enacted the Fair Trade Act in 1980 to prohibit unfair practices in the market and to
restrict the growth of the chaebols. At the same time, the government began to liberal-
ize the local market, bringing down tariff and nontariff barriers, thus forcing Korean
firms to compete against multinational firms not only in the export market but also in
the domestic market. In 1986, the government introduced legislation to protect intellec-
tual property rights, preempting the reverse engineering of foreign products. These
policies forced Korean firms to further intensify technological effort.
Government procurement is often mentioned in the literature as an important tool
in creating local demand for technological effort. However, except for significant gov-
ernment procurement of personal computers at the formative stage of that industry in
the early 1980s, this policy did not play a significant role in Korea in creating demand
for technological effort.
Major supply-side policies cover human resource development, technology transfer,
and domestic R&D. The formation of human resources enabled Korean industry to mas-
ter mature production technologies through reverse engineering in the early years.
However, the Korean government made a critical mistake in neglecting to invest in
research-oriented tertiary education in preparation for knowledge-intensive industries,
creating a major bottleneck in innovative technological learning in the 1990s. Korea
restricted reliance on FDI, enabling local firms to retain managerial independence and
allowing them to set the direction of technological learning. The government gradually
relaxed restrictions on licensing in the 1970s as Korean industries progressed into more
complex technologies. The government’s role in R&D was relatively small relative to
other countries, accounting for only about 20–25 percent of total R&D in the 1990s. The
government’s R&D was largely directed at keeping increasingly weaker GRIs afloat and
running mission-oriented national projects. Some national projects had significant
results, such as the development of electronic switching systems and Code Division
Multiple Access (CDMA) mobile telephone systems. In general, however, R&D policy
neglected diffusion-oriented projects such as upgrading the quality of tertiary educa-
tion and university research.
Preferential financing and tax incentives are the major instruments that lubricate the
links between demand and supply. The impact of the preferential financing on further-
ing R&D activities, however, is dubious. Its interest rates, ranging from 6.5 to 15 percent,
were far higher than similar loans in other countries. Tax incentives were another indi-
rect mechanism to make funds available for corporate R&D. Preferential financing and
tax incentives definitely provided funds for corporate R&D activities and lowered their
costs, but they were peripheral in promoting R&D in Korea. 
scale, specialized R&D laboratories or technology-based small firms. As shown in
figure 7.6, the number of corporate R&D centers increased rapidly after the financial
crisis, and most newly established corporate R&D centers are small.10
The increasing number of small-scale, specialized R&D centers or technology-
based small firms is changing the industry’s landscape. First, a direct effect is the
increases in SMEs’ R&D expenditure and intensity. Second, the existence of techno-
logically agile small firms will make changes in business relationships, particularly
between large firms and small firms. Table 7.9 compares SMEs’ and large enter-
prises’ changes in R&D expenditures and in number of researchers. SMEs’ total
R&D expenditures doubled between 1997 and 2000, whereas large enterprises’
increased by only 5 percent. The increases in total R&D expenditures reflect the fact
that the number of SMEs that spend on R&D activities is also sharply increasing, as
manifested by the sharp increases in the number of SME R&D centers. 
R&D intensity of SMEs, defined by the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales, also
increased from 2.8 percent in 1997 to 3.9 percent in 2005. In contrast, R&D intensity
of large enterprises increased only marginally from 2.07 percent in 1997 to 2.13 per-
cent in 2000. Therefore, not only are more SMEs spending on R&D, but also SMEs
are spending on more intense R&D activities than before the financial crisis. The
same observation and conclusion can also be applied to the case of researchers. Dur-
ing the period from 1997 and 2000, SMEs strengthened their R&D activities by dou-
bling the number of researchers (more than tripling the number with doctorates),
whereas the number of researchers used by large enterprises remained almost the
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10. In addition to the restructuring by large firms, other factors contribute to the increases
in small corporate R&D centers. Among these are the government’s drive to create venture
companies and changed capital market conditions for start-up companies.



























Source: Korea Industrial Technology Association 2006. 
same as before the crisis. 
The Role of Foreign-Owned Companies
Before the financial crisis, foreign-owned companies played a minor role in the
Korean economy. As shown in table 7.1, inward FDI had been quite low for many
years; before the financial crisis, foreign-owned companies played a minor role in
the Korean economy. This is more evident in technology and innovation issues. For
example, technology transfer in the private sector mostly went through licensing
contracts rather than FDI (OECD 1996). Also, technological activities of foreign-
owned companies are mostly centered on product modification to meet local
demand conditions. 
The situation changed drastically after the financial crisis of 1997 (figure 7.7).
FDI inflows into Korea increased sharply thereafter because of the favorable invest-
ment environment, depreciation in the local currency and asset values, the Korean
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Table 7.9 Changes in R&D Activities
R&D expenditure, in 
billion won (and as Researchers 
percentage of sales) (doctoral level)
1997 2000 2003 2005 1997 2000 2003 2005
SMEs 1,090.2 2,106.4 3,425.4 3,921.4 17,703 36,494 52,332 62,792
(2.82) (3.14) (3.57) (3.00) (474) (1,543) (2,291) N.A.
Large 7,755.1 8,148.2 11,084.2 14,642.9 56,990 57,839 71,698 91,514
enterprises (2.07) (1.81) (2.05) (2.13) (3,613) (3,878) (5,562) N.A.
Source: MOST, Survey of R&D Activities, various years.
N.A. not available.
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Source: United Nations, World Investment Report 2006.
government’s promotion of investment through deregulation, the increased num-
ber of company offerings as a result of corporate restructuring, and privatization of
government-owned companies (KPMG Consulting 2001). The effects of the FDI
increases on Korean industry’s technological activities are not easy to determine
because no comprehensive study has been done on the technology-related activi-
ties of foreign-owned companies. Instead, the effects can be inferred from changes
in the Korean economy. 
Table 7.10 shows the number of foreign-owned companies that spend on R&D,
classified by the share of foreign ownership. From 1997 to 2000, the number
increased from 329 to 462, a 40 percent increase in three years. In 2000, of the 462
companies, 333 were minority-owned foreign companies and the remaining 129
were majority-owned foreign companies. The total number of both foreign and
domestic companies spending on R&D also increased, showing a 30 percent increase
between 1997 and 2000. Therefore, the number of foreign-owned companies spend-
ing on R&D outpaced the number of domestic companies spending on R&D.
Clusters and the Regional Innovation System
As part of its industrialization, Korea has built many industrial complexes across
the country. The building of industrial complexes started from scratch at the begin-
ning of the industrialization process, because Korea is poorly endowed with natu-
ral resources and differences between localities’ industrial qualifications were
negligible. Population density might be a criterion: Seoul and its vicinity, as well as
other urban areas, have been favored as the industrial complexes, but otherwise,
great discrepancies exist across regions. According to the Korea Industrial Complex
Corporation (KICC 2005), as of 2004, Korea had 550 industrial complexes, which
host 34,083 companies and employ 1.2 million workers. The location of industrial
complexes is concentrated in two regions. The capital region (Seoul and its vicinity,
Inch’o˘n metropolitan area, and Kyo˘nggi province) has 41 percent of companies and
33 percent of workers, and the southeast region (cities of Pusan and Ulsan in south
Kyo˘ngsang province, and Taegu in nouth Kyo˘ngsang province) has 31 percent of
companies and 43 percent of employees. These two regions contain three-quarters
of Korea’s industrial complexes. 
The building of industrial complexes was intended to have synergistic effects by
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Table 7.10 Foreign-Owned Companies that Spend on R&D
Share of foreign ownership
Minority-owned Majority-owned 
(less than 50 percent) (50–100 percent) 100 percent Total
1995 236 23 15 274 (2,150)
1997 256 40 33 329 (2,522)
1999 287 97 61 445 (2,601)
2000 333 74 55 462 (3,269)
Source: MOST, Survey of R&D Activities, various years.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the total number of companies, both foreign and domestic, that
spend on R&D.
gathering individual firms and related supporting institutions in one place. Natu-
rally, industrial clusters mirror the regional distribution of industrial complexes;
however, the questions are whether the industrial clusters act as a mechanism for
interaction and learning, and what is expected from clusters. If well-connected,
industrial complexes are valuable assets for the development of innovation net-
works and clusters. But most of Korea’s industrial complexes do not act as a mech-
anism for interfirm networks and learning. Although various supporting
institutions aim to help resident firms, the frequency of use and the degree of satis-
faction with the services offered are less than expected. Also, only a small portion
of resident firms are doing collaborative R&D with other firms or innovators, such
as universities and GRIs.11
After their role as the drivers of industrialization over the past decades, indus-
trial complexes or industrial clusters in Korea now face a new challenge—to
become knowledge-based, technology-intensive centers of industrial activities. The
existence of an industrial base in a region greatly influences the nature of the eco-
nomic activities in that region. Together with other innovators and supporting insti-
tutions, industrial complexes can be the cornerstone of the regional innovation
systems. The question is whether the industrial base of a region can act as a learn-
ing mechanism for the region. 
Because the industrial activities and complexes differ, there are also differences
in the regions’ research capabilities. The capital region—Seoul, Inch’o˘n, and
Kyo˘nggi province—takes the lion’s share of Korea’s R&D resources, with the excep-
tion of Taejo˘n, where Daeduck Science Town is located (see figure 7.8). Recently the
Korean government started to develop innovation clusters and construct effective
regional innovation systems across the country. Of the government’s initiatives, the
most comprehensive one is the Regional Balanced Growth Plan. The basic concept
of the plan, which started in 2004, is to make regional economic development self-
sustaining and self-reliant for each region or province by combining research activ-
ities of university and public research institutions with industrial activities. Despite
some success stories (see box 7.2), there are many difficulties to overcome in achiev-
ing the goal of establishing self-sustaining regional innovation systems. The most
important of those tasks is the strengthening of research and innovation capabilities
in which local and regional universities are expected to play a key role. 
Conclusion and Policy Lessons
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Korean Innovation System
Korea has achieved enormous development in S&T over the past four decades. By
making continuous and massive investments in human resource development and
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11. Kim and Suh (2003) have detailed their analysis of Korea’s major industrial clusters:
the Daeduck valley in Taejo˘n; the Gumi electronics cluster, a biotechnology cluster in Kyo˘nggi
province; the Taegu textile industry, and the Chang-won machinery industry. All these
regional clusters have been assessed to determine whether they are acting as innovation clus-
ters. Most of Korea’s industrial custers receive negative assessments.
R&D, Korea succeeded in building up a unique innovation system in a technologi-
cally barren land. Some of the factors that have influenced the KIS most are (a) an
outward-looking development strategy, (b) an industry-targeting development
policy, (c) a large-firm-oriented industrial policy, (d) human resource development,
and (e) government-led S&T infrastructure building. These are also the sources of
the KIS’s strengths and weaknesses.
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Source: Courtesy of Dr. Young-Sub Kwon, Korea Research Institute for Human Settlement (KRIHS),
based on data from MOST (2004).
Some of the key determinants of Korea’s S&T and innovative capability are (a) an out-
ward-looking development strategy, (b) an industry-targeting development policy, (c) a
large-firm-oriented industrial policy, (d) human resource development, and (e) govern-
ment-led S&T infrastructure building.
The strength of the KIS is its dynamism, which is fueled by the government’s
strong commitment to technology-based national development and private enter-
prises’ efforts to gain technological competence. Despite the short history of R&D
in Korea, the country already has rich yields from the endeavor in the forms of
patents, scientific papers, and exports of various technology-intensive products
such as semiconductors, cellular phones, LCDs, and automobiles.
Yet there are problems, too. R&D activities in Korea have grown very rapidly,
led by private industries under the active promotion policy of the government.
Even though Korea spends a larger share of GDP on R&D than other countries, it
still lags far behind advanced industrial countries in terms of the absolute size of
R&D expenditures. 
Second, the discussions so far show that Korea has nearly reached the level of an
advanced country in terms of scientific and technological inputs, but it still has a
long way to go to reach the level of advanced countries in terms of R&D produc-
tivity. The most important source of inefficiency is the lack of interactions and
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Box 7.2 The Case of Wo˘nju Medical Equipment Cluster
Kangwo˘n province has been the most underdeveloped region in Korea. The industrial
activities of this province, with its mountains and high hills, are mostly centered on coal
mining and cement production, with some agricultural products in high mountain
areas. However, since 2002, the top export product of the province has changed from
cement to medical equipment because of the development of Wo˘nju Medical Equip-
ment Cluster (WMEC). The medical school of Yonsei University at the Wo˘nju campus in
Kangwo˘n initiated the concept of the WMEC: to combine university research and indus-
trial development. The Yonsei medical school has a medical engineering department
that has produced quality research and a large number of graduates for many years. The
concept began to materialize in 1996, when the Wo˘nju city government built a 10,000-
square-meter medical equipment production complex and tried to attract domestic
companies to the complex. The choice of location for the medical equipment complex
was not accidental. Medison Company, one of Korea’s leading companies in medical
equipment production, already operated a plant near Wo˘nju with a small number of
parts suppliers. 
The development of the WMEC has been undertaken in three ways: technology
development, business incubation, and production for the market. The Yonsei medical
school plays a key role in technology development. Yonsei University created a medical
equipment research center at its Wo˘nju campus and has actively participated in the
Wo˘nju Medical Equipment Technopark project, in which regional universities, includ-
ing the Yonsei medical school, Wo˘nju Chamber of Commerce, and Wo˘nju city govern-
ment work together as partners. The business incubation center, where new businesses
and new products are developed, is also a partnership project of these institutions,
including the Wo˘nju city government and local universities. The industrial complex
established by the city government hosts those already established companies that are
producing consumable products. 
The WMEC is a rare success story in Korea—creating new business by combining
university research and industrial development. Three things contribute the success of
the WMEC: the existence of quality research in the region, the financial support of the
local government, and active participation of the industry.
exchanges among the major actors of innovation, such as universities, research
institutes, and industries. Intersector mobility of scientists and engineers is
extremely low in Korea.
Third, the weakness in basic sciences poses a fundamental problem for the KIS,
because scientific capability determines the technological potential of a nation.
Because Korean R&D efforts have been overly devoted to industrial technology
development, basic scientific research has been neglected to a substantial extent.
The lack of a strong scientific base already limits technological progress in Korea. In
fact, the weakness in science results not just from the funding policy that favors
technology development but also from weak university research capability. There-
fore, strengthening the university research base poses a major policy challenge. 
Fourth, excessive reliance on private industries for R&D investments has made the
innovation system very vulnerable in two ways. On one hand, the system has placed
so much emphasis on applied R&D that it failed to build up the strong foundation
required for the long-term development of S&T. On the other hand, the R&D system
has responded too sensitively to changes in economic and business environments. For
instance, large Korean enterprises responded to the financial crisis of 1997 by cutting
their R&D spending by about 14 percent, destabilizing the R&D system. If the crisis
had continued for several more years, the whole system would have collapsed.
Fifth, despite Korean industries’ remarkable performance in technological
development, those industries harbor fundamental structural problems that have
to be redressed to sustain the technological dynamism. First, the extremely high
concentration of R&D activities poses a serious problem. High concentration means
that only a few large firms are actively involved in R&D. If this persists for long, it
will dichotomize Korean industries into technologically advanced and retarded
firms and sectors. This situation will result in reduced interfirm and interindustry
interactions, which are the key elements of innovation. The second problem is the
weakness of SMEs in R&D. This is important because even chaebols would not be
able to sustain competitiveness without technologically strong domestic SMEs. The
third problem is the insufficient interactions among industries, universities, and
GRIs. The lack of active interactions between R&D performers increases the gap
between public R&D and industrial needs.
Sixth, the industrial structure shows the weakness of upstream sectors, particu-
larly in the capital goods industry. This weakness is closely related to the predomi-
nance the chaebols, and the government’s industrial policy. In accordance with the
aggressive export-promotion policy that complements the limited domestic mar-
ket, the imported technologies are both mature in life cycle and of a kind that can
render economies of scale in production. Also, the production structure has cen-
tered on end products. Strengthening upstream industrial links is one of the most
urgent tasks for the Korean economy, but the speed of adjustment upstream into
capital goods needs to be balanced against (a) the competencies and strategies of
the chaebol, (b) opportunities for joint ventures with foreign suppliers, and (c) the
integration with foreign capital goods suppliers through international production
networks. Particularly in the era of rapid technological changes, when production
processes are fragmented and therefore much easier to expand using global pro-
duction networks (GPN), upgrading local suppliers’ technical and managerial skills
is very important (Ernst and Kim 2002). 
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By using the USPTO count of patents granted as an indicator of R&D produc-
tivity, figure 7.9 shows that Korea indeed has been slowly losing ground and being
overtaken by other economies with stronger innovation systems.
Lessons for Developing Countries
Korean experiences offer some lessons for policy makers responsible for education,
trade, and technology development in developing countries. There is no doubt that
education builds a nation’s ability to absorb new knowledge and technology. Edu-
cation gives rise to individuals’ initial tacit knowledge, which is an essential build-
ing block in technological learning. Therefore, the government should assume full
responsibility for taking measures necessary to promote human resource develop-
ment. For example, investing in education in advance, as Korea did in the 1960s
and 1970s, is essential in laying a foundation for industrial development. 
To help workers cope with changes in technology, the government should pro-
vide vocational and technical training or take steps to promote such training at
workplaces. As an economy becomes more advanced, technological competence
becomes a critical factor. To build up that competence, the economic decision mak-
ers must nurture high-caliber scientists and engineers who are capable of dealing
with the developments on the frontiers of S&T. In other words, advanced education
in S&T should come first in preparing for entrance into a developed world. In the
case of Korea, education and industrialization helped each other in sustaining and
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accelerating mutual development. Education made technological learning and
therefore industrialization possible, and industrialization enhanced the rate of
return on investment in education, further promoting demand for education.
Korea’s industrialization evolved from imitation to innovation. In the initial
stage, Korean industries attained technological capability through informal chan-
nels for technology transfer, such as production arrangements for OEM, reverse
engineering of imported machines, technical training as part of turnkey plant
importation, and so on. Contrary to the experiences of other developing countries,
FDI played a modest role in technological learning in the course of development in
Korea. To lay the initial technological foundation, many Korean industries resorted
to nonmarket processes, relying on the technological absorptive capacity of their
workers for technology acquisition. This approach enabled them to acquire tech-
nology at lower cost and maintain independence in business operations. But Korea
paid a great price for this: it had to abandon many of the technological opportuni-
ties that foreign direct investors might have offered. 
By adopting an outward-looking development strategy, the government drove
Korean industries out into the competitive international market, putting them
under great pressure to pursue technological learning or development. Korean
industries responded to such pressures by investing heavily in technology devel-
opment. By developing technological competence, they have been able to survive
international competition and establish world prominence in such high-technology
areas as telecommunications, semiconductor memory chips, LCDs, automobiles,
and shipbuilding. A protectionist policy may be effective in creating the initial mar-
ket opportunities for domestic industries, but if such a policy is prolonged, indus-
tries will develop immunity against market pressure for innovation. It may be for
this reason that export-oriented firms and economies achieved technological learn-
ing more rapidly than import-substituting firms and economies (Kim 1997).
In sum, Korea owes very much to its human resources and the outward-looking
development strategy for its achievements in technological development and
industrialization. Two major lessons form the Korean experiences: First, human
resources are the key to S&T development and thus to economic growth, and sec-
ond, nothing can better motivate private businesses to invest in technology devel-
opment than market competition. However, for Korea to sustain its past
development into the future, it has to further strengthen basic scientific research
capability and improve framework conditions for innovation, the core of which is
competitive markets.




Jean-Eric Aubert and Joonghae Suh
Lessons Learned
Korea is an example for developing countries in many ways. Admittedly, there are
unique aspects of the country that limit the direct applicability of lessons to be
derived:1 ethnic and cultural homogeneity, a strong Confucian tradition that places
high value on education, achievement and loyalty to the nation, a security threat,
and political leadership. In addition, some features of the country are typical of the
Asian model of development and growth, which cannot be easily replicated in
other cultures—among them, a strong state involvement in the orientation and
management of the economy, very high saving and investment rates, and an indus-
trial organization well-fitted to mass production. Nevertheless, there are a number
of key features of the Korean experience that illustrate how a country can gradually
build a KBE with approaches to follow and pitfalls to avoid.
Synchronizing the KE Pillars with Economic Development
Korea has been exemplary in developing each of the pillars of the knowledge econ-
omy at the level, type, and pace that complement the other KE pillars, and together
the KE pillars complemented the various stages of the economy’s development. For
example, in the 1960s, when the economy was starting out with subsistence agri-
culture and light manufacturing, the main focus of education was on providing
universal primary and secondary education. At the same time, the universal pri-
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1. Contrasting Korea-specific contexts and characteristics with other countries or coun-
try classifications will be useful for delineating the applicability of the Korean experiences.
Readers can refer to some earlier works. For example, using six factors of classifying coun-
tries, Ernst and O’Connor (1989) distinguish five developing country groups, among which
Korea belongs to first-tier Asian newly industrializing economies. Focusing on the role that
FDI played in building technological capabilities of various nations, Lall (2003) contrasts the
capability-building strategy of Korea and Taiwan (China) with the FDI-dependence strategy
of other countries, including China and Malaysia.
mary and secondary education of the labor force was also critical to the technology
assimilation efforts of the manufacturing industries. Similarly,  in the 1990s and
beyond, when Korea was deploying world-class industries in communications, IT,
and advanced electronics, there was the necessary expansion of the higher educa-
tion system to ensure an ample supply of workers with tertiary education for the
intensive R&D programs. At the same time, the modern and high-technology infor-
mation infrastructure was being established to facilitate the timely and prompt dis-
semination of information and knowledge from abroad and around the country. 
To reiterate, Korea developed the KE pillars by adopting a gradual, step-by-step
approach that emphasized coordination and complementarities among the various
KE pillars, and also with the country’s stage of economic development and indus-
trialization. In the early years, these complementarities took place even without an
explicit KE agenda. The KE approach is thus important in minimizing mismatches
in terms of quantity and type in any of the KE pillars and hence reducing misallo-
cations and wastage of the extremely scarce resources of any developing country.
Education, Human Resource Development, and Lifelong Learning
Education builds a nation’s ability to absorb new knowledge and technology,
because it gives rise to individuals’ basic competence, which is an essential build-
ing block in technological learning. Therefore, the government should assume full
responsibility for taking the measures necessary to promote human resource devel-
opment. For example, investing in primary and secondary education in advance, as
Korea did in the 1960s and 1970s, is essential in laying a foundation for industrial
development. In addition, to help workers cope with changes in technology, the
government should also provide vocational and technical training and constant
retraining, or take steps to promote such training at workplaces.
As an economy becomes more advanced, technological competence becomes a
critical factor. Building that competence requires high-caliber scientists and engi-
neers who are familiar with the developments on the frontiers of S&T. More specif-
ically, advanced education in S&T should come first in preparing for entrance into
a developed world. In the case of Korea, education and industrialization were
mutually complementary in sustaining and accelerating mutual development. Edu-
cation made technological learning, and therefore industrialization, possible, and
industrialization enhanced the rate of return on investment in education, further
promoting demand for education.
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The KE approach emphasizes a gradual, step-by-step coordinated and complementary
development of the various KE pillars synchronized with the country’s stage of eco-
nomic development.
Education is an essential building block in technological learning. Therefore, govern-
ments should invest in all levels of education, with priorities and sequencing to depend
on the stage of economic development and industrial strategy.
Technological Adoption and Innovation
Korea’s industrialization evolved from imitation to innovation. At the initial stage,
Korean industries attained technological capability through informal channels for
technology transfer, such as production arrangements for OEM, reverse engineer-
ing of imported machines, and technical training as part of turnkey plant importa-
tion. These practices were necessarily coupled with strong reliance on the
technological absorptive capacity of the workers. Thus, contrary to the experiences
of other developing countries, FDI played a modest role in technological learning
in the course of development in Korea. These channels of informal technology
transfer enabled Koreans to acquire technology at lower cost and maintain inde-
pendence in business operations. However, this independence probably came at a
significant price because Korea had to abandon many of the technological oppor-
tunities that foreign direct investors would have offered.
Today Korea continues to import a significant amount of technology and know-
how from abroad, but it has developed a strong indigenous R&D platform and
spends almost 3 percent of its GDP on R&D. These approaches for education and
technology illustrate both the pragmatism and the discipline that should inspire
developing countries in their knowledge efforts. As a whole, it is estimated that for
Korea, TFP growth, including knowledge-related contributions, accounted for
more than two-thirds of the growth of GDP per capita over the period 1960–2005
(see figure 1.3). This demonstrates the need for accumulating not only physical cap-
ital but also intellectual capital for successful takeoff and growth.
Market-Oriented Role of the State
One of the most important lessons from Korea’s economic development process is
the necessity of a market-oriented approach for the transformation to a knowledge
economy. Korea’s economic success was not based on policies that substituted for
the market. Instead, the success of Korea’s development policies up to 1997 was the
result of policies that complemented and facilitated the functioning of the market.
However, a contributing factor in the 1997 financial crisis was the continued dis-
cretionary resource allocation on the part of the government in the early 1990s. This
had resulted in a very weak financial sector that was saddled with large debts from
the bankrupt chaebols. The financial crisis thus showed the limitations of the gov-
ernment’s market intervention and underscored the importance of a market-based
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Advanced education in S&T should come first in preparing for entrance into a devel-
oped world.
Korea opted for a technology assimilation strategy through informal channels to main-
tain independence, but by doing so, it is likely to have forgone technological opportu-
nities that foreign direct investors would have offered.
approach for sustained economic development. A market-based approach requires
the existence of competitive forces and, as such, policies that in one way or another
foster competition. Transparency of financial markets, accountability of the gov-
ernment, a level playing field for all market participants, liberalized trade, and for-
eign investment regimes are all crucial characteristics of a market-based knowledge
economy.
Export-Led Industrialization
By adopting an outward-looking development strategy, the government exposed
Korean industries to competition in the global market, which compelled them to
invest heavily in technological assimilation and innovation to remain competitive.
This was true in the 1970s and 1980s, when Korea developed its heavy industries.
This outward-looking development strategy was complemented by intensive
development of government R&D programs and strong fiscal incentives for the
firms in the early 1980s. More recently, stimulated by the same strategy, the result-
ing increases in competitiveness have enabled Korean firms to gain significant
shares in global markets in high-technology areas such as telecommunications,
semiconductor memory chips, and LCDs. Protectionist policies may be effective in
creating initial market opportunities for domestic industries, but they eventually
lead to complacency in terms of innovation because of the lack of exposure to com-
petitive forces.
The Pivotal Role of the Government
The Korean government has played a very significant role throughout the entire
development process. Since the beginning of the industrialization process, Korea’s
visionary government provided effective leadership that ensured a stable and con-
ducive macroeconomic environment, providing mass education and training of the
population, encouraging the assimilation of foreign technologies and developing a
domestic R&D initiative, and establishing an accessible and modern information
infrastructure. As the economy developed and became larger and more complex, it
was best to leave economic activities to market forces, and the government conse-
quently adopted a less-direct interventionist approach and changed its role to that
of an architect and regulator. 
One characteristic of the Korean government that deserves special recognition is
its long-term fiscal prudence, which allowed the government to implement a series
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A market-based development strategy liberates competitive forces that are crucial for
mechanics of the knowledge economy.
An effective, visionary government is critical to the implementation of a KE approach to
long-term economic development.
of post-1997 economic reforms even though it had incurred astronomical costs. Ini-
tiatives such as removing NPLs and recapitalizing financial institutions, establish-
ing social programs such as unemployment insurance, and providing financial
support for low-income families required public funds and contributed to enor-
mous fiscal pressures. However, because of its long history of fiscal prudence and
financial credibility, the Korean government was not saddled with public debt and
was able to issue new bonds to finance the necessary reforms.
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Build a National Consensus
Because the KE approach is broad, in that it permeates many areas of the economy
and involves many actors, it is important to use both top-down and bottom-up
approaches to build a national consensus and achieve a set of coherent strategies
across the different of parts of the government, the private sector, and civil society.
Top-down and bottom-up approaches are both key for successful reform processes.
In the case of Korea, the sensitization of the society as a whole, including opinion
leaders and politicians, to the notion of the knowledge economy had begun before
the 1997 crisis as a bottom-up initiative of the Maeil Business Newspaper, the princi-
pal business newspaper in Korea. Before the crisis, the paper’s management had
organized policy forums that introduced the concept of the knowledge economy
and highlighted its benefits, and the public was informed of the basics of the KE
approach. The 1997 crisis may have actually energized existing KE awareness cam-
paigns, which led to the government finally initiating its top-down approach—the
government sought policy evaluations and advice from international organizations
on the KE approach. Thus, in 2000, a report was jointly prepared by the World Bank
and the OECD: Korea and the Knowledge-Based Economy: Making the Transition. The
report inspired subsequent government plans. In a typical Korean manner, all con-
cerned government departments were mobilized to elaborate new policy measures
with quantified objectives and budget estimates for implementing those measures.
Meanwhile, to maintain and enlarge the KBE mobilization, the Maeil Business News-
paper has pursued its awareness actions toward varied target groups: business, civil
servants, households, children, and even prisoners.
Indeed, without the resulting national consensus, efforts to reform and restruc-
ture the Korean economy would likely have been unsuccessful, because institu-
tional reforms inevitably invoke resistance from vested interests, which frequently
retards the reform process. For example, the legalizing of layoffs was made possi-
ble only through dialogues among the government, the private sector, and the labor
unions, all of whom shouldered a portion of the costs associated with labor reform.
No doubt there are specific features of Korean society that have facilitated its rapid
adhesion to the KE concept. However, the general concept of a simultaneous top-
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Because the KE approach permeates many areas of the economy and involves many
actors, it is important to use both top-down and bottom-up approaches to build a
national consensus and achieve a set of coherent strategies across the different of parts
of the government, the private sector, and civil society.
down, bottom-up approach is one that warrants the consideration of policy makers
implementing economy-wide strategies.
Recovery from the 1997 Crisis
The 1997–98 Asian financial crisis was particularly strong in the Republic of Korea
because of the vicious circle of the insolvent financial system and its significant
amount of NPLs to the chaebols, and the consequent capital flight. The situation
was created by the traditional opacity that characterizes the Korean financial sys-
tem—as well as other Asian systems—and by the nature of the relationships that
linked big industry (chaebols) to the government and the banking system. Mea-
sures to improve the transparency of financial markets, ameliorate corporate gov-
ernance, and introduce more competition into the economy contributed to the
recovery process. Meanwhile, the government adopted a less-direct interventionist
approach and changed its role to become more an architect and a regulator.
However, Korea did not respond by using only traditional financial and eco-
nomic policies. It also put into place a vigorous KE approach to boost the economy
after the crisis to recover a high-growth path. In fact, since the early 1990s, there had
been increasing signs of the gradual loss of industrial competitiveness and the need
to adapt the economy to the rapid globalization process. An exhaustive plan
inspired by the goal of a KBE was elaborated. Actions orchestrated by MOFE and
financially supported by the Ministry of Budget and Planning were launched in
several directions: ICTs, education, and innovation with clear targets to be reached.
Most of the objectives, but not all, were reached as planned. This two-pronged
approach—financial- and knowledge-based—has been effective. Although the rate
of unemployment rose to more than 10 percent in 1998, it came down to less than 5
percent four years later.
Successful Reforms and Initiatives
After several years of reforms, the government can clearly claim success in two pol-
icy areas of the four-pillar framework. First, the overall financial system has been
put in order and NPLs have been cleaned up. Of course, it was very costly for tax-
payers, but the situation was rapidly and significantly improved, and trust came
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The general concept of a simultaneous top- down, bottom-up approach is one that war-
rants the consideration of policy makers implementing economy-wide strategies.
Every country needs to have sound economic fundamentals if it wants to succeed as a
KBE.
The combination of financial, economic, and knowledge-based reforms contributed to
the rapid recovery of the Korean economy after the 1997 crisis.
back quickly for both domestic and foreign investors. Undertaking reforms was
vital to regain the economy’s global competitiveness and recover a growth path,
which explains why the measures were quickly implemented and generally met
relatively little resistance. Some aspects of the reforms that were not so vital, such
as those concerning corporate governance or the control of industrial power, were
less successful or less actively pursued.
Another very impressive achievement is the development of the telecommu-
nications infrastructure and the IT industry. In fact, Korea, like other Asian coun-
tries, enjoys a natural easiness with the hard dimension of technology and invests
massively in telecom lines, Internet equipment, multimedia, and so forth. Invest-
ment in IT infrastructure and its use in non-IT sectors has positively contributed
to the productivity growth in Korea (see table 5.6). The Korean policy was articu-
lated on three key areas: a very active informatization policy (setting up e-gov-
ernment, bridging the digital divide, and building an advance infrastructure), an
industrial policy (oriented toward R&D, human resources, and venture capital),
and a clearly enforced regulatory and competition policy (privatization and mar-
ket liberalization). Integrating the three policy areas in a complementary manner
has been the key for the success of the overall IT strategy, and it is a lesson that
could inspire policy makers worldwide, in both developing and developed coun-
tries. Korean society today enjoys highly well-developed information infrastruc-
tures,2 which have become the basis of the exceptional development of related
industries.
Challenges
Korea has made substantial progress in numerous dimensions related to the
knowledge economy. However, there are some areas still that require further
reform before Korea can continue its transformation into an advanced knowledge
economy.
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A well-functioning and credible financial system is vital to the global competitiveness of
the economy. Korea has successfully implemented reforms and restored public confi-
dence in the financial system.
The success of Korea’s IT strategy hinged on the implementation of a well-integrated
approach involving an active informatization policy, an industrial policy, and a clearly
enforced regulatory and competition policy.
2. Until recently, Korea has recorded sizable deficits in TBOP (technology balance of pay-
ments): US$2.4 billion in 2003. Korea’s TBOP payments in 2003 were US$3.2 billion, which
amounts to 20.2 percent of GERD (OECD 2005c).
Modernizing the Education System for the Knowledge Economy
Korea’s education and human resources development system has been a driver of
productivity growth over the high-growth years, but it now faces a challenge to
substantially upgrade its quality and build a more-open system. For example,
Korea’s share of professional and technical workers within the labor force is far
lower than the average of G-7 countries,3 which implies that there is further poten-
tial for productivity improvement when the government makes an effort to
upgrade the employment structure. Public spending on education needs be
increased to a level comparable to that in other OECD countries, and the quality
and availability of management education also need further improvement. 
Education and training in Korea are still being largely provided in a routine
way, which poses significant challenges as Korea now enters the information and
knowledge era. Teacher-centered, one-way teaching; rote memorization, the lack of
diversity in educational programs; and preoccupation with preparing for entrance
exams have left little leeway to nurture creativity and initiative, which are neces-
sary qualities of a workforce in a vibrant knowledge economy. Measures were
announced in the 2000 KE master plan to reform the education system, but progress
so far remains modest.
The low profile of public education creates problems in human resources sup-
ply. According to an opinion survey of executives on the usefulness of university
education, Korea ranked 50th among 61 countries, showing that Korean universi-
ties failed to sufficiently meet the needs of the economy (IMD 2006). As a partial
consequence of noncreative Korean graduates, strategic partnerships among uni-
versities, private corporations, and research institutions are weak, with little partic-
ipation in joint research projects and a significant loss of opportunity for indigenous
research and development.
Meanwhile the competitive nature of the education system has been reinforced,
and as a consequence, private schools have flourished, funded by families exces-
sively engaged in getting their children into elite establishments from an early age.
This trend contributes to increased inequality in Korean society. In fact, an impor-
tant group in the resistance to change was the teachers themselves, including those
at the primary and secondary levels. The reforms would work better if teachers
were asked to participate in the process not as the victims of the reform but as the
beneficiaries in the long run. In many countries, the education systems prove to be
the most difficult part of society to reform. Korea has not been an exception to this
rule.
174 Korea as a Knowledge Economy
3. See the appendix in chapter 1 and figure 6.5.
The dated Korean education system has yet to evolve to be able to deliver workers with
initiative and creative talents and capable of meeting the new skill and knowledge
requirements of the knowledge economy. 
Efforts to enhance the quality of human resources without reforming the educa-
tion system have inevitable limits. To nurture creativity and independent thinking,
the government intends to completely abandon the current rigid and bureaucratic
school system and work to create a whole new educational environment that can
meet the diverse demands and views of parents and students (Government of the
Republic of Korea 2004). The new system would allow greater autonomy of indi-
vidual schools and local administrations as well as enable students to have diverse
choices regarding their education. The new system will put an end to rigid govern-
ment control over higher education’s curricula, examination system, tuition fees,
and number of students in each discipline. In particular, this change would allow
higher education institutions to become more entrepreneurial, accountable, and
responsive to industrial needs. The education reform agenda also includes improv-
ing the quality of faculty, curricula, and teaching techniques while strengthening
support for the underperforming students and the economically disadvantaged
group.
In addition to the changes associated with the new education system, further
reforms are needed if the Korean education system is to fully meet the needs of the
knowledge economy. More specifically, three-party collaboration among govern-
ment, universities, and industry is needed to encourage universities to proactively
respond to the new demands of the economy.4 For example, universities should use
their specialty areas to develop innovative programs that cater to industrial needs.
Another area that needs a concerted effort from the government and industry is the
establishment of a more efficient system of job training. For workers to stay in touch
with rapid technological advances, formal links are needed between higher educa-
tion institutions and other forms of education and training, such as adult educa-
tion, job training, and employer-based training. In particular, lifelong education
should be strengthened. Currently only 19 percent of Korean adults participate in
lifelong education, which is low compared with the 35 percent average for the
OECD countries (OECD 2005c). 
Diversification and Coordination within the Innovation System
The innovation and S&T system is another area in which progress has been diffi-
cult. Although Korea has experienced dramatic increases in R&D efforts, the inno-
vation system still has significant issues to resolve. For example, a
disproportionately large amount of R&D is conducted by the private sector, partic-
ularly by the chaebols. This has made the innovation system in Korea vulnerable in
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Experience around that world has shown that it is always very challenging to imple-
ment reforms of education systems. However, reforms have a higher probability of suc-
ceeding if teachers are asked to participate in the reform process, not as the victims of
the reform but as the beneficiaries in the long run.
4. The New Industry-Academia Collaboration System that is currently being designed
is a step in the correct direction.
two ways. First, applied R&D have been overemphasized and insufficient resources
have been devoted to R&D in basic sciences, which is a necessary investment for
the long-term development of S&T. 
A second disadvantage is the small number of chaebols dominating industrial
innovation activities, which is the problem associated with the domestic diffusion of
innovation. The internal diffusion of technological innovation is not very active in
Korea. The lack of technological diffusion among domestic firms is well demon-
strated by the fact that repetitive importation of foreign technologies is common. Fur-
thermore, the diffusion from research institutions to private firms is not as effective as
expected. More organic cooperation between domestic firms, particularly between
large firms and SMEs, and more active collaboration between research institutions
and private firms are imperative for the technological advancement of the Korean
knowledge economy. In this regard, positive signs of change have been seen since the
financial crisis, such as the emergence of innovation networks between conglomer-
ates and SMEs (Suh 2003). Korea needs to sustain this trend.
Related to this situation, efforts to improve the relevance and importance of the
other institutions in the innovation system have been largely deemed unsuccessful.
GRIs, although sources of important technological progress in certain sectors such
as telecoms, have not adequately evolved despite repeated attempts to make them
more collaborative with industries. Korean universities have not been able to suffi-
ciently respond to the industries, in terms of providing both appropriate human
resources and relevant and collaborative industrial research. University research
remains at a low level of activity and performance, with few resources (10 percent
of national R&D expenditures), even though it employs the bulk of doctorate hold-
ers (70 percent of the national total). Interactions between the different innovation
actors are still poorly developed, so it is in this sense excessive to speak of an inno-
vation system. On top of that, mediocre coordination persists at the top level.
MOST, which is responsible for ensuring coordination among the different institu-
tions, has difficulty involving other key partners, such as the Ministries of Industry
and Labor and MOE & HRD, in a coherent strategy. These difficulties persist even
though the S&T minister’s status was raised to deputy prime minister and the
National S&T Council was convened to gather all key ministers concerned.
For a national innovation system to be effective, it must tap into global knowl-
edge, and foreign investment could have played an important role. However, Korea
kept foreign investments at arm’s length to maintain independence. This stand-
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A disproportionately large amount of Korean research and development is being con-
ducted by the private sector, resulting in insufficient R&D investment in basic sciences
and weak domestic diffusion.
Efforts to improve the relevance and importance of GRIs and universities in the inno-
vation system have not been successful. In addition, interactions between the different
innovation actors are still poorly developed, despite the efforts of MOST and the con-
vening of the National S&T council.
alone strategy will not be effective in the current globalized knowledge economy.
Therefore, technological cooperation between domestic firms and foreign firms
needs to be aggressively promoted. In the past, the Korean economy has benefited
from the inflow of advanced foreign technologies via informal channels. Now, new
modes of cooperation, such as cross-licensing and strategic alliances, need to be
used more. Facing rapid changes in technological opportunities and the expansion
of globalization, private enterprises need to strengthen the development of human
resources and international R&D networks.
These challenges in the education and innovation pillars of the Korean economy
have persisted for some time. For example, the problems with the innovation sys-
tem were pointed out in an OECD S&T policy review in 1995 (OECD 1996), and
they have yet to be resolved, despite the drastic economic crisis experienced by the
country and subsequent economy-wide reforms. Korea may encounter further dif-
ficulties in maintaining its current rate of economic growth if appropriate, concrete
steps are not taken to promptly and properly resolve these issues.
Polarization of Korean Society
Another challenge facing the Korean economy is that the economic development
has not been balanced across the different sectors of the economy, and the benefits
of economic growth have not been trickling down to all household groups. Thus,
economic inequality among different household groups has increased since the
1990s. This polarization has been amplified by the 1997 recession and takes place in
several dimensions. For example, workers in the manufacturing sector are earning
significantly more than workers in the service sectors, and workers in large enter-
prises (300 or more employees) are economically better off than those in SMEs. Sim-
ilar disparities are observed between workers in the HCIs and those in the light
manufacturing industries, between those in and those not in the IT sector (as dis-
cussed in chapter 5), and between permanent and contractual workers. 
Two initiatives are being implemented by the government in an effort to achieve
more balanced economic development across the different parts of the economy:
first, the promotion of the SME sector, and second, the economic regionalization
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For a national innovation system to be more effective, it must tap into global knowl-
edge. A stand-alone strategy in the current globalized economy is doomed to be inef-
fective. Therefore, technological cooperation between domestic firms and foreign firms
needs to be aggressively promoted, so that Korean firms can participate in and benefit
from international R&D networks.
Economic development in Korea has not been balanced across the different sectors of
the economy, and the economic benefits have not been trickling down to all household
groups, resulting in increased income inequality.
process. Korea is showing encouraging signs on both. For example, the SMEs sec-
tor has shown a significant increase in R&D. This is concomitant with the develop-
ment of venture capital businesses, boosted in the early 2000s. Moreover, a
significant number of industrial clusters are being formed around the country that
present promising opportunities for diversification and decentralization of activi-
ties away from the national capital.
The negative effects of high levels of income inequality on economic growth and
political stability have been well documented in the literature; therefore, efforts to
address this social issue need to be continued and expanded before income inequal-
ity becomes a hindrance to long-term economic growth.
Conclusion
Korea’s design and implementation of knowledge-based development strategies
and the resulting rapid and sustained knowledge-led economic growth over the
past four decades provide a wealth of valuable policy lessons for other developing
economies. First, and particularly important, are the coordinated and complemen-
tary expansion of the four pillars of the KE framework—economic incentive and
institutional regimes, educated and skilled workers, an effective innovation sys-
tem, and modern and accessible information infrastructure—that evolved in tan-
dem with the economy’s various stages of development. These pillars provided the
economy with the necessary means to effectively acquire and use knowledge to
improve productivity and enhance long-term economic growth. Second, the strong
and effective leadership provided by the government, which led to the coordinated
development of the education, innovation, and ICTs pillars, was particularly impor-
tant during the earlier stages of industrialization, when appropriate institutions to
coordinate an economy-wide development agenda were not yet sufficiently estab-
lished. The role of Korean government has appropriately mellowed in recent times
to allow the market to further spur economic activity. Third, the economy-wide
reforms and the array of policy measures that were implemented after the 1997 cri-
sis serve as good examples of making the best use of opportunities to improve eco-
nomic conditions. The government initiated the formalization of the action plan,
which was orchestrated by MOFE, but also sought support from the civil society
and some media groups. One outcome of those measures was the successful wiring
of the Korean economy and the public, resulting in a first-class information infra-
structure.5 And fourth were the exemplary ways in which the educational basis has
been built and gradually expanded and the way technology has been gradually
mastered and upgraded throughout the stages of industrialization.
Although Korea has made these advances, it needs to continue and increase
efforts in reforming its higher education and innovation systems. These pillars have
not sufficiently evolved in recent years to meet the demands of the current global
economy, in part as a result of several pockets of resistance inherent in the Korean
society and culture. In addition, a more proactive policy response is required to
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5. For example, in 2004, 86 percent of Korean households had a broadband connection
via a computer or mobile phone, the highest record among OECD countries (OECD 2005d).
achieve more-balanced economic development across the different sectors and
niches of the economy. Concrete steps to resolve these issues will eventually
become critical to Korea’s continued transition to the knowledge economy and fur-
ther sustained economic growth. To sum up these four decades of change, it has
been easier to invest in hard infrastructure than to change mentalities, traditions,
and institutional behaviors rooted in culture and history. This is not a new insight;
most, if not all, societies must endure this painful experience. Only by seeking a bet-
ter understanding of a country’s unique features and inner functioning can its cul-
tures truly progress. 
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